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This thesis consists of several independent papers in population ethics. I
begin in Chapter I by critiquing some well-known ‘impossibility theorems’,
which purport to show there can be no intuitively satisfactory population
axiology. I identify axiological vagueness as a promising way to escape or at
least mitigate the effects of these theorems. In particular, in Chapter II, I
argue that certain of the impossibility theorems have little more dialectical
force than sorites arguments do. From these negative arguments I move to
positive ones. In Chapter III, I justify the use of a ‘veil of ignorance’, starting
from three more basic normative principles. This leads to positive arguments
for various kinds of utilitarianism – the best such arguments I know. But
in general the implications of the veil depend on how one answers what I
call ‘the risky existential question’: what is the value to an individual of a
chance of non-existence? I chart out the main options, and raise some puzzles
for non-comparativism, the view that life is incomparable to non-existence.
Finally, in Chapter IV, I consider the consequences for population ethics
of the idea that what is normatively relevant is not personal identity, but
a degreed relation of psychological connectedness. In particular, I pursue
a strategy based in population ethics for understanding the controversial
‘time-relative interests’ account of the badness of death.
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Introduction
This thesis consists of several independent papers on population ethics. This
integrative chapter provides a thematic overview and points out a few of
the many loose ends which I may address in future work. Since each later
chapter is self-contained, I will keep these comments brief and work in broad
strokes. (The one substantial argument is my criticism of Parfit’s Imprecise
Lexical View, starting on page 7.)
What is Population Ethics?
The fundamental question of population ethics is how we should take into
account people whose very existence depends on our choices. This is impor-
tant because practically everything we do has an effect, or a chance of an
effect, on both how many people and which people eventually exist.
One of the main choice-points can be made vivid by considering the
possibility of human extinction. Suppose that, if we did nothing, the Earth
would be vaporised next year, killing everyone painlessly. Suppose we have
a way of completely avoiding this catastrophe, ensuring that humanity will
continue on as expected for a thousand generations. (Just for simplicity, I will
ignore animal life, and assume that future people by and large will have good
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lives.) But avoidance has a cost: it will impose on each person currently alive
a period of suffering slightly worse for each one than the prospect of painless
death. Does the current generation have a moral obligation, in such a case,
to endure great suffering and thus ensure the existence of future generations?
If so, what is the nature and the strength of this obligation?
In thinking about this case there are two competing principles. One,
which I call the principle of neutrality, is aptly summarised by the thought
that ‘We are in favour of making people happy, but neutral about making
happy people’ (Narveson, 1973, p. 80). It is far from clear how best to make
sense of this initially attractive thought. But one obvious reading is that
there are no moral reasons to ensure the existence of future generations, and
very strong moral reasons to avoid present suffering worse than death. On
balance we should accept annihilation.
The competing principle is that more is better: more good lives means,
in particular, more good. (See, for example, Huemer (2008, §6).) We must
ensure survival when the very existence of so many good lives, and so much
good, is at stake, at almost any cost to the few billion people presently alive.
Impossibility Theorems
Both of these principles face intuitive and theoretical difficulties. For one
thing, different people seem to have strongly opposed intuitions about the
importance of avoiding extinction. More generally, though, a number of
‘impossibility theorems’ have appeared that show that it is difficult to reconcile
various intuitive criteria. These theorems are the subject of Chapters I and
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II, although they also have some bearing on Chapters III and IV.
Broadly speaking, the problem with the principle of neutrality is that it
is hard not to make it too strong. We end up being neutral about too many
things. For example, we might end up being neutral about ‘making happy
people’ even when it benefits already existing people. (This violates a criterion
called ‘Dominance Addition’, in the terminology of Arrhenius (2013).) Or
we might end up neutral between creating good lives and creating bad ones.
(This violates a version of ‘Non-Sadism’.) Chapters III and IV of this thesis
are oriented towards problems of this sort.
In contrast, Chapters I and II are largely concerned with difficulties faced
by the principle that more is better. (To put it another way, in my discussion
of the impossibility theorems, I largely take it for granted that a theory of
population ethics should satisfy such conditions as Dominance Addition and
Non-Sadism mentioned above.) The most famous difficulty of that sort is
expressed by the so-called ‘Repugnant Conclusion’ (Parfit, 1986): for any
world full of wonderful lives, it would be better, all else equal, to have a
world of sufficiently many lives that are barely good at all. This conclusion,
considered unacceptable by many, is certainly suggested by the principle that
more is better – and indeed it turns out to be difficult to avoid.
Vagueness and Lexicality
Following a general evaluation of the impossibility theorems in Chapter I,
I identify axiological vagueness as a promising way to mitigate their impact.
The reason is that many of the impossibility theorems are formally akin to
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sorites arguments. This point has been noticed before, but not properly
spelled out. I claim that once it has been spelled out, it is difficult to dismiss.
That is the argument of Chapter II.
One project which I have had to leave for another occasion is to map out
more completely the space of theories that are left over, given this response to
the impossibility theorems. As it is, I have relied on some toy models to illus-
trate the mechanics and the internal consistency of the view. Unfortunately,
these models do not seem very promising in themselves, so some pessimism
is still warranted. Let me explain why.
Derek Parfit has recently advocated a view of the same kind, and since
I did not have an opportunity to discuss his view directly in the main text,
I may as well use it as the example here. His ‘Imprecise Lexical View’ is
characterised by two statements.
[1] Anyone’s existence is in itself good if this person’s life is
worth living. Such goodness has non-diminishing value…[1]
[2] If many people exist who would all have some high quality of
life, that would be better than the non-existence of any number
of people whose lives, though worth living, would be, in certain
ways, much less good. (Parfit, 2016, p. 112)
The first statement is a natural strengthening of the thought that more is
better. The second statement is a denial of the Repugnant Conclusion. So
1The sentence continues: ‘so if there were more such people, the combined goodness of
their existence would have no upper limit’. But I am not sure what he means by this, given
the part of the view quoted next.
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there are not many overt commitments here. Nonetheless, the view so
expressed faces serious problems.
Let A be the world in which many people exist with a high quality of life,
and Z a world with even more people but whose lives are barely worth living.
Let Z+ be like Z, but with ten times as many people. Imagine a scenario in
which either Z or A might arise by chance (call this ‘the Risky Scenario’),
and compare it to a scenario in which Z+ will arise for sure (call this ‘the Safe
Scenario’). Which of these scenarios is better?
Z+ is better than Z, by condition [1], and this counts in favour of the
Safe Scenario. On the other hand, Z+ is worse than A, by condition [2], and
this counts against the Safe Scenario. How do these things weigh up? In
general it may not be clear, but suppose that the chance that A will arise in
the Risky Scenario is only one chance in a billion, or one chance in a trillion,
or one chance in a trillion trillions. Thus it is all but certain that the Risky
Scenario will result in an outcome significantly worse than the outcome of
the Safe Scenario. It is hard for me, and for many others, to believe that the
Risky Scenario is not worse than the Safe Scenario, if the chance of A is small
enough.
Suppose, for concreteness, that the Risky Scenario is worse than the Safe
Scenario when the chance of A is one in one hundred. Then it is safe to say
that the value difference between A and Z is less than a million times greater
than the value difference between Z+ and Z. Otherwise, the small chance of
A would still easily make the Risky Scenario better than the Safe Scenario.
On the other hand, according to Parfit’s formulation of the lexical view,
the value of the lives in Z is non-diminishing. Let Z++ be a world like Z+,
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but with a trillion times more lives. I do not know what ‘non-diminishing’
means if it does not imply that the value difference between Z++ and Z is
at least a million times greater than the value difference between Z+ and
Z. Indeed, naively, the first value difference must be about a trillion times
greater than the second.
Therefore the value difference between Z++ and Z is unambiguously
greater than the value difference between A and Z. So Z++ is better than A,
and the imprecise lexical view is false.
Perhaps there are some ways to block this argument. But the fact that
value is vague or (in Parfit’s terminology) imprecise is no objection, as far as
I can tell. I did not say anything that presupposes precision. For example,
the claim that one value difference is more than a million times greater than
another does not presuppose that the first value difference is some precise
number of times greater than the second.
Uncertainty, Utilitarianism, and Non-Existence
The argument I just gave illustrates how powerful considerations of uncer-
tainty can be in evaluating normative theories. The argument thus goes well
beyond the austere formalism used in the standard impossibility theorems.
Indeed, that is the main moral of Chapter I: the indispensability of a wider
circle of considerations, both formal and substantive.
Uncertainty is also a crucial ingredient in some of the best positive ar-
guments in population ethics. In Chapter III, I give an argument of this
kind, drawing on joint work with David McCarthy and Kalle Mikkola. In
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the first instance, the argument is for a ‘veil of ignorance principle’. A bit
roughly, this associates the moral point of view with the point of view of
rational self-interest in the face of self-locating ignorance. As I explain, this
idea has a long history, but it has lacked both a clean formulation and a clear
justification. The implications of the principle depend on how one answers
what I call ‘the risky existential question’: what is the value to an individual
of a chance of non-existence? Some ways of answering this question lead to
efficient arguments for generalisations of total utilitarianism. My critique of
Parfit above meshes well with this point of view: lexical versions of utilitari-
anism correspond behind the veil to the denial of one of standard axioms of
decision theory.
This chapter also raises a puzzle. How should one answer the risky
existential question if one accepts the principle of neutrality along with
the cognate view that life cannot be better or worse for a person than non-
existence? I explore several options here, all problematic. It seems quite
plausible that the best way to understand the principle of neutrality requires
a more significant departure from the kind of axiological principles that we
use to derive the veil of ignorance.
Neutrality and Identity
The final chapter also centers around the principle of neutrality. I in fact
sketch two theories (‘Complex Necessitarianism’ and ‘Regret Minimization’)
that validate the principle in relatively plausible ways. But getting the optimal
version of the principle of neutrality is not my main concern in this chapter.
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Rather, my treatment of it is motivated by two other problems.
It has become popular to think that the normative role traditionally
played by personal identity is instead played by some relation of psychological
connectedness. Moreover, psychological connectedness, unlike personal
identity, comes in degrees. There is a well-known account of prudential
rationality that incorporates this idea. This is Jeff McMahan’s ‘time-relative
interests’ account of prudential value. (It is most often discussed as an
account of the badness of death.) Even though it is initially an account of
prudential value, it is also supposed to have certain ethical consequences.
But serious questions have been raised about the coherence and plausibility
of the resulting ethical view. Really, it is unclear what the view amounts to.
The first motivating problem in Chapter IV is how best to understand the
theory of time-relative interests.
This is (so I claim) intertwined with a more general problem. Formal
discussions of population ethics most often deal in lifetime welfare – how good
a whole life is for the person who lives it. But this way of doing population
ethics conflicts with the idea that it is not personal identity but degrees of
psychological connectedness that matter. The second problem is how to
reimagine population ethics in light of this idea.
This is where the principle of neutrality comes back in. My suggestion
is that the problems faced by the time-relative interests account coincide
with the problems faced by the principle of neutrality, when the latter is
reinterpreted in terms of psychological connectedness. Making good sense
of the principle of neutrality is the key step to systematizing (and ultimately
evaluating) McMahan’s ethical view.
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Some Loose Ends
Let me conclude this overview by mentioning a few of the themes which I
wish I could have developed in detail, but could only touch on. They provide
some directions for future work.
First, throughout this thesis I assume that there are only finitely many
people who are relevant in any given choice. Infinite populations raise
additional problems. In a sense, these problems are sui generis, and easy to
set aside, as I do here. But they are also potentially devastating, and deserve
proper consideration.2
Second, given my preoccupation with vagueness in Chapter II, as well as
some discussion of indeterminate personal identity in Chapter IV, the ques-
tion arises what one ought to do when faced with axiological indeterminacy.
If it is indeterminate whether X is better than Y, is it indeterminate which of
them one ought to choose? Or are both of them in some sense permissible?
Several different approaches to this kind of question have recently appeared
in the literature, but very little consensus has been reached.3
Finally, the principle of neutrality is especially difficult to understand in
situations of uncertainty. I touch on these difficulties in Chapters III and IV,
but there is much more to say. The basic issue can again be made vivid by
the prospect of extinction. It is only in rather extreme cases that a course of
action will lead to extinction with anything like certainty. But many things
we do can affect the risk of extinction in the medium term. How should we
apply the principle of neutrality in the face of existential risk?
2See Bostrom (2011) for an influential survey.
3See Williams (2014a); Rinard (2015); Dunaway (2016) for three very different recent
approaches.
I | Some Possibilities
in Population Axiology
. It is notoriously difficult to find an intuitively satis-
factory rule for aggregating welfare. Standard examples, like total
utilitarianism, either entail the Repugnant Conclusion or run afoul
of some other intuition of similar strength. Several philosophers have
presented formal arguments that seem to show that this happens of ne-
cessity: our core intuitions stand in contradiction. This paper assesses
the state of play, focusing on the most powerful of these ‘impossibility
theorems’, as developed by Gustaf Arrhenius.
Narrowly construed, the goal of these theorems is to establish
a conflict between intuitions that are so strong and widespread it
would seem repugnant to set them aside. I argue that, even accepting
the force of these intuitions, the theorems fall short of their goal.
Some of them appeal to a supposedly egalitarian condition which,
however, does not properly reflect egalitarian intuitions; others rely
on a background assumption about the structure of welfare which
cannot be taken for granted.
More broadly construed, the theorems remain important: they
give insight into the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of construct-
ing a satisfactory population axiology. We should aim for reflective
equilibrium between intuitions and more theoretical considerations. I
conclude by highlighting one possible ingredient in this equilibrium,
which, I argue, leaves open a still wider range of acceptable theories:
the possibility of vague or otherwise indeterminate value relations.
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1 Introduction
It sometimes happens that one possible population is better than another
with respect to the distribution of welfare. For example, suppose that the
two populations have the same size, and that in the first population everyone
has a happy and fulfilling life, while in the second population every life is
unhappy and devoid of meaning. Then – always as far as welfare goes – the
first population is better than the second. A population axiology, in a sense I
will later make precise, is a theory of such comparisons.1
It turns out to be hard to find such a theory that accords with certain
strong and widely held intuitions. For example, consider a large population
of happy and fulfilling lives, and a second, perhaps larger one, in which life
is barely worth living. Many people strongly intuit that the first population
must be better than the second. On the other hand, it appears that, if the
second population is sufficiently large, it will inevitably have more total
welfare than the first. And so one obvious criterion for betterness seems
to entail what Parfit (1986) calls the Repugnant Conclusion: the second
population may be better than the first.2
1A few clarificatory points. First, I will speak of ‘happy’ lives, and so on, just to mean
those lives with a high level of welfare, without commitment to any particular theory of
wellbeing. The core intuitions are meant to hold for a wide range of views about what
constitutes welfare. Second, some people might prefer to frame things in terms of what
we ought to do, or in terms of reasons. They might say, for example, that as far as welfare
goes, we have more reason to bring about the first population than the second. Such a
re-framing would not change the specific arguments of this paper. Finally, where I say that
one population is better than another with respect to the distribution of welfare, some prefer
to say that a population with one distribution of welfare would be better than a population
with another distribution, all else equal. I prefer my formulation, but nothing is supposed
to hang on it here.
2I say only ‘seems to entail’ because I will later consider a theory of total welfare that
does not entail the Repugnant Conclusion. The well-known ‘critical-level’ theories (for
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Can we avoid the Repugnant Conclusion? By itself, of course. But
concrete attempts to do so have turned out to violate other intuitions of
comparable strength. This has led several authors to produce formal argu-
ments that seem to rule out any completely satisfactory population axiology.3
These arguments reach their culmination in Gustaf Arrhenius’s Population
Ethics, intended to be the major survey of the current state of the field.4
His six increasingly subtle ‘impossibility theorems’ claim to show that our
core intuitions stand in contradiction. The implications of this claim are
potentially profound. At a basic level, we are simply learning what kinds of
bullets we must bite. But if we cannot adjudicate between the core intuitions,
we may be pushed into a wider methodological and meta-ethical inquisition.
In this paper I will review some of the basic ideas used in these impossibil-
ity theorems, and identify some problems with them. Because Arrhenius has
approached the subject systematically and aimed for the best possible results,
it is convenient to focus on his work. However, as I will make clear along the
way, these problems undermine all arguments I have seen of a similar kind.
Those arguments deploy two basic strategies, and I will divide up my
analysis accordingly. The first basic strategy relies on the background assump-
which see Blackorby et al. (1995)) are also arguably of this kind. Of course, one may wonder
what it means to ‘total’ welfare at all; I will raise a related issue in section 4.
3Examples include Ng (1989); Carlson (1998); Kitcher (2000); Tännsjö (2002). Most
of the ideas are ultimately derived from Parfit (1986).
4 Arrhenius’s book, forthcoming from Oxford University Press, is well known in draft
form. In fact, all of the relevant parts have been published in previous work (subject to some
irrelevant revisions). I will refer to the theorems as they are enumerated in the manuscript,
but cite the published discussions. The first four theorems are essentially those developed in
(Arrhenius, 2000a); the fifth is from (Arrhenius, 2003); the sixth is from (Arrhenius, 2009,
2011). I note that the proof of his favoured sixth theorem contains an error in the derivation
of the ‘Restricted Quality Addition Condition’ (Arrhenius, 2011, Lemma 1.3). As far as
I know, one has to slightly strengthen the premisses of the theorem, in a way unlikely to
cause further controversy. This will not affect my discussion.
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tion – typically suppressed – that one can get from a low welfare level to any
higher welfare level by a finite number of appropriately ‘small’ increments.
I will call this premiss ‘Small Steps’. In section 3, I argue that Small Steps
could be denied, and show that, without it, there are counterexamples to
four of Arrhenius’s six theorems. One is a lexic version of total utilitarianism.
The second basic strategy is used in the remaining two theorems, and is
very popular in the wider literature. It appeals to egalitarian intuitions. But,
as I argue in section 4, the key ‘egalitarian’ condition is poorly motivated, and
does not capture any useful notion of egalitarianism. Indeed, my example
of total lexic utilitarianism satisfies two other egalitarian conditions that
are often supposed to be logically stronger. In particular, none of the six
theorems tells strongly against total lexic utilitarianism.
Where does this leave us? The impossibility theorems I will discuss
embody a particular top-down methodology. Instead of building on foun-
dations, the focus is on identifying high-level and very abstract intuitions
as hard constraints. These intuitions should be so strong and widespread
it would seem repugnant to set them aside. For the purposes of this paper,
I will take for granted that Arrhenius’s adequacy conditions meet this test,
with the exception I discuss at length in section 4.5 But the key background
assumption, Small Steps, does not fit well with this methodology. Its denial,
5There is lively disagreement about whether the Repugnant Conclusion itself is truly
repugnant; see especially Huemer (2008), who invokes (for one thing) the kind of argument
for RC that I discuss. It is worth noting that the most nuanced fifth and sixth theorems
involve intuitive strengthenings of the Repugnant Conclusion, which strike many, including
me, as more problematic. For example, the fifth invokes the ‘Very Repugnant Conclusion’:
any large population of blissful lives is worse than one consisting of (say) ten times as many
people in terrible agony as well as a lot of others whose lives are barely worth living. But
such strengthenings would not change the main points I will make, and in general I will
avoid irrelevant complications.
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while perhaps surprising, would hardly be repugnant. Nor does it have the
quasi-logical character of some other background assumptions, like the one
that ‘better than’ is transitive. To evaluate Small Steps, we have to look be-
yond the intuition-matching rubric to more deeply theoretical considerations
about the nature and structure of wellbeing.
I will sketch some of these considerations in section 5, and then explain
a final way to mitigate the impact of the theorems. I suggest that a careful
treatment of axiological vagueness could leave open a still wider range of
acceptable theories. I show that, even assuming Small Steps, there need not
be determinate counterexamples to the most important adequacy conditions.
At a minimum, vagueness provides a conservative way to weaken those
conditions – conservative because our intuitions may not easily distinguish
between certain cases of determinate and indeterminate truth.
2 The Framework and Key Examples
To set the stage, I will first describe the framework in which all of the im-
possibility theorems take place. The idea is to assume as little as possible
beyond what is needed to state the main adequacy conditions. Although I
have omitted some possible nuances, this framework is meant to be com-
mon ground. I will start a bit informally, and then say officially what data
constitute a population axiology.
The first idea is that one life may be better for the person living it than
another – it may have higher welfare. The relation ‘at least as good as’ is
assumed to be a preorder, that is, reflexive and transitive. (It is not required to
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be complete, although it will be in my examples.) If two lives are equally good,
I say they have the same welfare level. So a welfare level can be understood as
an equivalence class of lives, all equally good.
A population is a collection of lives, and a population axiology will give a
preorder on populations – a specification of when one possible population is
at least as good as another. However, when I compare populations, I am – by
stipulation – only interested in the welfare levels of the lives that they contain.
Let me then define a distribution to be a finite, unordered list of welfare
levels (perhaps containing repetitions). Each finite population determines a
distribution, and the population axiology amounts to a preorder on these
distributions. (Of course, one might also be interested in infinite populations,
but these raise sui generis problems – see, for example, Bostrom (2011).)
Although nothing ultimately turns on it, it is convenient to assume that every
logically possible distribution – every finite unordered list of welfare levels –
lies in the domain of the preorder. Here is some useful terminology. If a is a
welfare level, then a population or distribution ‘at level a’ is one in which
only level a occurs (perhaps many times). And if A and B are distributions,
then A∪B is the distribution obtained by concatenating the lists A and B .
Finally, the size of a distribution is the number of people involved, i.e. the
length of the list.
The impossibility theorems articulate various adequacy conditions for a
population axiology, and state that these adequacy conditions are mutually
incompatible. It is important to realise that these adequacy conditions are
officially about the form of the population axiology; they don’t explicitly
concern themselves with the interpretive question of which welfare levels
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correspond to which lives. However, to formulate the adequacy conditions in
an understandable way, it helps if we can refer to a few broad features of this
correspondence. For example, one of the main adequacy conditions is that the
population axiology must avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. The Repugnant
Conclusion in turn refers to a class of happy, fulfilling (henceforth ‘blissful’)
lives and a class of barely worth living (henceforth ‘drab’) lives. Officially:
The Repugnant Conclusion. For any distribution at a blissful
welfare level, there is a better one at a drab level.
It is possible to eliminate this classification by quantifying over sufficiently
high and sufficiently low welfare levels, as Arrhenius effectively does. But I
will pragmatically take the classification as a part of the axiology.
Officially, then, a population axiology consists of the following data. First,
a set of welfare levels; second, a preorder on that set. Third, a preorder on the
corresponding set of distributions. Fourth, a particular welfare level, singled
out as ‘neutral’. We can then say that a welfare level is ‘positive’ or ‘worth
living’ if it is higher than the neutral one.6 Fifth, among the positive welfare
levels there is a class of ‘blissful’ ones, and a disjoint class of ‘drab’ ones. For
my purposes, the only further assumptions are that there exists a blissful level,
and that for any blissful level there is a lower drab level and another even
lower drab level. Some of Arrhenius’s more complicated arguments require
three blissful and three drab levels, but those complications are irrelevant to
what I shall say.
6How exactly to understand the neutral level is one of the key substantive questions; I
will say nothing about it here.
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To illustrate this framework, let me lay out a few examples. The first is
total utilitarianism. According to this axiology, the welfare levels are indexed
by integers, positive or negative, and ordered in the obvious way.7 The neutral
welfare level is indexed by 0; at least the levels 1 and 2 are drab and 100 is
blissful. One distribution (or population) is at least as good as another just
in case its total welfare – the sum of integers – is at least as high. A variation
on this axiology is average utilitarianism. It rules that one distribution is at
least as good as another just in case its average welfare is at least as high.
Here is a second example, which I call total lexic utilitarianism (TLU).
Let me begin with an informal picture. (As I emphasise below, this picture is
not an official part of the axiology.) There are two things that make life good
– call them ‘love’ and ‘money’. The neutral level of welfare corresponds to a
life with no love and no money; a blissful life has at least a little love, while a
drab life has none. Moreover, a little love is worth any amount of money. So
one population, or one life, is at least as good as another if it contains either
more love in total, or the same amount of love and at least as much money.
Formally now, TLU claims that welfare levels can be represented by pairs
of integers (corresponding, in the picture above, to quantities of love and
money respectively). These pairs are ordered lexicographically: (a1, a2) is at
least as good as (b1, b2) just in case either a1 > b1 or else a1 = b1 and a2 ≥ b2.
The neutral welfare level is (0, 0). I will stipulate that (1, 0) is a blissful level,
and that the drab welfare levels are those of the form (0, m), with m > 0. Two
welfare levels can be added together: (a1, a2) + (b1, b2) = (a1+ b1, a2+ b2). It
7It is quite common to think of welfare levels as indexed by arbitrary real numbers
rather than integers. It makes very little difference to this example, but sticking to integers
here and below will be useful in the discussion of Small Steps.
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thus makes sense to speak of the total welfare of a distribution. As in total
utilitarianism, one distribution is at least as good as another just in case its
total welfare is at least as high.
To be clear, this paper is not a defence of total lexic utilitarianism. Rather,
I introduce it because it illustrates a wide variety of important ideas. Before
getting into more specific issues in the next section, let me explain in general
terms why the impossibility theorems get so little traction on this theory.
The first point is that TLU does not entail the Repugnant Conclusion.
According to my stipulations above, a drab life contains no love. Therefore
a population of drab lives contains no love, and must be worse than any
population of lives at the blissful level (1,0). At this point one might object
that (1, 0) could not reasonably correspond to a blissful life. After all, a life
with a minimal amount of love is not much better than a life with none at
all. We must recognise that a life at level (1, 0) is barely worth living, and
then we will obtain a version of the Repugnant Conclusion.
But this objection is based on a misunderstanding. My interpretation in
terms of ‘love’ and ‘money’ was picturesque and convenient. I will continue
to use these terms in informal discussion. But this interpretation is not part
of the axiology. All the axiology says is that welfare levels can be represented
by ordered pairs. The welfare levels can be represented in other ways, too;
the view is not commited to a two-component analysis of wellbeing. For
example, we could represent the welfare levels by real numbers. Concretely,
instead of using a pair (a1, a2) of integers, we could use the real number
2a1 + arctan a2. The ordering of welfare levels would then correspond to the
standard ordering of these real numbers. This new representation allows me to
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answer the preceding objection. Despite what the picturesque interpretation
might suggest, there is no fundamental sense in which the welfare level (1, 0)
is adjacent to the neutral level (0, 0). There are, indeed, infinitely many
welfare levels in between them. There is no reason (1, 0) cannot represent a
high level of welfare.
The final point is that total lexic utilitarianism has a very desirable prop-
erty in common with ordinary total utilitarianism: it is a separable axiology.
Here is what that means. Suppose that populations A and B have a subpop-
ulation C in common. Let A′ be the rest of A, and let B ′ be the rest of B .
Then separability says that A is at least as good as B if and only if A′ is at
least as good as B ′. To see why this is plausible, suppose that C is on the
other side of the universe from A′ and B ′. Or suppose that C existed a long
time before A′ and B ′. It seems that in these cases, at least, we should be
able to ignore C when comparing the merits of A and B . The intuition is
particularly strong in so far as this comparison influences which population
we should bring about. We should not have to worry about the unaffected
welfare of far-off aliens or ancient Egyptians when making such a choice
(Parfit, 1986, p. 420).
Indeed, many standard objections to particular population axiologies
involve violations of separability. For example, suppose that A′ consists of
many people, all with good lives, and that B ′ is a smaller population of
people with truly appalling lives. Average utilitarianism will rightly judge
A′ to be better than B ′. But, contrary to separability, average utilitarianism
may also judge B to be better than A (whether it does so depends on C ).
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This looks fatal for average utilitarianism and similar theories.8 But total
lexic utilitarianism, like ordinary total utilitarianism, is immune to such
objections.
Having said all that, separability is not one of the adequacy conditions ap-
pearing in the impossibility theorems I will discuss. It is a strong condition,9
and perhaps one could countenance some small violations. In particular,
some egalitarians are happy to reject separability. They think that inequality
in the population matters, and some natural ways of making it matter violate
separability.10 So I will henceforth put separability aside.
3 Against Small Steps
Now let me begin my analysis of the impossibility theorems. One strategy
used by these theorems relies on the following principle.
8This argument essentially shows that average utilitarianism fails the ‘non-Sadism’ con-
ditions used in Arrhenius’s third, fourth, and sixth impossibility theorems. A comprehensive
critique of average utilitarianism along similar lines is given in Hurka (1982a,b).
9In fact, any separable axiology allows for a quantitative representation of welfare, such
that the value of a population is represented by the total welfare. (For this I assume that
the preorder on one-person populations coincides with the preorder on welfare levels.) The
‘quantities’ involved may not be real numbers, however. They may be some more unfamiliar
objects, such as, in our case, pairs of integers. See Pivato (2014) for a general result. To
avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, a separable axiology can either (i) incorporate a lexical
element, i.e. accept that there are positive quantities a > b > 0 such that no multiple of b is
greater than a; or (ii) introduce a critical level, i.e. deny that neutral lives contribute zero to
the welfare total. (They may contribute negative value, or a value incomparable to zero.)
Critical level views face further problems (see e.g. Arrhenius (2000b) or Mulgan (2002)),
and in that sense lexical views like total lexic utilitarianism occupy a special place in the
constellation of population axiologies.
10See chapter 9 of Broome (1991). As I will argue in section 4, it is hard to say which
population axiologies, in our very abstract sense, are egalitarian. Still, the underlying point
is that the degree of inequality is not itself separable, however it is measured. By way of
illustration, suppose that the lives in A′ are at welfare level a, and the lives in B ′ and C are
all at welfare level b . Then A′ and B ′ are each perfectly egalitarian, but A is more unequal
than B . Separability is nonetheless compatible with egalitarianism, as argued by McCarthy
(2015).
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Small Steps. Any blissful welfare level a can be reduced to any
lower drab level z in a finite sequence of small steps.11
Of course, ‘small’ is context-dependent. It invokes an implicit standard for
smallness. The standard must be weak enough to make Small Steps true.
But it must also be strict enough to make various adequacy conditions seem
compelling. For example, here is a simplified version of Arrhenius’s first
impossibility theorem.12 The simplified claim is that no population axiology
can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion while satisfying
The Quantity Condition. Suppose that a and b are positive
welfare levels, that b is lower than a, and that the difference
between a and b is small. Then, for any distribution at level a,
there is a larger, better distribution at level b .
Informally, we should accept a small decrease in welfare levels in exchange for
a sufficient increase in population size. It is easy to see how one might argue
from the Quantity Condition to the Repugnant Conclusion. Starting from a
distribution at a blissful level a, we should accept a small decrease in welfare
levels in exchange for a sufficient increase in population size. But, according
to Small Steps, a sequence of such small decreases can lead us from a to a
drab level z . We should therefore accept a decrease in welfare levels from
11More formally: there is a finite decreasing sequence a = a1 > a2 > · · · > an = z of
welfare levels such that the difference between consecutive terms is small. Arrhenius does
not state Small Steps explicitly; he relies instead on Discreteness, below, and tends to speak
of ‘slight’ differences.
12See Arrhenius (2000a, §10.3). His argument (including his version of the Quantity
Condition) is more nuanced than the version I give here, as he is keen to make his premisses
as weak as possible. I have eschewed certain subtleties in the interests of clarity, while
preserving the features of the argument that I wish to discuss. A similar comment applies to
my discussion of his other theorems.
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a to z in exchange for a sufficient increase in population size. That is the
Repugnant Conclusion. So no population axiology can satisfy the Quantity
Condition and Small Steps while avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion.
The first, fourth, fifth, and sixth of Arrhenius’s theorems follow this sort
of strategy, proceeding through a sequence of small steps. (Recognising that
the Quantity Condition is open to criticism, the later three theorems rely
on the so-called Non-Elitism Condition, which I will discuss in section 4.)
Each theorem is implicitly of the following form.
Given any population axiology, there can be no standard of
smallness according to which (a) Small Steps is true; and (b)
certain intuitively compelling adequacy conditions are all true,
perhaps including the Quantity Condition or the negation of
the Repugnant Conclusion.
There are several types of objections one might make to such a theo-
rem, while conceding the force of the underlying intuitions. One possible
objection is that an argument via Small Steps has the character of a sorites
argument. Although I think this objection has merit, its force is not imme-
diately clear; for a critical discussion, see Temkin (2012, chapter 9). I will
make some related comments in section 5. A second objection calls into
question the way in which the adequacy conditions formalise the underlying
intuitions. Let me say a little about this second objection, and then focus on
the main line of thought: we can easily defuse the impossibility theorems by
giving up Small Steps.
To see why the formal adequacy conditions might not properly reflect
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the underlying intuitions, consider the case of the Quantity Condition. As
far as I can tell, the intuition is that any sufficiently small decrease in the
quality of lives can be compensated by a sufficiently large increase in the
quantity of lives. But that is not what the Quantity Condition actually says.
The intuition as just stated is better represented by the weaker
Tradeoff Condition. Suppose given a distribution at a positive
welfare level a. Suppose that b is a lower welfare level, but still
positive. If the difference between a and b is sufficiently small,
then there is a larger, better distribution at level b .
The worry is that the Quantity Condition gains plausibility by conflation
with the strictly weaker Tradeoff Condition. At any rate, it is not obvious
to me that intuition supports the Quantity Condition over and above the
Tradeoff Condition. The Tradeoff Condition is weaker because what counts
as a ‘sufficiently small’ difference between a and b can depend on the size of
the population at level a. The Quantity Condition, in contrast, requires there
to be a single standard of smallness that works for all populations. Small
Steps also presupposes such a universal standard. To see that this matters,
consider Ng’s axiology, which he calls ‘Theory X ′’ (Ng, 1989). He assumes
that welfare levels are represented by real numbers, with 0 as the neutral level.
We might take level 100 to be blissful, and those between 0 and 2 to be
drab. Ng then gives a rule for aggregating these numbers, with populations
ranked by their aggregate scores. The rule, in one concrete version, is that a
population of n people with average welfare a has aggregate score
(1− 0.99n)a.
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It is easy to see that this axiology satisfies the Tradeoff Condition and avoids
(as Ng argues) the Repugnant Conclusion. It also satisfies Small Steps, for
any standard of smallness (see footnote 28 below). However, Arrhenius’s
first impossibility theorem rules out Theory X ′ because it does not satisfy
the Quantity Condition for any standard of smallness. The failure of Theory
X ′ to satisfy the Quantity Condition over and above the Tradeoff Condition
does not, in itself, seem like compelling grounds for criticism. One can
raise similar worries about the other adequacy conditions that refer to small
differences.13
Now let me turn to my main objection. My main objection is that
Small Steps is not itself compelling enough to be considered a basic adequacy
condition. Faced with the impossibility theorems, the simplest answer is just
to give up Small Steps.
First, let me show that the use of Small Steps is no mere convenience;
without it, the impossibility theorem fails. Consider the example of total
lexic utilitarianism that I introduced in section 2. I explained there that this
axiology does not entail the Repugnant Conclusion. On the other hand, it
does satisfy the Quantity Condition, for an obvious standard of smallness.
The standard is that the difference between a and b is small if and only if a
and b have the same amount of love.14 (As I explained in section 2, there is
13I thank John Broome for first alerting me to this kind of objection, in personal
communication.
14To see that the Quantity Condition applies, suppose that a = (x , y ) and b = (x , z )
are positive welfare levels whose difference is small. A population A of m people at level a
has aggregate welfare (mx , m y ). If x > 0, then a population B of m + 1 people at level b
has aggregate welfare ((m + 1)x , (m + 1)z ); this is better than A. Or if x = 0, then y and z
must both be positive. If we choose a number n such that nz > m y , then a population B
of n people at level b is better than A, as the Quantity Condition requires.
I -3 AGAINST SMALL STEPS 28
no reason to think of differences in love as in any way small.) Thus the only
objection that the first impossibility theorem raises against TLU is that it
violates Small Steps. In fact, TLU satisfies all the adequacy conditions (save
Small Steps) that are required by Arrhenius’s first, fourth, fifth, and sixth
impossibility theorems.
Why, then, accept Small Steps? One might, with Arrhenius, endorse
Discreteness. For any welfare levels a and b , there are at most
finitely many welfare levels worse than a and better than b .15
According to Discreteness, one can get from a to b through a finite sequence
of consecutive welfare levels. Presumably, the difference between consecutive
levels counts as small by any standard. The question, though, is why we
should believe Discreteness. Arrhenius has very little to say about this. He
claims that the alternative to Discreteness is
Denseness. For any welfare levels A and B , if B is better than
A, then there is a welfare level that is better than A and worse
than B .
Arrhenius finds Denseness ‘improbable’, and so favours Discreteness. The
rejection of Denseness is already controversial, since it is very common to
model welfare levels by real numbers. Be that as it may, Discreteness and
Denseness do not exhaust the options. Total lexic utilitarianism satisfies
neither. I have already explained why it does not satisfy Discreteness. It does
15My discussion here refers to Arrhenius (2011, §1.2), as well as to parallel sections
in his other cited works. I have slightly simplified his formulations of Discreteness and
Denseness below.
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not satisfy Denseness, because each welfare level has an immediately higher
one, consisting of the same amount of love and a penny more of money.16
Are there some other, more convincing arguments in favour of Small
Steps? No doubt; I will mention one such argument in section 5. The
point, however, is that Small Steps does not have the same status as the other
premisses of the best impossibility theorems. It is not backed up by a strong
normative intuition, like the one many people have against the Repugnant
Conclusion. Nor is it a quasi-logical precondition for doing axiology, as
transitivity is often thought to be.17 It is not a basic adequacy condition, but
something that requires support.
4 Against the Inequality Aversion Condition
Now let me consider the second basic strategy of the impossibility theorems.
It involves the following adequacy condition.18
The Inequality Aversion Condition. Suppose that a, z , b are
welfare levels, with a higher than z and z higher than b . For
any distribution A at level a, there are distributions Z at level
z and B at level b , such that Z has the same size as A∪B and
Z is better than A∪B .
16Although Arrhenius favours Discreteness, he does not rely on its being true. He
suggests that, even if Discreteness is not true, we can focus attention on some subset of all
welfare levels in which Discreteness holds, and in which the difference between consecutive
levels is small. But this claim is little more than restatement of Small Steps. It gives no new
argument.
17See Broome (2004, Chapter 4) for a forceful statement of this view.
18Cf. Arrhenius (2000a, §10.5). Again, I have made some harmless simplifications in
order to focus on the key issues.
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Informally: the decrease of some people’s welfare levels from a to z can be
compensated by the increase of sufficiently many others’ from b to z .
Before discussing the merits of this condition, let me explain how it is
used in the impossibility theorems. The simplest argument appeals to the
following principle.
The Mere Addition Principle. Suppose that A and B are dis-
tributions containing only positive welfare levels. Then A∪B
is at least as good as A.
The claim is that no population axiology can satisfy the Inequality Aversion
Condition and the Mere Addition Principle while avoiding the Repugnant
Conclusion. This is a simplified version of Arrhenius’s second impossibility
theorem.19 Here is how the argument goes. Take a to be a blissful welfare
level, z to be a drab level lower than a, and b to be a drab level even lower
than z . (Recall that my official definition of ‘population axiology’ in section
2 stipulated that such levels exist.) For any distribution A at level a, the
Inequality Aversion Condition gives us distributions Z and B , with Z at
least as good as A∪ B . The Mere Addition Principle tells us that A∪ B is
better than A. So, by transitivity, Z is better than A. That is the Repugnant
Conclusion.
19The theorem replaces the Mere Addition Principle by the ‘Dominance Addition
Condition’. While ‘mere addition’ simply adds the population B of positive lives, ‘dominance
addition’ (or ‘benign addition’ in the terminology of Huemer (2008)) simultaneously
improves the lives in A. Curiously, Kitcher’s impossibility theorem (Kitcher, 2000) includes
an adequacy condition (‘DVA’, p. 567) that directly denies the Mere Addition Principle
as applied here: he insists that, if the Repugnant Conclusion is false, then adding drab
lives to a large, blissful population decreases its value. This significantly reduces the interest
of his theorem, since the Mere Addition Principle is widely seen as (at least) the default
hypothesis, or even ‘obviously true’ (Tännsjö, 2002, p. 357). Kitcher also relies on Small
Steps, recognizing, however, that this may be problematic (§9).
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Arrhenius’s second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth theorems elaborate
this basic strategy. They replace the Mere Addition Principle with intuitive
weakenings (‘Dominance Addition’ and two versions of ‘Non-Sadism’). But
they all rely on the Inequality Aversion Condition, either as a premiss or a
lemma. It is a thread common to almost all the impossibility theorems.
Is the Inequality Aversion Condition intuitively compelling? To answer
that question, consider how the condition is used in the argument just
described. It is used to show that large penalties for some people (the people
in A, reduced from blissful to drab lives) can be compensated by small benefits
to sufficiently many others (the people in B , raised from one drab level to
another). I think it is far from clear that we should favour such trade-offs.
For example, can all-but-imperceptible benefits to sufficiently many people
make up for the loss of all real joy in the world? If, as it seems to me, the
answer is intuitively negative or unclear, we should not accept the Inequality
Aversion Condition as a fundamental adequacy condition.
Perhaps one can argue for the Inequality Aversion Condition from intu-
itively compelling premisses. Arrhenius attempts two such arguments. As the
name suggests, the basic thought is that the Inequality Aversion Condition is
necessary for an appropriate degree of inequality aversion. Before considering
the specific arguments, let me raise some general doubts.
It seems to me that the Inequality Aversion Condition has little to do with
inequality aversion. Consider the two examples of ordinary and lexic total
utilitarianism. On the face of it, these two axiologies express the very same
attitude towards inequality. On either theory, adding one quantum of welfare
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to the population improves the population by one quantum, regardless of
whether the quantum is given to a well-off person, a badly-off person, or to a
new person. These theories are alike with respect to inequality aversion. But
the Inequality Aversion Condition distinguishes between them: ordinary
total utilitarianism satisfies the condition, while the lexic version does not.20
Thus the Inequality Aversion Condition makes distinctions for which
there is no apparent egalitarian rationale. Of course, one might think that
the condition nonetheless correctly rules out TLU. Then we should also rule
out total utilitarianism on egalitarian grounds. But this cannot be correct.
For it makes no sense to ask whether total utilitarianism, as I have defined
it, is egalitarian or not. This is because I did not specify what sort of lives
correspond to each numerical index of welfare. Whether or not the theory is
egalitarian depends on this correspondence, which is not part of the formal
axiology. More precisely, an axiology in the present sense only contains
ordinal information about welfare levels (it tells us whether a is better than b )
but not cardinal information (it does not tell us how much better a is). For
example, in the present version of total utilitarianism, we should not suppose
that welfare level 10 is better than welfare level 9 to the same degree that
welfare level 9 is better than welfare level 8. All we know is that 10 is better
than 9 and 9 is better than 8. In contrast, criteria for egalitarianism typically
presuppose a cardinal scale.21 For example, they require that it be a net
20Indeed, if again a is the blissful level and z and b are drab levels, then the population
A∪B is always better than the population Z , according to total lexic utilitarianism.
21An exception to this rule is the criterion discussed by McCarthy (2015). But his
criteria make fundamental use of uncertainty, which is again absent from the current
framework. Indeed, the strongly separable egalitarian theories that McCarthy considers
would be indistinguishable from total utilitarianism in the present framework.
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improvement to decrease the welfare of a well-off person by a small amount
while increasing the welfare of a worse-off person by that same amount. The
sameness of the two amounts is a cardinal fact. Whether or not the present
version of total utilitarianism is egalitarian depends on how the numerical
indices of the welfare levels correspond to the cardinal facts that matter to
egalitarians. If the cardinal difference between level n and level n + 1 is
independent of n, then the theory will be equality-neutral. (This is what
I supposed in the previous paragraph: on an obvious interpretation, both
total and total lexic utilitarianism are equality-neutral.) But if the difference
increases as n increases, the theory will be egalitarian. It would make no
sense to rule out total utilitarianism, in the present sense, on egalitarian
grounds. More generally, it seems hard to say anything meaningful about
egalitarianism within our purely ordinal framework.
With these general observations in mind, let me turn specifically to
Arrhenius’s two arguments for the Inequality Aversion Condition. The first
argument (Arrhenius (2000a, §6.1), following Ng (1989)) starts from
The Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle. A perfectly equal
distribution is better than an unequal distribution of the same
size and with lower total (and thus lower average) welfare.
It is important to note that the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle requires a
notion of total welfare.22 The basic framework I introduced in section 2 does
22This in turn requires the sort of cardinal facts I mentioned earlier. If we can compare
totals, we can compare differences. (For example, a− b = c −d if and only if a+d = b + c .)
The motivation for the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle does not require talk of ‘total’ or
‘average’ welfare. (I thank Ralf Bader for pressing this point.) The idea is that the betterness
relation might combine two values – let us call them ‘utility’ and ‘equality’. The principle is
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not include such a notion. Be that as it may, many people agree with Ng that
the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle is extremely compelling, and, like
him, use it to derive the Repugnant Conclusion via the Inequality Aversion
Condition.23
On the latter count, it is not true in general that the Non-Anti-Egalitarian-
ism Principle entails the Inequality Aversion Condition. After all, I defined
total lexic utilitarianism using a notion of ‘total welfare’, and with respect to
that notion, it satisfies the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle. But it does
not satisfy the Inequality Aversion Condition.
Of course, proponents of the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle invari-
ably assume that we must represent welfare levels by real numbers. They
define ‘total welfare’ in terms of the sum of such real numbers. On that
assumption, the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle does indeed entail the
Inequality Aversion Condition.24 This raises two questions. First, why real
numbers instead of something else? Second, granting for the sake of argu-
ment that we have a real-numbered representation, why should we accept
that a population that is better with respect to utility and better with respect to equality is
better overall. This formulation makes sense whether or not utility (whatever that is) can be
summed. However, this more abstract version of the Non-Anti-Egalitarian Principle only
slightly ameliorates the issues raised below.
23See e.g. Huemer (2008) and the ‘first trilemma’ of Carlson (1998). Carlson’s second
trilemma uses a similar argument to derive the ‘Reverse Repugnant Conclusion’: for any
population of truly awful lives, there is a worse one consisting of lives only just below the
neutral level. The derivation is a simple adaptation of Ng’s to deal with negative welfare
levels, and so faces the same worries. In fact, Carlson must appeal to an adequacy condition
even stronger than Non-Anti-Egalitarianism: one population is better than another if it has
higher total and higher average welfare.
24Here is the argument. Suppose that A has m people at welfare level a, and B has n
people at welfare level b . Then the total utility of A∪ B is ma + nb , while that of Z is
mz +nz . Thus the latter has higher total utility (and the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle
says it is better than the former) so long as n(z − b ) > m(a − z ). If a, b , z are real numbers,
then this inequality will hold for all sufficiently large n, but it need not ever hold if they are
(say) lexicographically ordered pairs.
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the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle?
All I need for my purposes is to note that neither of these questions
admits a simple answer. That is enough to show that we should not take the
Inequality Aversion Condition as a fundamental adequacy condition. For
example, the most common way to produce a real-numbered representation
of welfare levels is to argue that welfare satisfies the axioms of expected utility
theory. But the axioms of expected utility theory, while rather plausible,
are subject to dispute. In any case, by introducing uncertainty, they take
us far beyond the minimal framework of the impossibility theorems. Then,
once we have tied down a real-numbered representation, we can talk about
total and average welfare. But at this stage there is no reason to think
that these notions of ‘total’ and ‘average’ are directly relevant to population
axiology, let alone relevant in the precise way described by the Non-Anti-
Egalitarianism principle. Indeed, different real-numbered representations
of welfare levels lead to different, mutually incompatible versions of the
Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle. To see this, suppose that I assign to each
welfare level a a numerical value u(a). If, in a certain population, the people
have welfare levels a1, . . . , an , then I interpret the ‘total welfare’ to be the sum
u(a1) + · · ·+ u(an). That yields one form of the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism
Principle. But now suppose I assign numbers in a different way, according
to a function v , and interpret the ‘total welfare’ as v (a1) + · · ·+ v (an). That
yields a different, and contradictory form of the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism
Principle which contradicts the first. Which one of these two principles
is supposed to be intuitively compelling? It is impossible to tell without
further information. It may be that for some particular choice of representing
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function u, the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle is compelling. But we
need an explanation of what that choice is, and an argument for why the
principle is compelling for that, as opposed to other, choices.25
Here is an analogy. Consider the weights in grams of various coins. The
weights are real numbers. I can very well add them up to find the total weight
of a pile of coins. But the total weight of a pile of coins tells me very little
about its value in the ordinary sense. (This is true even if we suppose that,
the heavier a single coin, the greater its face value.) So too, the mere fact that
we have assigned real numbers to welfare levels (thus measuring welfare on a
‘ratio scale’) does not mean that the total of these real numbers carries any
particular significance.
Here is a final, less technical worry about the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism
Principle. The principle concerns cases in which considerations of equality,
total utility, and average utility coincide. The thrust of the principle is that,
in these cases, no additional considerations can make a difference. But that
is not obvious. For example, perhaps it is also relevant how many lives
are above a certain level of sufficiency. In particular, in our application of
the Inequality Aversion Condition, populations like A∪ B contain many
high-quality lives, while populations like Z contain none. When thinking
about the Repugnant Conclusion, a natural idea is that this very fact has
25The abstract version of the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism principle mentioned in footnote
22 suggests one kind of argument. It might be claimed that betterness with respect to utility
is separable, and therefore can be represented by a ‘total welfare’ formula (cf. footnote 9).
This notion of total welfare would, by definition, validate the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism
Principle – at least assuming that only utility and equality matter to population axiology. To
derive the Inequality Aversion Condition, one would still need to argue that total welfare
was given by real number addition. An argument along these lines for the significance of
total utility in the sense of expected utility theory is provided by Broome’s development of
Harsanyi’s famous aggregation theorem (Broome, 2004; Harsanyi, 1976).
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overriding axiological significance. More generally, considerations of utility
and equality may, in some cases, be overridden by others. This possibility
undermines the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle.
Now let me turn to Arrhenius’s second (and rightly favoured) argument
for the Inequality Aversion Condition (Arrhenius, 2000a, §6.3). He claims
to deduce it from
The Non-Elitism Condition. Suppose that a, z , b are welfare
levels, with a better than z and z better than b , and that that
the difference between a and z is small. Then, for some number
n, it is always a net improvement to reduce one person’s welfare
from a to z while increasing that of n others from b to z .26
I agree that this condition sounds compelling. It should also be clear, at
least in outline, how the argument from Non-Elitism to Inequality Aversion
goes. The basic difference between the two conditions is that the Non-Elitism
Condition only allows us to compensate for the loss of a small amount of
one person’s welfare, while the Inequality Aversion Condition allows us to
compensate for the loss of a large amount of many people’s welfare. But a
sequence of small losses to one person at a time can amount to large losses
26Arrhenius has two versions of the Non-Elitism Condition (one of them ‘General’), but
the difference between either of them and the version I have given here is nugatory. Parfit’s
arguments (1986, §142ff) also use a version of the Non-Elitism Condition: small losses to
some are compensated by at least as large gains to others. (Parfit justifies such compensation
using heuristics about utility and equality akin to the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle;
these heuristics inspired Ng’s work.) He does not derive the Inequality Aversion Condition
per se, but my objection applies to his argument as well, since it relies on a series of small
steps. The second and third arguments for the Repugnant Conclusion in Tännsjö (2002)
are variations on Parfit. (Tännsjö’s first argument uses the Quantity Condition as in section
3, following Arrhenius.)
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for many people. Thus recursive application of Non-Elitism leads to the
Inequality Aversion Condition.27
However, this argument implicitly requires Small Steps: it assumes that a
sequence of small decreases in welfare can amount to a large one. If, as I have
already suggested, we deny Small Steps, the argument from Non-Elitism to
Inequality Aversion fails. Indeed, total lexic utilitarianism does not satisfy the
Inequality Aversion Condition, but it does satisfy the Non-Elitism Condition.
Recall that the difference between a and z is ‘small’ only if they have the
same amount of love. Suppose then that a and z differ only by m units of
money. Since the difference between z and b is at least one unit of money, a
decrease in the welfare of one person from a to z can be compensated by an
increase in the welfare of m + 1 people from b to z .
In conclusion, the Inequality Aversion Condition is not clearly related to
inequality aversion. It is not strongly supported by direct intuition. Nor is
it, in general, a consequence of the Non-Elitism Condition or of the Non-
Anti-Egalitarianism Principle, and the latter principle has problems of its
own.
5 Small Steps and Indeterminacy
Recall the story so far. I have argued that the Inequality Aversion Condition
should not be one of the fundamental adequacy conditions of population
axiology. On the other hand, this condition follows from the much more
27Elabourations of this argument appear as lemmas in the proofs of the fourth, fifth,
and sixth theorems. See Arrhenius (2000a, Lemma 5.1.1; 2003, Lemma 1; 2011, Lemma
1.1.1).
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compelling Non-Elitism Condition, if we accept Small Steps. We have
also seen another impossibility theorem, based on the Quantity Condition,
which employs Small Steps. I have argued that the assumption of Small
Steps is no harmless technicality, nor is it clearly justified. Still, it would
be uncomfortable to pin the hopes of population ethics on the falsity of
Small Steps. Small Steps follows if the welfare levels are ordered like the real
numbers or the integers.28 Many of the quantities we detect in the world
around us have that sort of structure, and it is (if nothing else) often assumed
that welfare is the same.
One can say more in favour of Small Steps. That is not the project of
this paper, but here is the kind of argument that I find most compelling. For
simplicity, let us be hedonists. (Non-hedonists can tell a similar story, but
there may be complications.) Stipulate that a life is ‘blissful’ if it consists of
one hundred years of intense pleasure followed by a single neutral minute,
completely devoid of pleasure and of pain. Stipulate that a life is ‘drab’ if
it begins with one minute of that same intense pleasure, followed by one
hundred neutral years. (These stipulations are appropriate as long as the
Repugnant Conclusion seems repugnant when understood in terms of these
kinds of lives.) Then we find a natural continuum between drab lives and
blissful ones, as we lengthen the initial period of pleasure from one minute to
one hundred years. Consider two lives on this continuum that differ by only
28For the real-number case, I assume that, for any real number x , the real numbers that
differ from x by a ‘small’ amount include all those in some open interval around x . The
Heine-Borel theorem says that any closed, bounded interval of real numbers is contained
in the union of finitely many of these small intervals. Thus any closed, bounded interval
can be traversed in a finite number of small steps. Note that this argument depends on the
assumption that all real numbers in an appropriate interval correspond to welfare levels; it
will not work if there are gaps.
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one millisecond’s worth of pleasure. The difference in welfare between two
such lives is surely ‘small’ in the relevant sense. But then there are finitely
many small steps between a blissful welfare level and a drab one, since there
are finitely many milliseconds between one minute and one hundred years.29
Given the plausibility of such arguments, the impossibility theorems do
pose genuine difficulties for population axiology. We should presumably aim
for some kind of reflective equilibrium between basic intuitions and more
theoretical considerations. In concluding this paper, I want to highlight one
possible ingredient in this equilibrium that has not been widely addressed in
the literature: the possibility of vague or otherwise indeterminate axiologies.
Such indeterminacy has been considered before, but only in a limited way.
For example, Broome (2004) advocates a version of total utilitarianism with
a vague critical level. As he recognises, this move only partly mitigates the
impact of the impossibility theorems. I suggest that vagueness has a more
general role to play in balancing competing intuitions.30
Why is vagueness relevant at all? Let me begin with an analogous case.
Suppose I believe that Fred – whom I have never met – is tall; I know precious
little else about him. I walk into a room, certain that Fred will be there.
But there are two men present. Which one is Fred? The first man I see is
determinately not tall. If the second man were determinately tall, I would
infer that he was Fred. But the second man is only borderline tall. Still, all else
29A similar argument can be run with probabilities instead of times: vary the chance of
pleasure, rather than its length. The key point is that probabilities, like times, standardly
have the structure of a real continuum, and this has implications for the structure of welfare.
Indeed, this is essentially the strategy of expected utility theory for identifying welfare levels
with (some) real numbers, as mentioned in section 4.
30I develop these ideas from a different angle in Chapter II of this thesis.
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equal, I will be inclined to think that the second man is Fred. This matches
my prior beliefs and my new evidence better than the alternative. Moreover,
some borderline tall people are taller than others. Some are borderline tall but
almost determinately tall. The closer the second man is to being determinately
tall, the more inclined I will be to believe that he is Fred. So too in the case
of population axiology. If I think the Quantity Condition (for example)
is compelling, then, all else equal, I should be inclined to favour a theory
according to which that condition is borderline, but almost determinately
true, over a theory according to which it is determinately false.
This picture is strengthened if we observe that the impossibility theorems
that use Small Steps are structurally similar to sorites arguments.31 The
impossibility theorem I discussed in section 3 repeatedly invokes the Quantity
Condition to derive the Repugnant Conclusion. Similarly, a sorites argument
might claim to prove that every tree is tall by repeatedly invoking
The Tolerance Condition. Suppose that a and b are heights,
that b is lower than a, and that the difference between a and b
is small (less than one millimeter, say). Then it cannot be the
case that a is tall for a tree and b is not.
Theories of vagueness that respect classical logic must accept that there are
counterexamples to the Tolerance Condition. But they must also explain the
strong intuition in its favour. A typical explanation is that the Tolerance Con-
31I will develop and defend this analogy in other work. For a critical view, see Temkin
(2012, Chapter 9). Here I only rely on a broad similarity to amplify the considerations of
the preceding paragraph. In my informal survey, a few philosophers resist the very idea of
moral vagueness. But many others take it to be an obvious and widespread phenomenon:
see Constantinescu (2014); Dougherty (2014); Schoenfield (2015) for recent examples.
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dition has no determinate counterexamples. Every instance of the Tolerance
condition is at least borderline true, and indeed close to determinately true.32
If this kind of story explains why theTolerance Condition is compelling, then
it may help with the Quantity Condition and the Non-Elitism Condition as
well. Even if these conditions admit counterexamples, they need not admit
determinate counterexamples. That may go some way towards explaining
their attraction.
Let me now illustrate these general considerations with a toy model.33
In this axiology, welfare levels are indexed by integers. Let us suppose that
0 is the neutral level, 1 and 2 correspond to drab lives, and 100 to a blissful
life. Small Steps is bound to hold, assuming that the difference between
consecutive welfare levels counts as ‘small’. The ranking of populations will
have a sufficientarian flavour. There is some positive welfare level S , the level
of sufficiency, above which life is ‘very good’; lives below −S are ‘very bad’.
Populations are ranked, in the first instance, by the number of very good lives
minus the number of very bad lives. Then ties are broken by total welfare,
the sum of integers.
Does such an axiology entail the Repugnant Conclusion? No – not as
long as the blissful lives are above S and the drab lives are below it. By the
first impossibility theorem (section 3) we know that the Quantity Condition
must fail. Indeed, it fails when, and only when, the small decrease in welfare
32See e.g. Keefe (2000, pp. 185–6) in the case of supervaluationism. Note that for
Keefe, as for many supervaluationists, plain-old-truth is what I have called determinate
truth. For a theory that emphasises closeness to determinate or ‘clear’ truth, see Edgington
(1996). Of course, other treatments of the sorites are available, including treatments that
forgo classical logic; I cannot give a survey here.
33The model here resembles the views defended by Qizilbash (2005) and Knapp (2007),
and also has some affinity to the ‘Imprecise Lexical View’ sketched by Parfit (2016).
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from a to b brings us from a life that is very good to one that is not. But this
is where vagueness can soften the blow. If the level of sufficiency is vague,
then there are no consecutive welfare levels a and b such that, determinately,
a is very good and b is not. Thus the Quantity Condition has no determinate
counterexamples. Each instance is at worst borderline true, failing on at
most one of the many possible precisifications of S .
For the same reason, the Non-Elitism Condition has no determinate
counterexamples. Indeed, of the adequacy conditions appearing in Arrhe-
nius’s theorems, only one is entirely invalidated by this axiology. That is the
Inequality Aversion Condition, which, I have already argued, we should not
accept on its own merits.
6 Conclusion
Narrowly construed, the aim of the impossibility theorems is to establish a
conflict between core axiological intuitions, given only minimal background
assumptions like the transitivity of ‘better than’. As I have argued, they fail
in that aim: first, because the background assumption of Discreteness is
unjustified, as is, consequently, the use of Small Steps; second, because the
Inequality Aversion Condition does not properly reflect egalitarian concerns,
and could reasonably be rejected.
More broadly construed, however, the theorems remain important: they
insightfully illustrate the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of constructing
a satisfactory population axiology. From that point of view, the aim of this
paper has been to focus attention on some ways forward that respect as far
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as possible the adequacy conditions of these theorems. We can reject Small
Steps, or, if driven to accept it, appeal to axiological vagueness to mitigate
the inevitable conflict of intuitions.
II | Vague Spectra
. I explore the relationship between two types of paradox-
ical argument: sorites arguments for predicates like ‘tall’ and spectrum
arguments for comparatives like ‘better than’. It has often been claimed
that spectrum arguments are structurally different from sorites argu-
ments. I argue that vagueness may still be the source of paradox in
each case. I show that for each spectrum argument there is a closely
related argument indisputably of sorites form. It is natural to think
that this latter argument is indeed a sorites argument: vagueness ex-
plains the intuitive force of its premisses, even though the argument is
unsound. But then vagueness must also lie at the heart of the original
spectrum argument.
1 Introduction
Derek Parfit’s ‘Repugnant Conclusion’ (RC) claims that, for any possible
population in which every life is excellent, there is a better one in which
every life is barely worth living (Parfit, 1986).1 The Repugnant Conclusion
is widely, although not universally, regarded as unacceptable. There are,
nonetheless, many arguments in favour of RC. Some of these are based on
relatively specific axiological theories. For example, the most obvious versions
1Parfit’s original formulation of RC contains a ceteris paribus clause. I prefer to un-
derstand ‘populations’ as abstract welfare distributions falling under a relation of intrinsic
betterness, in which case the ceteris paribus clause is unnecessary. But the reader may
reformulate to taste.
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of total utilitarianism entail RC. I am going to consider some arguments for
RC which, in contrast, appeal to very general intuitions about the structure
of the good.
These so-called ‘spectrum arguments’ were pioneered by Parfit and honed
to an art by Gustaf Arrhenius (2013). They have also been pressed, from a
slightly different vantage point, by Stuart Rachels (2004) and Larry Temkin
(2012).2 I think that everyone in this literature has noticed – but also, in
general, rapidly dismissed – the objection that these spectrum arguments are
at least superficially similar to sorites arguments, and that, therefore, they
might be unsound in the same way that sorites arguments are unsound. Just
as sorites arguments confirm that tallness and redness and baldness are vague,
so too, the thought goes, spectrum arguments do no more than confirm that
betterness is vague. We should not accept that everyone is tall, or that there
are no heaps, on the basis of the sorites; no more should we accept RC on the
basis of the spectrum arguments. Call this the indeterminacy thesis. Despite
having occurred to almost everyone, I do not think that the indeterminacy
thesis has been properly spelled out. And once it is spelled out, it is – so I
shall argue – very hard to dismiss.
Let me introduce my argument by considering two preliminary issues.
First, since the most common examples of vague predicates, like ‘tall’,
are unary predicates rather than relations, it may not be obvious what it
means to claim that ‘better than’ is vague. The simplest way to think about
2In this paper I will focus on the Repugnant Conclusion to keep things relatively
concrete. But spectrum arguments similar to the ones I will discuss have been put forth
in many different contexts – see Temkin (2012, ch. 2 and 5) for a survey – and almost
everything I say could be adapted to the general case.
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this is that, for some precise state of affairs X , the unary predicate ‘better
than X ’ is vague.3 This helps us navigate the following common point of
confusion. One might think that ‘tall’ is vague, but the comparative ‘taller
than’ is precise; in analogy, one might think that ‘good’ is vague, but ‘better
than’ must be precise. What I agree with in this thought is that often ‘good’
means something like ‘better than the standard’, and one reason why ‘good’ is
vague is that the standard is vague.4 Even if ‘better than’ were precise, ‘good’
would still be vague, since the standard would be vague. But this does not
show that ‘better than X ’ is precise when X is precise. For example, it might
be indeterminate whether X includes some particular good-making feature.
Or there might be numerous factors with respect to which something can be
better than X , and it might be indeterminate how these factors weigh up.
Some non-normative comparatives, like ‘hairier than’, exhibit vagueness of
both these kinds. It is often a vague matter which of two precisely specified
heads is hairier than the other. In some cases, it is indeterminate whether
one of the heads instantiates a particular ‘hairy-making feature’ (e.g. some
hairs are semi-detached and it is indeterminate whether they count); in other
cases, it is indeterminate how various factors weigh up (e.g. the number of
3I assume that betterness, in the relevant sense, is a relation between states of affairs. By
a ‘precise’ state of affairs I mean something like an exactly specified microphysical state; it
should not admit any borderline cases of instantiation. The point, as I discuss below, is to
rule out cases in which ‘better than X ’ is vague just because X is vague.
I will also consider some more complicated unary predicates derived from ‘better than’,
but ‘better than X ’ indicates the main idea. In general, one should presumably say that a
binary relation is vague if and only if it is vague as a unary predicate of ordered pairs. If
R admits sorites series of pairs, it may not be true that, for some x , the unary predicate
R(−, x ) admits sorites too. For example, consider the relation on natural numbers such
that R(x , y ) is true if and only if x is small and y = x . This is intuitively a vague relation,
and indeed admits a sorites series (1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3), . . .. But, for any fixed x , the unary
predicates R(x ,−) and R(−, x ) do not.
4See DeRose (2008) for one careful discussion of the semantics of gradable adjectives.
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hairs, the length of the hairs, and the way they are distributed). Similarly,
‘taller than’ is vague in at least the first of these ways. So it is simply irrelevant
that ‘better than’ is a binary predicate, or that some paradigmatic cases of
vagueness arise through a comparison to a vague standard.5
Here is the second preliminary point. Part of the indeterminacy thesis is
that certain arguments with the logical form of sorites arguments are genuine
sorites arguments, i.e. they fail in a characteristically vagueness-related way.
But this thesis does not at all suppose or suggest that every argument of the
sorites form is a genuine sorites. For example, as far as logical form goes,
a sorites argument is essentially a case of mathematical induction. In that
sense, the usual proof that the sum of the first n odd numbers equals n2 has
the same form as a sorites argument. But this similarity is no reason to think
that the proof is unsound.6 There are three main factors that distinguish an
arithmetical case like this from the normative case at hand. Noting them
here will help to set up the dialectic.
First, we are quite generally disinclined to think that arithmetic might
be vague.7 In contrast, moral discourse is almost always carried out in
vague terms: things that people deem to matter, like personhood or happiness,
are bound to admit borderline cases. There are, besides, many different
morally relevant respects in which one state of affairs might be better than
another. It is at least plausibly vague how these respects weigh up. Thus
5Temkin (2012, §9.2.3), following RyanWasserman, considers spectrum-like arguments
for ‘hairier than’ and other non-normative predicates. To the extent that those arguments
are paradoxical, the discussion in this paper can be adapted straightforwardly to them.
6I thank Theron Pummer for pressing this point.
7I set aside here the idea that there might be some sort of indeterminacy in the more
arcane corners of mathematics – for example, concerning the truth of the axiom of choice.
This purported indeterminacy does not generate sorites series.
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many have thought moral vagueness to be pervasive, and have put forward
sorites arguments as evidence of this fact.8 The indeterminacy thesis need
not overcome a general presumption against vagueness.
Second, although it might at first be surprising that the sum of the first
n odd numbers is n2, this is because it appears unlikely – who would have
guessed! – rather than repugnant. There is no countervailing intuition that we
cannot rather quickly set aside. In contrast, the Repugnant Conclusion strikes
many as false, and not merely unlikely.9 The spectrum arguments, and not
the arithmetical induction, have the air of paradox. And it is only paradoxical
sorites-like arguments that indicate vagueness. To put it another way, the
indeterminacy thesis is supported by inference to the best explanation. But
if a sorites-like argument is not paradoxical, then there is nothing to explain,
and the inference fails.
Finally, the axioms of arithmetic are more fundamental than any hy-
potheses about the sum of odd numbers, to the extent that the axioms are
sometimes considered definitive of their subject matter. In contrast, the
negation of RC is roughly on a par with the kind of premisses from which
RC is purportedly derived. So there is more room than in the arithmetical
case to think of a spectrum argument as a reductio of its premisses.
As these comments should make clear, the indeterminacy thesis will
8See Shafer-Landau (1995) and Constantinescu (2014), Dougherty (2014), Schoenfield
(2015), and Dunaway (2016) for recent examples.
9It is worth mentioning here that although I will focus on RC, some of the spectrum
arguments lead to even more striking conclusions. For example, theVery Repugnant Con-
clusion (Arrhenius, 2003): any world in which every life is excellent would be worse than
some world in which there are vastly many more lives that are full of unmitigated suffering,
and all the other lives are only just worth living. The indeterminacy thesis applies to these
spectrum arguments as well.
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have only indirect interest to those who accept the Repugnant Conclusion
independently of the spectrum arguments, and for whom, consequently,
there is no paradox. However, as it turns out, the philosophers who have
most emphasised the spectrum arguments have also tended to see the denial of
RC (or at least some related condition) as non-negotiable, and have therefore
found these arguments profoundly worrying. While Parfit is steadfast in
his hope to find an adequate ‘Theory X’ that avoids RC, Arrhenius sees the
spectrum arguments as ‘impossibility theorems’, threatening to undermine
the basic methodology of moral philosophy. Temkin and Rachels have a
more specific, but perhaps equally radical, diagnosis: they take the spectrum
arguments to show that ‘better than’ is not a transitive relation. This itself
threatens to leave axiology and practical reason in disarray.
In such a context, the indeterminacy thesis offers an extremely conser-
vative way forward. It affirms (or is at least compatible with) transitivity,
and revises the inductive premisses of the spectrum arguments only to the
extent that the right theory of vagueness revises the inductive premisses of
sorites arguments.10 I will have much to say about this in section 4. The
bottom line, though, is that (on most views!) we constantly and successfully
reason with vague concepts. The vagueness of ‘better than’ is no threat to
the general cogency of axiological thinking.
Here is an outline of the paper. My first goal is to develop the indeter-
minacy thesis and establish a positive case for it. In section 2, I introduce
10Of course, some approaches to vagueness affirm the premisses of the sorites argument,
but call into question its validity. I will also consider this sort of move, but it is convenient
mainly to speak in terms of revisions of the premisses.
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the basic spectrum argument and discuss its main premisses. In section 3,
I explain the formal relationship between spectrum arguments and sorites
arguments. In section 4, I explain why, given this formal relationship, the
indeterminacy thesis is hard to dismiss. I also contrast indeterminacy with
cognates like parity and imprecise equality.
The thesis of indeterminacy does not involve a commitment to any par-
ticular axiology, or, indeed, to any particular theory of vagueness. My second
goal is to illustrate how the view works under some further assumptions.
First, in section 5, I specialise to theories of vagueness like supervaluationism
that adhere fairly closely to classical logic. Then, in section 6, I specialise
even further by providing a toy model.
I next use this discussion to address some objections. The most explicit
and best-developed objection to the indeterminacy thesis is the one in chapter
9 of Temkin (2012). He claims that there is a basic structural disanalogy
between spectrum arguments and sorites arguments. I explain why this
argument misses its mark in section 7. Then, in section 8, I consider a
more elaborate spectrum argument based on an assumption of ‘non-elitism’.
I explain how the indeterminacy thesis applies to this kind of spectrum
argument, and suggest two ways it can rebuff the charge of elitism.
Finally, in section 9, I recap and re-evaluate how my case for the indeter-
minacy thesis shifts the dialectical balance.
2 The Basic Spectrum Argument
Let us look at the basic spectrum argument (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: The populations Pi at welfare levels wi .
As usual in this literature, each rectangle represents a population; the
height represents the quality of life in the population, and the width represents
the number of lives. We first consider (on the left) a population P0 of high-
quality, henceforth ‘blissful’ lives, corresponding to a welfare level w0. We
construct a sequence of better and better populations, P1, P2, and so on.
GivenPi , we constructPi+1 by decreasing the quality of life a small amount,
from wi to wi+1 – the difference corresponding, perhaps, to a single grain of
chocolate – while adding many more new people at the lower level. The idea
is that we lose some value insofar as the quality of life falls, but we gain even
more, because we gain so many new good lives.
Thus the argument relies on a principle which, following Arrhenius, I
call
The Quantity Condition
Suppose that wi , wi+1 are positive welfare levels, such that wi+1
is lower than wi , but the difference between them is small. Then,
for any number N > 0,
(QC) Any sufficiently large populationPi+1 of lives at level wi+1
would be better than a population Pi of N lives at level
w .
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By applying principle QC sufficiently many times, we end up with a popu-
lation Pn, on the right, in which all the lives are ‘drab’, or only just worth
living. We make things better and better and better, so we reach the repug-
nant conclusion: for any initial population P0 of blissful lives, at level w0,
there is a better population Pn of drab lives, at level wn.
Before comparing this argument to a sorites argument, let me clear up
the status of its premisses. There are two important implicit premisses. First,
we have relied on some sort of finiteness or boundedness condition: we have
assumed that it is possible to get from the blissful level w0 to the drab level wn
by a finite number of ‘small’ decrements. This is open to question, but I leave
that discussion for other work (Chapter I of this thesis). Second, we have
assumed that the relation ‘better than’ is transitive. We have said that each
population is better than the one before, but to get that the last population is
better than the first, we need transitivity. Some people think that transitivity
is a logical feature of grammatical comparatives like ‘better than’.11 On the
other hand, Temkin and Rachels have taken spectrum arguments like this one
to provide a reductio of transitivity. Whether or not the appeal to grammar
is sufficient, abandoning transitivity strikes many of us as a desperate move.
It is the kind of desperate move that the indeterminacy thesis allows us to
avoid.
Finally, the main explicit premiss, the Quantity Condition, is also con-
troversial. It is controversial how, if at all, the size of a population contributes
to its value. For example, average utilitarianism has its prima facie attractions.
But it denies that any population at level wi+1 can be better than one at level
11See Broome (2004, §4.1) for a forceful statement of this view.
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wi , if wi+1 is lower than wi . So average utilitarianism denies QC. Similarly,
many people are attracted to some version of the idea that adding good lives
to a population is morally neutral.12 Suppose we elevate that to an axiological
principle: adding good lives to a population does not make it better. Since
Pi is surely better than a same-size population P at level wi+1, and adding
good lives to P to get Pi+1 does not make it better, it seems that Pi+1
cannot be better than P . (There are many subtleties here; I wish merely to
point out the basic difficulty.)
There are two things to say about this. First, there are some more com-
plicated spectrum arguments which arguably circumvent the controversy.
I would like, until section 8, to bracket those complications and focus on
this simplest case. Second, isomorphic arguments are sometimes made in
less controversial settings. For example, Temkin and Rachels present an
argument that any pain, no matter how long and torturous, is better than a
mild but sufficiently long headache. The argument proceeds on the basis of
the following analogue of QC:
Suppose that Ii , Ii+1 are levels of pain intensity, and the dif-
ference between them is small. Suppose that Pi is a pain of
constant intensity Ii . Then a sufficiently long pain of constant
intensity Ii+1 would be worse than Pi+1.
This is much less controversial than QC. At least, a pain of fixed intensity
is undoubtedly worse the longer it goes on. The main points of this paper
12In Narveson’s famous formulation, ‘We are in favor of making people happy, but
neutral about making happy people’ (1973, p. 80).
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apply, mutatis mutandis, to the more complicated arguments in population
ethics as well as to the argument about pain.
3 Sorites Arguments
Now I will explain the formal connection between the basic spectrum argu-
ment and sorites arguments. It will help to have some standard examples of
sorites arguments in mind. A sorites argument about tallness might go like
this. We have a sequence of one thousand people, p1, p2, and so on, each
one millimeter shorter than the last. Here are the two premisses (I present
the second as a schema, a choice that will become relevant in section 5).
(A) The first person, being 2m tall, is tall.
(B) If pi is tall, then pi+1 is also tall.
One millimeter never makes the difference between tall and not tall. But
then, by repeated modus ponens, we may conclude
(C) The last person, p1000, is tall, despite being only 1m in
height.
More generally, one can prove in this way that everyone of whatever height
is tall. The conclusion is absurd, and almost no one thinks that we should
accept it on the basis of this argument.
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Let me give a second example of a sorites argument.13 This second
example provides a typical example of axiological vagueness. We consider an
embryo at different stages in its development, going one second at a time.
It would be better to destroy the one-day-old embryo than to cut off
my thumb.
If it would be better to destroy the embryo at one time than to cut off
my thumb, it would still be better to destroy the embryo one second
later than to cut off my thumb.
But then
It would always be better to destroy the embryo, even as a 39-week-old
foetus, than to cut off my thumb.
This seems to be a completely standard sorites argument for ‘better to x than
to cut off my thumb’. The existence of sorites arguments in a normative
context should not, after all, be surprising. If anything, the orthodoxy is that
few things are completely precise outside of mathematics and fundamental
physics.
Now, the general resemblance between the spectrum argument and the
sorites arguments is obvious: they all involve a long sequence of steps. How-
ever, it is perhaps less obvious what exactly the formal relationship is between
them. Let me explain that now.
13Roughly the same example is given in Schoenfield (2015); she works with permissibility
rather than betterness.
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In fact, there are at least two ways of drawing the connection. As we will
see, the second way makes the analogy somewhat clearer, but let me start
with the way that has been most considered in the literature. On this first
way of doing things, the putatively vague predicate, the analogue of ‘tall’, is
‘better than P0’. So a population is F (let us say) if and only if it is better
than P0. We have by construction
(A1) P1 is better than P0.
(To make (A1) even more convincing, we could replace it by the tautological
‘P0 is at least as good as P0’, although that would not, strictly speaking, be
of the form ‘x is F ’.) We also have
(B1) If Pi is better than P0, then Pi+1 is better than P0.
Why? By construction, Pi+1 is better than Pi ; so, by transitivity, if Pi is
better than P0, then Pi+1 is also better than P0.
Finally, iterating modus ponens, we deduce
(C1) The last population, Pn , is better than P0.
That is one way to put the spectrum argument in the form of a sorites
argument. However, there is a different way of doing it, which is I think
more fundamental. On this second way, instead of considering the sequence
of populations, we consider the corresponding sequence of welfare levels.
The predicate in question is ‘G ’ defined by the following biconditional.14
14Qizilbash (2005) explicitly considers this predicate, and the view he sketches resembles
the toy model I describe in section 6.
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(Predicate G) A welfare level w is G if and only if a population
of sufficiently many lives at level w would be better than P0.
Recall that w1 through wn are the welfare levels of the lives in populations
P1 through Pn . First of all, we have
(A2) The first welfare level, w1, is G .
(We could, again, replace (A2) by a more tautologous claim: a population of
sufficiently many lives at level w0 would be at least as good as P0.) Then we
have the inductive premiss,
(B2) If wi is G , then wi+1 is also G .
Why is that? According to QC, given any population at level wi , a sufficiently
large population at level wi+1 would be better. So, given a population at level
wi that is better than P0, a sufficiently large population at level wi+1 would
be better still.
Therefore, we can deduce
(C2) The last welfare level, wn , is G .
That is just to say that sufficiently many drab lives would be better than the
blissful population P0 – whence the Repugnant Conclusion.
The two versions of the argument, (A1,B1,C1) and (A2,B2,C2), are very
closely related. But the first form of the argument slightly obscures the logic,
and is less clearly analogous to a standard sorites. Let me explain why.
Suppose that one tried to deny some instance of premiss (B1). This
would be confused: the populations Pi are constructed to make (B1) true.
II -4 SORITES ARGUMENTS 59
The only thing that we can do is to deny that the construction succeeds. In
contrast, one can straightforwardly deny (B2). So the second form of the
argument makes the logic clearer.
It is also more clearly analogous to the standard sorites. Consider again
the case of tallness. We have an underlying parameter, the height, which is
precise for all intents and purposes.15 This parameter changes gradually from
one case to the next, and whether or not someone is tall depends only on
this parameter; tallness is a matter of height. That is also what is happening
in the second form of the spectrum argument. We have a single precise
parameter – namely, the welfare level – that varies gradually from one case
to the next, and whether the predicate G applies is, again, simply a matter
of that parameter. But the first form of the spectrum argument is a little bit
different. The cases P1 through Pn differ along two dimensions. As before,
there is gradual variation in one parameter, the welfare level, but there is also
potentially massive variation in the size of the populations. And whether or
not a population is better than P0 depends on both of these parameters, not
just on a single parameter that varies gradually. This is a way in which the
argument (A1,B1,C1) is different from a standard sorites argument.16
15 This is not to deny that my height is vague. It is presumably vague which atoms are
part of me, and therefore my spatial extent is vague. The claim is rather that whether or not
I am tall supervenes on my height, and yet the vagueness of ‘tall’ is not simply a matter of
the vagueness of height. We can assume that each person in the sequence has a height that
is definitely within half a millimeter of the specified value.
16Despite this concession, I think that the parameter-dependence of the two sequences
is more similar than it may appear. I will come back to this in section 7.
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4 The Indeterminacy Thesis
The central claim of the indeterminacy thesis, as applied to the spectrum
argument of section 2, is that (A2,B2,C2) is a sorites argument. The basic
argument for the indeterminacy thesis is inference to the best explanation. If
it walks like a duck, and it quacks like a duck, then it surely is a duck. So
too, insofar as (A2,B2,C2)
(a) has the same form as a sorites argument, and
(b) is paradoxical in the same way as a sorites argument,
it surely is a sorites argument. Before explaining in more detail why the
indeterminacy thesis is, at least, a good explanation, let me elaborate a bit on
(a) and (b), and address some initial objections.
The basic sense of (a) is that (A2,B2,C2) has the same logical form as
the standard sorites argument (A,B,C). In light of the discussion at the end
of section 3, I can add that the cases considered in the argument represent
gradual variations in a single precise parameter. That is not quite a matter of
logical form, but it is part of the form more broadly. As for (b), the main
thing I have in mind is that the premisses of the argument have a great deal
of intuitive support, and the conclusion is extremely counter-intuitive. At
least, many people have thought so, and in this paper I am simply taking
such intuitions as read.
Still, it is natural to wonder whether there isn’t some deeper sense in
which (a) and (b) fail, or whether there isn’t some disanalogy of another kind.
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Let me mention a common initial thought along these lines. Many of my
respondents have pointed out that to accept the conclusion of the tallness
sorites would involve a fundamental conceptual confusion. One would have
failed to understand what it means to be tall. In contrast, even the most
hardened opponent of RC should not claim that those who accept it simply
fail to understand the word ‘better’. Now, I agree that this is a difference
between the two cases, but the question is whether this difference undermines
the indeterminacy thesis. Betterness is conceptually and epistemically subtler
than tallness, but what does that show? The challenge for opponents of the
indeterminacy thesis is to find a difference and explain why it matters. The
minimum aim of this paper is to convince the reader that the challenge has
not yet been met, and that, moreover, there are reasons to think that the
challenge is a hard one.
Another initial objection is that the conditions (a) and (b) refer specifically
to the argument (A2,B2,C2). So even if (A2,B2,C2) is a sorites argument,
this does not show that the original spectrum argument (whether understood
in the form (A1,B1,C1), or in some other way) is a sorites argument. I may
have identified a sorites argument, but I have not said anything about the
argument in which everyone else is interested. In responding to this objection,
let me set aside the thought that considerations parallel to (a) and (b) apply
to (A1,B1,C1), and perhaps to other arguments in the neighbourhood. After
all, I conceded in section 3 that (A1,B1,C1) might in some ways be dissimilar
to a standard sorites. My main response is, rather, that if (A2,B2,C2) fails
because of vagueness, then, as a matter of logic, (A1,B1,C1), and all other
arguments in the neighbourhood, also fail because of vagueness, whether
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or not they are sorites arguments in the strictest sense. I will develop this
response in section 5, when I specialise to a particular logic of vagueness.
Let me now elaborate on why the indeterminacy thesis is a good explana-
tion of (a) and (b), and hence a good working hypothesis. I claim it is both
conservative and charitable in important ways.
First, it is theoretically conservative. It identifies the data given by the
spectrum argument as an instance of a widespread phenomenon, something
we were committed to explaining anyway. We do not need any new theoretical
or conceptual resources; we have completely general reasons for thinking that
betterness is vague and admits sorites sequences. And absent any presumption
against vagueness, we might come to the indeterminacy thesis in the following
way. Suppose that we deny RC. We then believe that some welfare levels
are G , and that some welfare levels are not G ; in particular, we accept (A2)
and deny (C2). Moreover, we have quite general grounds for thinking that
G , like most things outside fundamental physics, is vague. But, if in doubt,
there is a standard way to check: look for a sorites sequence, a sequence
w1, w2, . . . , wn of welfare levels that intuitively satisfy the inductive premiss
(B2). This is, at least at a first pass, what it means for G to be vague.17 Is there
such a sequence? Yes: that is exactly what the spectrum argument shows. It
shows that G is vague. Of course, there is something of a problem, because
(A2) and (B2) entail (C2). But we know the name of this problem: it is the
sorites paradox, and nothing else.
17See, for example, Bueno and Colyvan (2012) for a defence of the view that ‘A predicate
is vague just in case it can be employed to generate a sorites argument’ (p. 29). Whether or
not this is exactly right, the existence of a sorites series must be strong prima facie evidence
of vagueness.
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The second point is that the indeterminacy thesis promises to leave
untouched most of our axiological thinking. Again, vagueness is widespread;
we habitually work with vague concepts. What I take the sorites paradox
to show, among other things, is that reasoning with vague predicates is a
delicate matter. But it is not as if vague predicates suffer from irretrievable
incoherence. We don’t need to give them up altogether, and we couldn’t if
we wanted to. By the same token, according to the indeterminacy thesis,
the spectrum arguments show that axiology is a delicate matter, but it is
not rotten through and through. I note here that in this paper I am purely
concerned with what is better than what, rather than with what one ought
to do (even if I occasionally slip into the language of choice). So I will only
incidentally consider an important question – what value vagueness means
for moral choice.18
Third, the indeterminacy thesis is charitable to our intuitions. Theories
of vagueness typically point to some defect in the inductive premiss (B). But,
in doing so, they also aim to tell us what is right about it: why it seems
compelling, and to what extent it might be reliable in ordinary circumstances.
According to the indeterminacy thesis, the very same considerations will
explain why the premiss (B) in the spectrum argument seems compelling
and in some sense reliable.
I take these to be three theoretical virtues of the indeterminacy thesis.
The third one is particularly significant: it means that it is hard to argue
against the indeterminacy thesis based on intuitions, since the indeterminacy
18See Williams (2014a); Dunaway (2016); Moss (2016) for recent work on this subject.
I plan to address this issue in future work.
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thesis promises to explain away those intuitions. There is a final feature of
the indeterminacy thesis which has a similar significance. The final feature is
that there is very little consensus about what the correct theory of vagueness
might be. Therefore the exact implications of the indeterminacy thesis are
very hard to pin down, and therefore the indeterminacy thesis is very hard
to refute. The situation is even more difficult because most treatments of
vagueness stray to some extent, and in different ways, from classical logic.
So not only is it hard to know what the implications are, it is hard to know
what the right notion of ‘implication’ is! (I will consider some examples in
the next section.) In addition, one need not take the view that vagueness is a
monolithic phenomenon. One could defensibly claim that the vagueness of
tallness and the vagueness of betterness arise in different ways, have different
logics, or have different cognitive roles. So it is not enough to argue that
the theory of vagueness that is appropriate to tallness is inappropriate to
betterness.19
To be clear: this under-specification is not a theoretical virtue of the
indeterminacy thesis. I would by no means put it forth as a reason for
endorsing the thesis. It is, nonetheless, a reason why the indeterminacy thesis
is an effective spoiler: the dialectical force of the spectrum arguments is
diminished to the extent that the indeterminacy thesis might be true, and it
is hard to rule it out.
19Embracing pluralism in this way does not undercut the first point above, insofar as we
are already committed to giving a theory of the vagueness of betterness. It is not too surprising
that normative vagueness might be sui generis, if one accepts that normative facts are sui
generis. SeeWilliams (2012) for a discussion of pluralism about indeterminacy, and especially
Williams (2014b, §1) for the importance of distinguishing theories of indeterminacy by
cognitive role.
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Parity and Imprecise Equality
Let me illustrate these considerations by distinguishing the indeterminacy
thesis from some others in the neighbourhood. Parfit (2016) has been
developing a view which he calls ‘the Imprecise Lexical View’ which has at
least a family resemblance to the kind of model I have in mind. The salient
difference is that, for him, the central notion is not vagueness but what he
calls ‘imprecise equality’.The indeterminacy thesis claims that we cannot
guarantee that Pi+1 is better than Pi ; it may be indeterminate whether this
is true. On Parfit’s view, it may (instead) turn out that Pi+1 is imprecisely
equally as good as Pi . Another potentially distinct view would appeal to
‘parity’ rather than vagueness: sometimes, it would claim, Pi+1 is merely on
a par with Pi .
And so the question arises: supposing that the diagnosis I am pushing
is generally right, in that the spectrum arguments point beyond a determi-
nate and precise trichotomy of value relations. Is what’s going on actually
vagueness, or is it something else, like parity?20
First, some general comments. There is much disagreement in the liter-
ature about whether various cases are cases of parity or of vagueness. And,
to my mind, the arguments are not very strong either way. For example, in
the case I considered earlier of destroying an embryo versus cutting off my
thumb, I am sympathetic to the idea that there is more than vagueness in
play. Perhaps, for some broad range of cases, destroying the embryo is on
par with, or imprecisely as bad as, cutting off my thumb. But, on the other
20I focus on parity because it is more widely studied than imprecise equality; as far as I
can tell, though, the following comments could apply to either one.
II -4 THE INDETERMINACY THESIS 66
hand, perhaps such cases are adequately analysed in terms of vagueness. The
distinctions, are especially difficult to make if you think that there is such a
thing as metaphysical vagueness. In Chang’s work on parity (Chang, 2002),
it seems that parity is supposed to be some deep structural feature of value,
whereas vagueness is something lightweight and conventional and merely
linguistic. If you think that there is metaphysical vagueness, then this kind
of distinction can’t really be the operative one.21
Nonetheless, let me reiterate why I think the indeterminacy thesis has
the upper hand over the analogous parity thesis. The trump card of the
indeterminacy thesis is that it promises an account of why the inductive
premiss (B2) seems true. That is why the thesis is hard to dismiss; it explains
away the countervailing intuitions. I will have some more to say about how
this works in section 5, but the basic idea is that the indeterminacy thesis
does not outright deny any instance of QC – it claims that some instances are
borderline true. Parity-based views do not have this kind of structure. They
outright deny some instances of QC, introducing an alternative hypothesis –
namely, that a sufficiently large population Pi+1 at level wi+1 would be on a
par with Pi . Moreover, cases of parity are fundamentally symmetrical. If
Pi+1 is on a par with Pi , there is no reason why Pi+1 should seem better
than Pi , rather than vice versa; there is no reason why the inductive premiss
(B2) would appear true instead of false. This does not accurately reflect the
21This is one way in which axiological vagueness might differ from the vagueness of
tallness (cf. footnote 19). Despite recent work on the subject (see Barnes and Williams
(2011); Wasserman (2015); Wilson (2016) for three very different approaches), there is
widespread skepticism about metaphysical vagueness. Schoenfield (2015) argues that moral
vagueness must be metaphysical vagueness, given moral realism. In general, it seems clear
that questions about axiological vagueness lead quickly into metaethics (Schiffer, 2002;
Constantinescu, 2014; Dougherty, 2014).
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psychology of the spectrum arguments.
The first theoretical virtue of the indeterminacy thesis is also relevant
here. Not everyone accepts the possibility of parity, but everyone should
accept the possibility of vagueness. And even if we have independent reasons
to accept the possibility of parity, it is not clear why it should play a role here.
Vagueness can do the work, just as it does in every other sorites argument.
5 Classical Versions of the Indeterminacy
Thesis
The basic stance of the indeterminacy thesis is: tell me what to say about
sorites arguments, and I’ll tell you what to say about spectrum arguments.
It is not my business here to decide what one should, in fact, say about
sorites arguments. However, in this section, I will briefly sketch some typical
approaches to the sorites. The purpose is to give at least a sense of what the
final picture might look like, and to ground further discussion of the thesis.
Classical versus non-classical
Theories of vagueness can, in the first instance, be divided into those that
respect classical logic, and those that do not. In the first camp I include
epistemicism and supervaluationism, while truth-functional degree theories
fall in the second.22 ‘Respecting’ classical logic means, for one thing, that
22It is a vexed question what ‘the’ logic of supervaluationism is; see Varzi (2007) for an
overview. In this paper, I adopt a ‘local’ perspective, according to which the truth predicate is
disquotational. The logic of truth preservation is then a classical modal logic (KT or stronger,
often assumed to be S5) with respect to the operator ‘It is definitely true that’ (or ‘Definitely’
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classically valid inferences preserve definite truth.23 In particular, the the-
orems of classical predicate logic like excluded middle come out definitely
true. Views in this first group must accept the existence of cutoffs:
Tallness Cutoffs
There exists a person pi such that pi is tall and pi+1 is not.
This is the most obvious cost of these classical theories; I will say more about
it soon. In contrast, non-classical theories may deny, or anyway not entail
Tallness Cutoffs. The ways to do this are potentially diverse, but, as Bacon
(2015, §1.1.1) has argued, one typically has to give up a wide swathe of
classical logic including (for example) the axiom of conjuctive syllogism:24
(CS) (P →Q )∧ (Q → R)→ (P → R).
Now, of course, departing from classical logic to this extent is a cost to the
theory. But, as far as the indeterminacy thesis is concerned, it is a sunk cost.
Giving up such classical theorems as (CS) is already justified (if at all) by
standard cases of vagueness. It is not something the indeterminacy thesis
needs to justify anew. To put it another way: if one finds such revisions
for short). The more traditional ‘global’ approach to supervaluationism (see e.g. Keefe
(2000)), identifies truth with supertruth. The truth predicate is then not disquotational,
and the obvious notion of validity invalidates classical metarules like conditional proof. But
the difference between these approaches is not very important for me here, and everything I
say could be rephrased in ‘global’ terms.
23So e.g. we have modal axiom K. I tend to speak of ‘definite’ truth rather than ‘de-
terminate’ truth, because it is less of a mouthful. As usual, a sentence or proposition is
indeterminate or borderline if it is neither definitely true nor definitely false. Also, see Smith
(2013, especially §5.2) for an account of vagueness that claims to preserve classical validity
without affirming classical tautologies as definitely true.
24Example: in traditional fuzzy logic, suppose that P, Q , R have degrees of truth 1, 1/2, 0
respectively. Then (CS) has degree of truth 1/2. (This works whether we define ‘→’ in
terms of negation and disjunction, or use the Łukasiewicz conditional.)
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of logic objectionable, that is a reason to reject non-classical theories of
vagueness; it is not a reason to reject the indeterminacy thesis.
In most of what follows I will concentrate on classical theories of vague-
ness. This is, in part, because I find them more plausible, and in part because
they are more tractable: it is fairly easy to say what the indeterminacy thesis
looks like, and to do so in fairly specific terms, even if there is some variety
among classical views (e.g. epistemicism versus supervaluationism). There is
also the sociological fact that supervaluationism is a common default theory,
even if it is not universally endorsed.
A final reason for focusing on classical theories of vagueness is that
they make certain debates much clearer. I have mentioned that one debate
surrounds the role of parity; another surrounds transitivity. But it is not
entirely clear what these debates are about, outside of a classical framework.
On classical views, it is obvious what it means to affirm trichotomy (and
hence exclude parity): given populations P andQ,
Trichotomy
P is better thanQ, or P is worse thanQ, or P is exactly as
good asQ.
Classical views can endorse this disjunction while allowing that there may be
cases in which none of the disjuncts definitely applies. They can thus affirm
trichotomy while allowing that betterness is vague. In contrast, non-classical
theories typically do not affirm the disjunction unless one of the disjuncts is
definitely true. They reject trichotomy in roughly the same way they reject
bivalence. The best they can ensure is that the disjunction is not definitely
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false.
Similar considerations apply to transitivity. Classical theories can affirm
the conditional:
Transitivity
IfP is better thanQ andQ is better thanR , thenP is better
thanR .
In non-classical theories of vagueness, the conditional may often fail to be
definitely true, so it is unclear how such a theory can affirm transitivity. At
least heuristically, transitivity fails in the same way that (CS) fails.
Applications to the Spectrum Argument
Now let me discuss classical versions of the indeterminacy thesis in more
detail. As I have explained, the upfront cost of classical theories is that they
endorse Tallness Cutoffs and its analogues. The corresponding version of the
indeterminacy thesis transposes this to the setting of the spectrum argument,
endorsing
G-ness Cutoffs
There exists a welfare level wi such that wi is G and wi+1 is not.
This is counterintuitive. However, Tallness Cuttoffs is also counterintuitive.
Unless we can point to some relevant difference between the two cases,
the countering intuitions are objections to classical views of vagueness, not
objections to the indeterminacy thesis per se.
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Notice thatTallness Cutoffs is just the claim that the inductive premiss (B)
has some false instance. So the task of explaining why (B) seems compelling
is closely related to the task of explaining why Tallness Cutoffs seems false.
The claim of the indeterminacy thesis is that the same explanations work for
(B2) and G -ness Cutoffs respectively. There are two types of considerations
usually adduced.
The scope error
The first type of consideration is that (B) has no definitely false instances.
This lulls us into thinking that it has no false instances.25 To put it another
way, Tallness Cutoffs, though true, is easily confounded with a claim which
is similar but false:
Narrow-Scope Tallness Cutoffs
There exists a person pi such that, definitely, pi is tall and pi+1
is not.
This amounts to a scope error for the operator ‘definitely’: definitely, Tallness
Cutoffs is true, but we think it is false because we mistakenly move ‘definitely’
within the scope of the existential quantifier.
What would be really counterintuitive, by these lights, would be to have
an assertable (or knowable, or distinctly conceivable) instance of ‘pi is tall
and pi+1 is not’. But, typically, the assertability of S tracks the definite truth
of S . Since this sentence schema has no definitely true instances, it has no
25See for example Keefe (2000, pp. 185-6).
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assertable instances.26 It is, moreover, plausible that all of the instances are far
from definitely true, and thus far from assertable; I will take this up below.
Now, if this is right, we can certainly use the same maneuver in the case
of the spectrum argument. The claim will be that the inductive premiss
(B2) has no definitely false instances, even though some of its instances are
borderline. Insofar as G -ness Cutoffs seems false, it is because we conflate it
with something else: the claim that there exists a determinate cutoff.27
Here is a possible objection. We do not reject G -ness Cutoffs because
we conflate it with something else; we reject it because (B2) follows from
Transitivity and QC. To answer this objection, we can just change the level
of explanation. Assuming that Transitivity is definitely true, (B2) is logically
equivalent to QC. Why do we accept QC? All the same considerations can
apply. QC has no definitely false instances, and this lulls us into thinking it
has no false instances. Or, if you prefer, the negation of QC has no definitely
true instances, hence no assertable instances. We are mistaken about the
status of QC in a way characteristic of vagueness – and as a result we are
mistaken about the status of (B2), in the very same characteristic way.
Degrees of Truth
There is a second strategy, complementary to the first. (A version of this
strategy is also typically evoked by non-classical theories of vagueness.) The
26At least at a first pass, supervaluationists and epistemicists take the same line here;
epistemicists, of course, emphasise an epistemic reading of ‘definitely’.
27‘There exists a determinate cutoff’ is just shorthand for ‘There is a welfare level wi such
that, definitely, wi is G and wi+1 is not’. Thus Narrow-Scope Tallness Cutoffs claims that
there exists a determinate cutoff for tallness.
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idea is that there are gradations between definite truth and definite falsehood;
I will call the levels ‘degrees of truth’, although, as Dorothy Edgington (1996)
observed, ‘degrees of closeness to definite truth’ might be more apt, since the
theories I am considering affirm bivalence. Thus if x is definitely not tall,
then ‘x is tall’ has the lowest possible degree of truth (let us call it 0); this
should increase continuously with the height of x , attaining its maximum
(let us call it 1) when x is definitely tall.
One can always make sense of something akin to degrees of truth. One
can rank propositions by the relation of definite material implication. That
is, T is at least as highly ranked as S if, definitely, S implies T . In superval-
uationist terms, T is true on every precisification on which S is true. This
relation is a preorder, i.e. it is reflexive and transitive. A theory of degrees of
truth might refine this logically defined ranking in some way (but everything
I say can be understood in terms of the logical ranking). For example, sup-
posing that there is a probability measure on the set of precisifications, the
degree of truth of a sentence may be the measure of the set of precisfications
on which it is true.28 In any case, all definitely true propositions have the
same (highest) rank, and all definitely false propositions have the same (low-
est) rank. In the tallness sorites (and similarly in every standard example),
the rank of ‘pi is tall’ decreases steadily as pi becomes shorter; it is true on
a steadily shrinking set of precisifications. Moreover, each instance of the
inductive premiss (B) is almost definitely true – that is, true to a high degree
– since there are qualitatively few precisifications that make the antecedent
28This kind of view is explored, for example, by Kamp (1975), Lewis (1980), Edgington
(1996), andWilliams (2014a). The following discussion is especially informed by Edgington’s
work.
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true and the consequent false.
In application to the sorites, the key idea is that a proposition that is
almost definitely true is, as it were, almost as good as one that is definitely
true. Cashing out ‘almost as good’ is clearly a central problem for such a
view. As far as the sorites goes, the natural idea is that a proposition that is
almost definitely true, like the inductive premiss (B), is liable to seem true.
Similarly, a proposition that is almost definitely false (like the claim in a
particular case that pi is tall and pi+1 is not) is liable to seem false, being so
far from definitely true.
Insofar as this strategy works, it can be applied to the spectrum argument.
The indeterminacy thesis can hold that all the instances of (B2) are, if not
definitely true, then almost definitely true, and so, as far as that goes, liable
to seem true. It is not hard to believe that our moral intuitions might have
trouble discerning cases of definite truth from cases of almost definite truth.29
The indeterminacy thesis can give a similar account of QC, since QC and
(B2) must have the same degree of truth.30 Thus every instance of QC will
be almost definitely true, and liable to seem true.
As Keefe (2015) has observed, it is not entirely clear that this strategy
29It may help to keep in mind here a point I will develop more fully in section 7. The
degree to which Pi+1 is better than Pi , in the ordinary sense of the phrase, is conceptually
distinct from the degree to which it is true that Pi+1 is better than Pi . One has to carefully
distinguish the thought that Pi+1 is much better than Pi from the more technical thought
that Pi+1 is definitely better than Pi . In particular, the intuition that Pi+1 is much better
than Pi does not hinder the strategy under discussion, as long as it is almost definitely true
that Pi+1 is much better than Pi . Thanks to Gustaf Arrhenius for pressing me on this
point.
30I assume here that Transitivity is definitely true, and that classically valid inferences
preserve degrees of truth. More precisely, assume that if p and q jointly entail r , and q is
definitely true, then p and q have the same degree of truth. This works for the logically and
probabilistically defined degrees of truth mentioned above.
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does work, or how much it adds. After all, Tallness Cutoffs is definitely
true. So the degree-theoretic considerations I have sketched so far cannot by
themselves explain why Tallness Cutoffs seems false. We have to appeal to
some version of the earlier strategy: Tallness Cutoffs seems false because the
existential quantification is not made true by any determinate instance. We
can now add that each instance is very far from being definitely true, and is
liable to seem false.
Thus degrees of truth may play some role in explaining why the inductive
premisses are plausible. More interesting, I think, is their potential role
in explaining why the inductive premisses are reliable. Let me explain the
relevant sense of reliability. A natural thought is that a well-informed, rational
person will believe S if and only if S is definitely true. But when S is
merely borderline, well-informed, rational people will still have some sort
of quasi-doxastic attitude, short of belief, towards S . This quasi-doxastic
attitude should play a role in determining behaviour, contributing towards
the kind of hedging that people display about borderline cases. (It may
not completely explain this hedging, since, in the first place, people are
actually badly informed and irrational, and, in the second place, pragmatic
and other factors will usually be in play.) The idea is that the appropriate
attitude towards S is a function of the degree of truth of S , and, moreover, a
continuous function. If S is close enough to definite truth, the appropriate
attitude towards S will be close to full belief.
The simplest version of this picture is to understand the degree of truth
of S as the ideal credence in S , conditional on the precise facts. Thus degrees
of truth are analogous to objective chances, considered as ideal credences
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conditional on ‘admissible’ information. If S has degree of truth 0.95, then
it would be a mistake to rely on S in roughly the same way that it would be
a mistake to rely on a 20-sided die not landing with 20 facing up. Credences
plug into a broadly Bayesian framework, and into a theory of rational choice,
in the usual kind of way.31
There are potential alternatives to this credential view of degrees of truth.
The degree could correspond to a kind of hedging different from that associ-
ated with partial belief. For example, Williams (2014a) promotes a different
view, on which the degree of truth is, roughly, the propensity for the agent
to act as if S is true. So, for example, if the sentence ‘John is tall’ gets weight
2/3, then, if you are forced to classify John as tall or not tall, you will plump
for ‘tall’ two thirds of the time. This suggests a different way in which S ’s
having a high degree of truth leads rational, well-informed people to act as if
S is true.
One sense, then, in which propositions with a high degree of truth might
be ‘reliable’ is that they might warrant attitudes and behaviour similar to those
warranted by propositions that are definitely true. Another, related sense is
that they might be inferentially reliable.32 For example, the conclusion of
a classically valid single-premiss deduction is at least as true as the premiss;
multi-premiss deductions preserve degrees of truth in a more complicated
31This kind of view is advocated by Bacon (2015), Dunaway (2016), and (as far as I
understand the end-point) Moss (2016). (A natural thought is that, on these ideal-credence
views, expected utility theory will effectively resolve any axiological vagueness, but the
situation is not straightforward. I will take up this issue in other work.) Similar moves can
be made by non-classical theories, with the caveat that the degrees of belief in question must
not satisfy the probability calculus. See Field (2000); Schiffer (2000); Smith (2013). Bacon
(2015) contains an especially helpful survey of such alternatives.
32This is especially emphasised by Edgington (1996). Williams (2011) discusses the
logic of these degreed theories starting from the thought that logic norms belief.
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sense. If a deduction has few premisses, and they, being close to definitely
true, warrant something close to full belief, then the conclusion will also be
close to definitely true, and warrant something close to full belief. Serious
problems only arise when an inference involves many premisses that are close
to definitely true. The conclusion of such a inference may be definitely false.
That is what happens in sorites arguments, and, on the indeterminacy thesis,
that is what happens in the spectrum argument.
According to this sort of theory, the right attitude towards the premisses
(B2) and QC is something close to full belief. Moreover, these premisses are
inferentially reliable in the sense just explained. This illustrates the sense in
which the indeterminacy thesis is conservative: it holds that our intuition in
favour of QC does not lead us far astray.
Summing up
Let me summarise what the indeterminacy thesis will look like, given a
classical theory of vagueness. In doing so, I will address the worry raised in
section 4 that the indeterminacy thesis might be right about some forms of
the spectrum argument but not about others.
In this section I have mainly focused on the argument (A2,B2,C2).
That is the version of the spectrum argument of most direct concern to the
indeterminacy thesis, since it is the version most clearly resembling a sorites.
As in any other sorites, the first premiss will be true and the conclusion false.
Since the argument is clasically valid, the inductive premiss, (B2), must have
at least one false instance. But it need not have any definitely false instances.
Every instance may be very close to definitely true.
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The inductive premiss (B2) is based originally on the principle QC and
Transitivity. Let us assume that transitivity is definitely true. Then an instance
of (B2) holds if and only if the corresponding instance of QC holds. If one
is indeterminate, then so is the other. More precisely, they must have the
same degree of truth. Some instance of QC is false, but every instance is
almost definitely true. QC, like (B2), is liable to seem true.
Now let us turn to the argument (A1,B1,C1), and indeed to my original
sketch of the spectrum argument. Here we use QC to construct, given Pi , a
better populationPi+1. Since some instance of QC is false, this construction
might fail. On the other hand, since every instance of QC is almost def-
initely true, the construction almost definitely succeeds. The upshot is that
we can always find Pi+1 that is almost definitely better than Pi .33 By the
same token, we can guarantee that the inductive premiss (B1) is, in every
instance, almost definitely true. The indeterminacy view, applied initially to
(A2,B2,C2), thus leads to a vagueness-based account of why other forms of
the spectrum argument appear paradoxical, whether or not they are sorites
arguments in any strict sense.
33More carefully: let SN be the sentence ‘A population of N people at level wi+1 would
be better than Pi .’ Make the plausible assumption that if SN is true, then so is SN+1. This
means that the degree of truth of SN is monotonic in N , and that the degree of truth of
QC is the supremum. (Supervaluationistically, QC is true on exactly those precisifications
on which at least one SN is true.) We can thus find N such that the degree of truth of SN is
as close as we like to the degree of truth of QC. This is presumably enough to ensure that
some SN counts as almost definitely true.
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6 The Toy Model
I have explained what the indeterminacy thesis claims about the premisses
of the spectrum argument, assuming a classical theory of vagueness. But
can these claims be made good? Perhaps there is no reasonable population
axiology on which the inductive premiss is indeterminate. Or, even if there
is, the indeterminacy might not work in the right way to block the repugnant
conclusion and to see off various objections. I cannot dissolve the worry
completely, if that would involve presenting an axiology entirely beyond
reproach. What I can do is present, as a starting point, a toy model in which
everything works as advertised, and which is at least prima facie plausible.
Since such a model exists, there cannot be a simple formal objection to the
indeterminacy thesis. A bit more generally: even if the toy model turns
out to be quite wrong as a model of betterness, it does seem to be a pretty
reasonable model of a vague but transitive binary relation. And the vagueness
of this relation leads to paradoxical arguments of both types (A1,B1,C1) and
(A2,B2,C2). It seems that vagueness can do the explanatory work that we
require.
First a qualitative description.34 The model will be sufficientarian in
flavour. (I will discuss the interpretation more carefully in section 8.) It claims
an important distinction between lives that are ‘satisfactory’, or above a level
of sufficiency, and those that are not. The level of sufficiency is somewhere
34The model I am describing is similar to views proposed by Qizilbash (2005) and by
Knapp (2007). I do not think they had any very specific models in mind, but what follows
is a natural way of spelling out their ideas, given a classical theory of vagueness and certain
general assumptions (e.g. separability and trichotomy).
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between the levels of drab and blissful lives. In the drab populationPn , there
are no satisfactory lives, while in P0 there are many; that will be enough to
make the latter better than the former. As far as the spectrum argument goes,
the principle QC fails if the level of sufficiency lies between wi and wi+1,
since at that point Pi+1 has no satisfactory lives, while Pi has many. That
is therefore the point at which the inductive premisses (B1) and (B2) fail.
This is the distinctively sufficientarian way to avoid RC, and to render the
spectrum argument unsound.
The role of vagueness is just to make the sufficientarianism easier to
stomach. The most obvious objection to sufficientarianism is that a small
change in welfare from above to below the level of sufficiency cannot plausibly
make such a big difference. This objection loses some of its force when we
realise that ‘satisfactory’ is vague, and that there is a similar problem for
all vague predicates. (Indeed, if we were to adopt a theory of vagueness
that rejected Tallness Cutoffs, we could analogously reject the existence of
a cut-off for ‘satisfactory’; it would be misguided to talk about the level of
sufficiency at all.)
Now to the details. I will suppose that each life has a welfare level given
by a real number. For simplicity I will focus only on positive levels, although
it is easy enough to extend the model symmetrically to include negative ones.
The level of sufficiency will be some real number α. Let us suppose it is
between 10 and 100, but otherwise indeterminate. So welfare levels equal to
α or above are ‘satisfactory’, and those below are not.
The overall value of a population is given by the number of satisfactory
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lives it contains, with ties broken by ‘total welfare’ (i.e. the sum of the real
numbers representing welfare levels).35
Let us suppose that the blissful lives in population P0 are at welfare level
101, while the drab lives in Pn are at level 1. Then the blissful lives are
definitely satisfactory, and the drab lives are definitely not satisfactory. It is
obvious from what I have said that no population at level 1 can be better
than P0. The Repugnant Conclusion is definitely false.
More generally, consider the spectrum argument. QC, as I earlier sug-
gested, fails just when the level of sufficiency α lies between wi and wi+1.
Suppose we take w1 = 100, w2 = 99, w3 = 98, and so on. Then it is never
definitely true that α lies between wi and wi+1, so it is never definitely true
that QC fails. This means that the inductive premisses (B1) and (B2) are
never definitely false.
We can supplement this with a story about degrees of truth. The simplest
thing to say is that the degree of truth of a sentence S is the proportion of
candidates for α that would make S true. For example, suppose S is the
sentence ‘Welfare level w is satisfactory.’ There are three cases. If w is at
least 100, then S is true regardless of where the threshold α lies: it is true to
degree 1. If w is below 10, then S is false regardless of where the threshold
lies: it is true to degree 0. In other cases, S is indeterminate: it has degree of
truth (w − 10)/90, since S would be true if and only if the threshold were
between 10 and w .
With this supplement, we see that QC and the inductive premiss (B2)
35The point of breaking ties in this way is that losses to one person can be compensated
by equal gains to another, as long as neither or both of them crosses the level of sufficiency.
More nuanced tie-breaking rules are possible, but this will do for my current purposes.
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are almost definitely true. At any rate, their degrees of truth are at least 89/90.
This is because they are false only if α is between wi and wi+1; they are false
for at most 1/90 of the candidates for α. As for (B1), suppose that we make
Pi+1 twice as large as Pi . Then, again, (B1) is false only if α is between wi
and wi+1. So (B1) is almost definitely true.
7 Structural Objections
As I mentioned in the beginning, a lot of people have noticed something
like the indeterminacy thesis, but then they have set it aside very quickly,
without sustained argument. The typical thought is that there is an obvious
structural disanalogy between the spectrum argument and sorites arguments.
For example, Derek Parfit writes
It may be objected that my argument is like what are called
Sorites Arguments, which are known to lead to false conclu-
sions.…A Sorites Argument appeals to a series of steps, each of
which is assumed to make no difference. My argument would be
like this if it claimed that [P1] is not worse than [P0], [P2] is
not worse than [P1], [P3] is not worse than [P2], and so on.
But the argument claims that [P1] is better than [P0], [P2]
is better than [P1], [P3] is better than [P2], and so on. The
objections to Sorites Arguments are therefore irrelevant.36
36Parfit (2004, fn. 13). He is really discussing not the spectrum argument I have
presented, but his ‘second paradox’, which is closely related to the form of spectrum argument
I will consider in section 8.
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My response to this is, again, to call attention to the argument (A2,B2,C2).
This argument appeals to a series of steps, each of which is assumed to make
no difference to G -ness. The objections to Sorites Arguments are therefore
potentially relevant. But if they are directly relevant to (A2,B2,C2), then
they are indirectly relevant to the spectrum argument in any form, in the
way I have discussed in section 5 and modelled concretely in section 6.
The subtlest and most interesting objection of this structural kind is
the one developed in chapter 9 of Temkin’s Rethinking the Good. To be
sure, my basic response to his objection is the one just given: (A2,B2,C2)
has exactly the structure of a sorites argument. Still, what Temkin says is
initially persuasive, and deserves a more direct response, which will in any
case illuminate some features of the view on offer.
Temkin focuses on the first form of the argument, (A1,B1,C1), in which
the different cases are different populations, and the predicate is ‘better
than P0’. (In fact, he is writing about the pain spectrum I mentioned in
section 2, but the considerations are exactly parallel.) Here is the disanalogy
Temkin sees between the tallness sorites and the spectrum argument, in my
reconstruction.
Tallness Disanalogy
The standard sorites sequence moves from a tall case through less
and less tall cases to a non-tall case. It might be a bit mysterious
where and how exactly the transition occurs from tall to not
tall; but at least we are moving in the right direction. In the
spectrum argument, however, we move from a better-than-P0
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case through better and better cases to a not-better-than-P0 case.
This would be like moving from a tall case through taller and
taller cases to a non-tall case. We are going in completely the
wrong direction. (If we could go through taller and taller cases
to a non-tall, hence overall less tall case, then ‘taller than’ would
not be transitive. By the same token, we should conclude that
‘better than’ is intransitive.)
The first and main point is that Temkin’s objection clearly does not apply
to the second form of the spectrum argument, (A2,B2,C2). In that argument,
the precise parameter on which G -ness depends – the analogue of height –
is the welfare level. Intuitively, high welfare levels are G , and low welfare
levels are not G . There can be no doubt that this form of the spectrum
argument moves in the right direction, from high welfare levels (ones that
are G ) through lower welfare levels (ones that are less plausibly G ), to low
welfare levels (ones that are definitely not G ). So Temkin has not identified
a disanalogy between (A2,B2,C2) and the tallness sorites. So it is hard to see
how the considerations he adduces can tell against the indeterminacy thesis.
The second point is that the indeterminacy thesis easily rebuffs the argu-
ment for intransitivity implicit in the Tallness Disanalogy. That argument
is based on the claim that Pi+1 is better than Pi ; the cases get ‘better and
better’. However, remember, a central claim of the indeterminacy thesis is
that it is sometimes indeterminate whether Pi+1 is better than Pi . As long as
we accept this indeterminacy, there is no argument in the offing that ‘better
than’ is intransitive. Temkin can insist on the intuition that Pi+1 is better
than Pi ; but that is precisely the kind of intuition that the indeterminacy
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thesis promises to explain away.
Despite all this, the Tallness Disanalogy is a source of legitimate puzzle-
ment. Each person in the tallness sorites is (definitely!) shorter than the
one before. Shouldn’t the indeterminacy thesis hold that (A1,B1,C1) is just
like that, with each population worse than the one before? If not, how can
we possibly get from definitely better than P0 to definitely worse than P0?
Consider, after all, the normative sorites I discussed in section 3: the act of
destroying the embryo gets worse (or, anyway, no better) from second to
second until in the end it is definitely worse than cutting off my thumb. But
the indeterminacy thesis cannot say that each population is no better than
the one before: that would require definitely false instances of QC, which the
thesis is designed to avoid. Isn’t this an important disanalogy, an important
sense in which the waterfowl fails to quack?
Now, I’ve already conceded that (A1,B1,C1) may be a little different
from a standard sorites, and shown that, nonetheless, a paradoxical argument
of this type can arise from a vague binary relation – but I also admit that it
is initially hard to see what is going on with this argument, and to see in a
detailed way why the Tallness Disanology is not an important one. It would
be valuable to put things in a clearer light.
The key, I suggest, is to distinguish two senses in which the sequence
of people in the tallness sorites moves ‘in the right direction’ from people
who are definitely tall to people who are definitely not tall. One sense,
emphasised by the Tallness Disanalogy, is that the people get shorter and
shorter. But remember that we also have a natural gradation between def-
inite truth and definite falsity, given by the relation of definite material
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implication. Edgington’s locution of closeness to definite truth serves well
here: some people are closer than others to being definitely tall.37 Two things
are happening in the sorites sequence: the people gradually get shorter, but
they also gradually get further from being definitely tall.
Now, when it comes to understanding how classical theories of vagueness
treat the tallness sorites, I claim that it is really the latter fact that does all
the work. How so? First of all, we are trying to get from a person who is
definitely tall – tall on every precisification – to a person who is definitely
not tall – tall on no precisification.38 So insofar as one is worried about
‘moving in the right direction’, what seems to be crucial is that subsequent
people are tall on fewer precisifications. But that is just another way of saying
that they are further from being definitely tall. Second, the characteristic
claim that the inductive premiss (B) is not always definitely true is exactly
the claim that pi+1 may be strictly further than pi from being definitely tall.
Finally, the thought that each instance of the inductive premiss is ‘close’ to
being definitely true is just the thought that pi+1 is ‘not much’ further than
pi from being definitely tall. That is: pi+1 is tall on fewer precisifications,
but not ‘many’ fewer. In this sense, pi and pi+1 are similar with regards to
tallness. Of course, tallness should supervene on height, but the diagnosis of
the sorites argument is all about how the cases in the sequence descend the
37Explicitly, when I say that X is closer than Y to being definitely tall, I mean: it is def-
initely true that if Y is tall then X is tall, and (in order for ‘closer’ to be a strict comparative)
it is not definitely true that if X is tall then Y is tall. As I discussed in section 5, this
logically-defined preorder could be supplemented by a more refined theory of degrees.
38I use the language of precisifications as a supervaluationist would (and I always mean
admissible precisifications). But at least at a first pass, any clasical theory of vagueness can
make use this idea: precisifications are ways of resolving vagueness that are not definitely
incorrect. (For subtleties surrounding this move, see Bacon (2015, ch. 3).)
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gradations between definite truth and definite falsity.
It is easy to overlook the point just made because ‘shorter’ and ‘further
from definitely tall’ almost coincide. Consider Adric, who is 200cm in height;
he is definitely tall. Turlough, who is 199cm in height, is definitely tall. That
is an example in which Turlough is shorter than Adric, but Turlough is no
further than Adric from being definitely tall: they are both definitely tall,
full stop. On the other hand, the two comparatives coincide in the loose
sense that ‘further from definitely tall’ implies ‘shorter’, and ‘shorter’ implies
‘not closer to being definitely tall’. Because of this, it is not strictly speaking
true that each person in the sorites sequence is further from definitely tall
than the one before. Strictly speaking, the first few people are definitely
tall, so equally close to being definitely tall. After some indeterminate point,
the people become further and further from being definitely tall. Then the
last few people are equally far from being definitely tall, since they are all
definitely not tall. Still, the two comparatives loosely coincide, and it also
seems acceptable to say, in a loose phrase, that the people gradually get further
from being definitely tall.
However – and here is the key point – ‘worse’ and ‘further from being
definitely better-than-P0’ need not coincide, even in the loose sense just
explained.39 For suppose that it is indeterminate whetherQ is better than
P0. And suppose that R contains the same people as P0, but everyone is
very slightly better off. ThenR is definitely better than P0. But becauseR
and P0 are very similar, it may still be indeterminate whether Q is better
39Note the hyphenation to help parse some unwieldy phrases: we are considering the
binary relation X is further than Y from being definitely better-than-P0.
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or worse than R . In such a scenario, Q is further than R from being
definitely better-than-P0, but it is indeterminate whetherQ is worse than
R . This is not, of course, to say that the two comparatives are completely
unrelated. Consonant with transitivity, we can expect that ‘further from
definitely better-than-P0’ implies ‘not definitely better’. But, the example
shows, it does not imply ‘worse’.
Note that this line of thought does not rely on the indeterminacy thesis
as a view about spectrum arguments. It just relies on the general hypothesis
that ‘better thanP0’ could be vague. Here is a concrete and familiar example
from outside the setting of population ethics. Suppose that P0 is the life of
a rock star, R is the life of a slightly happier rock star, and Q is the life of
a philosopher. Then (in some such case) Q is further than R from being
definitely better-than-P0, but it is indeterminate whether Q is worse than
R . And in this respect, there is nothing special about ‘better than’. We
could instead consider the predicate ‘redder than’. Suppose that P0 is an
orange-ish patch of colour, R is a slightly redder orange-ish patch of colour,
and Q is a reddish-purple patch of colour. Then R may be closer than Q to
being definitely redder-than-P0, even though it is indeterminate whether R
is redder than Q .
Where does this leave us? Let me return to the spectrum argument. We
cannot say that the populations are gradually getting worse – that is the
point made by the Tallness Disanalogy. But the argument (A1,B1,C1) can
still be analogous to the tallness sorites in the sense that the populations
gradually get further from being definitely F , i.e. further from being def-
II -8 ELITISM 89
initely better-than-P0.40 If what I’ve said is right, that analogy is sufficient
for vagueness to play the same explanatory role in (A1,B1,C1) as it does
in the tallness sorites argument. It provides the important sense in which
the cases gradually change from definite F -ness to definite not-F -ness. It is
not directly relevant whether the cases are gradually getting worse. Getting
worse is only one way to get further from definite F -ness. This is my detailed
explanation of why it is that Tallness Disanology does not undermine the
indeterminacy thesis.
8 Elitism
I will now consider a different spectrum argument from the one given section
2. Instead of QC, it is based on a principle of ‘non-elitism’.41 The indetermi-
nacy thesis in this setting will be the same, in outline, as before. However, the
new spectrum argument is more worrying for population ethics in general,
just because the non-elitism principle is prima facie more compelling than
QC: no one wants to be called an elitist, or even a borderline elitist. Thus it
is worth looking at the argument from non-elitism in more detail.
Consider a sequence of populationsQ0,Q1, …,Qn constructed in the
following way (Figure 2). Let z to be a welfare level below wn, but still
positive. The inital population Q0 is just P0 with the addition of a vast
number of lives at level z . (The number needs to be large enough for the
40This is indeed what happens in the toy model. If Pi+1 is always (say) twice as large as
Pi , the degree to which it is true that Pi is better than P0 is just the degree to which it is
true that wi is satisfactory. This gradually decreases as wi decreases from 100 down to 10.
41One can use the principles discussed below to give an argument for QC, but the
dialectic is a bit easier to understand if we use them to argue directly for RC.










Figure 2: The populationsQi , with some lives at level wi and some at z .
subsequent argument to go through.) Given Qi , we construct Qi+1 by
slightly lowering the welfare level of the best-off people from wi to wi+1, and
raising the welfare level of some of the worst-off people from z to wi+1. The
non-elitism principle claims that this will result in a net improvement, as
long as enough people benefit. (What counts as ‘enough’ should not depend
on the number of lives initially at level z .) Here is a formulation parallel to
that of the Quantity Condition in section 2.
Non-Elitism
Suppose that wi , wi+1 are positive welfare levels, such that wi+1
is lower than wi , but the difference between them is small.
Then, for any number N > 0,
(NE) Any populationQi+1 with sufficiently many lives at level
wi+1 and the rest at level z would be better than a popula-
II -8 ELITISM 91
tionQi of the same size with N lives at level wi and the
rest at level z .
Using this, we can construct someQi+1 that is better thanQi . As long as
enough people were included inQ0, this process can continue until we reach
Qn, a vast population of drab lives, at or below wn. By construction, each
Q-population is better than the one before, so, by Transitivity,Qn is better
thanQ0.
Now, to obtain the Repugnant Conclusion, we need only claim thatQ0
is better than P0. This would follow, for example, from
The Mere Addition Principle
IfQ0 can be obtained from P0 by adding lives that are worth
living, and leaving all the other welfare levels alone, thenQ0 is
better than P0.
It is certainly possible to deny the Mere Addition Principle.42 It is even
possible to claim that it is indeterminate whether Q0 is better than P0.
But that is not the response characteristic of the indeterminacy thesis. The
characteristic response is rather to call into question the definite truth of the
inductive step. In a sorites argument, it is the inductive step which is suspect.
Before discussing the indeterminacy thesis in detail, note the following
heuristic justification for NE. If the benefiting group is large enough, they
will gain many times more welfare in total than is lost in total by the people
42This is a relatively popular move; for example, it is part of the critical level utilitarianism
espoused by Broome (2004) and others. On the other hand, more complicated spectrum
arguments can be produced in which the Mere Addition Principle is replaced by intuitively
weaker ones: cf. the use of the ‘dominance addition’ and ‘non-sadism’ principles in Arrhenius
(2013).
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who are harmed. However, this heuristic would seem to imply immediately
thatQn is better thanQ0. In comparingQn withQ0 it is natural to wonder
whether such a large loss of welfare to each of the many people in P0 can
really be compensated by minuscule gains to however many others. So an
important part of NE is that the best-off people lose only a little each time.
Since it is the welfare level of the best-off people that changes gradually in
each step of the spectrum argument, this is the parameter that is analogous
to height in the tallness sorites.
To formulate the indeterminacy thesis in this context we need to put the
spectrum argument in the form of a sorites. That is easy enough, following
the model of section 3. The only complication is that the populationQ0 is
not well specified, requiring enough lives at level z to make the argument go
through. But here is one way to do things. The vague predicate, the analogue
of ‘tall’, will be ‘H ’, defined by the following biconditional.
A welfare level w is H if and only if any population with suf-
ficiently many lives at level w , and the rest at level z , would be
better than a populationQ0 of the same size, consisting of P0
and additional lives at level z .
We then have
(A3) The first welfare level, w1, is H .
(B3) If wi is H , then wi+1 is also H .
(These follow from NE and Transitivity.) Therefore,
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(C3) The last welfare level, wn , is H .
The Repugnant Conclusion then follows from (C3) and the Mere Addition
Principle.
Like the earlier argument (A2,B2,C2), this one has exactly the form
of a sorites argument. Assuming classical logic, the indeterminacy thesis
for this spectrum argument must deny that every instance of (B3) is true.
Assuming Transitivity, it denies that every instance of NE is true. This may
be unpalatable, but vagueness provides mitigation: there are no determinate
counterexamples to NE; every instance of NE is almost definitely true.
I have already said what I can here about the nature and extent of this
mitigation, in sections 4 and 5. In the rest of this section, I will instead tilt
the scales a little more in favour of the indeterminacy thesis by arguing that
borderline violations of NE need not be symptomatic of elitism at all.
The point can be made most clearly with reference to the toy model of
section 6. There NE fails when wi and wi+1 straddle the level of sufficiency,
α. There are two possible stories about the nature of this threshold.
The first possibility is that the threshold is personal : it is significant for
the value of lives to the people who live them. There are a few ways to cash
out this idea. Consider again the populationQi , with some lives at wi and
many others at z ; compare it to a population Pi+1 of the same size, with
every life at wi+1. In terms of chance, one might ask: would it be better for
an individual to have a life chosen uniformly at random fromQi than a life
chosen uniformly at random from Pi+1? Alternatively, one could use the
‘serial lives’ heuristic of Lewis (1946). Would it be better for an individual to
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live out the lives fromQi in sequence than those fromPi+1? If the answer to
either question is affirmative, it gives a sense in which the threshold between
wi and wi+1 is significant for personal good. Indeed, according to these
heuristics, it is inapt to think of the evaluative difference between wi and
wi+1 as being small. (We can still imagine that the physical and perhaps even
the phenomenal difference between them is small.) According to the chance
heuristic, for example, a welfare gain from wi+1 to wi is so important for
each individual that an arbitrarily small chance of it cannot be outweighed
by a correspondingly large chance of a welfare loss from wi+1 to z .
Now, of course this is implausible. In imagining lives at levels wi and
wi+1, we might specify that the only difference between them is some ob-
jectively small pleasure, like a grain of chocolate, or a 10-second headache.
It is implausible that such a small difference in the underlying physical or
experiential facts can make such a significant evaluative difference.The old
point was that vagueness can mitigate this implausibility. Once we have
specified wi and wi+1, the supposition that the threshold lies between them
is almost definitely false; on the credential view of degrees of truth, we should
have a very low credence in it. We should certainly not expect the location of
the threshold to be detectable in our attitudes and judgments, even if those
same attitudes and judgments suggest to us, via the spectrum argument, that
the threshold must exist.
The new point is that, if the threshold is a personal threshold in this sense,
then the charge of elitism does not stick. Even if there were a determinate
counterexample to NE, it would not be an example of elitism. For the
situation is not aptly described as one in which even a small harm to a few
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well-off people cannot be outweighed by benefits to many worse-off others.
It is, rather, a situation in which an evaluatively large difference cannot be
surpassed by aggregating evaluatively small ones, even when the small dif-
ferences pertain to a single person’s wellbeing. This is a doctrine not of elitism
but of the kind of value superiority most famously espoused by Mill.43
The second interpretation of the toy model is that the threshold between
wi and wi+1 is of merely impersonal significance. This is the interpretation
on which the toy model is really sufficientarian. Containing a life at wi
rather that wi+1 makes a big difference to the value of a population, even
though, for an individual, the evaluative difference between these lives is
small. Whatever one thinks about sufficientarianism – and about impersonal
goods more generally – it would again be wrong to call this view elitist. It is
not a matter of giving greater weight to the interests of the well off. There
are two ways to see this, formal and substantive. Formally, suppose we are
considering giving a fixed-size benefit either to someone who is definitely
above the threshold, or to someone who is definitely below it. Then it is at
least as good to give it to the person below the threshold, and sometimes it
is better. This is not elitist; on the contrary, it illustrates the sense in which
sufficientarianism is a cousin of egalitarianism. And, substantively, in the
cases where it is better to give the benefit to the better-off person, this is not
43Mill (1863, chapter 2):
If one of [two pleasures] is, by those who are competently acquainted with
both, placed so far above the other that they…would not resign it for any
quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justi-
fied in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far
outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.
See also Arrhenius and Rabinowicz (2005) for a formal analysis of this kind of value
superiority.
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because the person is better off, but because it raises them above the threshold.
The mode of explanation is sufficientarian rather than elitist.
These two interpretations of the toy model show that, more generally, the
indeterminacy view cannot be impugned by a generic charge of elitism. We
have to look at specific axiologies in more detail to evaluate both the rationale
for violations of NE and the role of vagueness in making such violations
easier to maintain.
9 Conclusion
The argument I have given for the indeterminacy thesis rests on the two
claims with which I started section 4. First, the argument (A2,B2,C2) has
the same form as a sorites argument; second, it is paradoxical in the same
way as a sorites argument. I later extended the thesis to cover the argument
(A3,B3,C3) from non-elitism.
There are two main gaps in what I have said. First, although I considered
(and, I hope, decisively refuted) several objections to the first claim about the
form or structure of spectrum arguments, I did not say much in defence of
the second claim, concerning their paradoxical nature. Of course, the main
sense in which they are paradoxical is clear: to many people, at least, the
premisses seem right and the conclusion wrong. This paper is most directly
addressed to such people. But even such people may wonder whether the
psychology of spectrum arguments is quite the same as the psychology of
the sorites, and whether, given any subtle differences there may be, the core
explanation can remain the same. The reason I have not said much on this
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score is, I am afraid, simply that it seems hard going. What exactly are the
psychological differences, and, crucially, why do they matter? The standard
explanations from classical theories of vagueness seem to adapt seamlessly
to spectrum arguments. If they are sufficient in one case, why not in the
other? This is an important question for understanding not only spectrum
arguments but sorites arguments as well.
Second, granting the two claims, I have indicated why the indeterminacy
thesis provides a good explanation of them, but I have not argued in any
detail that it provides the best explanation. There is a reason for this. The
indeterminacy thesis is not committed to any particular axiological principles.
For example, in terms of the discussion of section 8, the thesis does not
compete with sufficientarianism or value superiority; rather, it is an attempt
to make such views more palatable. It must therefore be evaluated within a
broader axiological theory. It would be futile to argue that the indeterminacy
thesis is anything more than very good pro tanto without taking on (or
surveying at length) more substantive commitments.
Still, the arguments I have presented shift the balance towards certain
kinds of axiological views. These views endorse transitivity and reject RC.
They also endorse trichotomy, or at least downplay the role of parity in the
spectrum arguments. At the same time, they are views on which the inductive
premisses like (B1,B2,B3) are often right. Unlike the average and person-
affecting views I mentioned in section 2, they do not hold that these premisses
fundamentally misfire. Rather, assuming classical logic, they posit thresholds
at which the inductive premisses fail. The prima facie implausibility of such
thresholds is exactly the sort of thing that classical theories of vagueness seek
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to explain away.
Of course, rejecting transitivity would allow us to hold that the premisses
of the spectrum argument are definitely true, while rejecting the Repugnant
Conclusion. But the indeterminacy thesis fares only slightly worse by that
metric, and is far less revisionary in other ways. If intransitivity is on the
table, then indeterminacy should be too. Similarly, one could of course
accept RC, or deny the inductive premisses wholesale, without recourse to
vagueness. But these responses are unattractive precisely to the extent that
the spectrum arguments are paradoxical.
III | The Veil of Ignorance and
the Risk of Non-Existence*
. Roughly speaking, the ‘veil of ignorance principle’ iden-
tifies the moral point of view with the point of view of rational self-
interest in the face of self-locating uncertainty. I sketch a positive
argument for an axiological version of this principle, and explore its
implications for population ethics.
1 Introduction
Moral evaluations are often supposed to be impartial. One sense in which
they might be impartial is that they might correspond to the judgment of
someone behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, ignorant of who he is in each alternative
under evaluation. The judge surveys the world as if in third-person, seeing
every detail but not recognizing which life is his own. Such a judge necessarily
puts aside self-interest as usually understood: not knowing which life is his,
he cannot judge on the basis of his own well-being. There are, however, at
*This chapter largely develops and interprets ideas that first appeared in ‘Utilitarianism
With and Without Expected Utility’, joint work with David McCarthy and Kalle Mikkola
(2016) (henceforth MMT ). I will make some specific connections to that work below, but
I would like to acknowledge here the inseparable influence of McCarthy, in particular, on
many points throughout, and especially in section 3. (On the other hand, he may not agree
with everything I say!)
99
III -1 INTRODUCTION 100
least two points of view open to him.First, he might be inspired to adopt
an impersonal ‘point of view of the universe’, engaging in a distinctively
moral form of evaluation, excluding self-interest altogether. Second, he
might evaluate on the basis of ‘veiled’ self-interest – self-interest tempered by
self-locating ignorance. In doing so, he would have to take every person’s
interests into account, on the self-interested basis that he might be any one
of them. What I will call the Veil of Ignorance Principle – to be made precise
below – is the idea that these two forms of evaluation coincide: the point of
view of the universe is the point of view of veiled self-interest.
There is something deeply attractive about this principle, but, taken
literally as referring to a self-interested judge, it faces a number of interpretive
difficulties. The judge is stipulated to be ignorant of his own identity, but
what other evidence is available to him? Does he maintain his own tastes
and values? His own attitude toward risk? Or, if not, to what criteria does he
appeal? I will be particularly interested in a problem arising from population
ethics: if the alternatives under evaluation contain different people, then
who is the judge supposed to be? Does he know that he exists? Besides such
interpretive issues, there is the question of justifying the principle. Is there
anything to be said beyond its prima facie plausibility?
In this paper I will present an argument for a precise version of the Veil
of Ignorance Principle. It is axiological in that it concerns what is good for an
individual, rather than what an individual prefers. It thus leaves open whether
the former should somehow be analysed in terms of the latter; but, crucially,
it sidesteps the worries mentioned above about the judge’s idiosyncracies. It
is welfarist in the sense that it assumes that the evaluatively salient features
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of each possible world are determined by the welfare levels of each person in
that world (that is, by how good each world is for each person). There might
be other features that are salient in principle, but I am assuming that they can
be held fixed, or that we can ignore them for some other reason. Setting aside
the sui generis difficulties of infinite populations (see Bostrom (2011)), I will
assume that there are only finitely many possible individuals involved in any
given context of evaluation. Enumerating all these relevant individuals in
some way, I can then fully specify a world by a ‘welfare distribution’, a list of
welfare levels (x1, x2, . . . , xn). Here is the precise Veil of Ignorance Principle I
will consider:2
The VoIP. Welfare distribution (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is at least as good overall as
(y1, y2, . . . , yn) if and only if it would be at least as good for an individ-
ual to have equal chances of x1, x2, . . . , xn rather than equal chances of
y1, y2, . . . , yn .
In examples I will typically display welfare distributions L or M in tables like







The VoIP says that L is better overall than M just in case it would be better
for an individual to have a half-chance of x and a half-chance of y rather
than a half-chance of a and a half-chance of b . I will call a probability
2At the end of section 3, I will introduce a more general version that applies to cases in
which the welfare distributions are uncertain.
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measure over welfare levels (e.g. a half-chance of x and a half-chance of y ) a
prospect, and a probability measure over welfare distributions a lottery. With
one exception I will come to momentarily, I am simply going to assume
that it makes sense to ask whether one prospect is better for an individual
than another, and whether one lottery is better overall than another. This
assumption was defended by John Broome in his Weighing Goods (1991,
§6.1), and I agree with what he says. In fact, the project of this paper is
closely related to his project in that book, in ways I will explain in section 2.
The VoIP, as I intend it here, makes sense even when different individuals
exist in each alternative. We can formally allow that one of the ‘welfare levels’
that may occur in a welfare distribution is non-existence, traditionally denoted
by Ω. This is not to claim that non-existence is a welfare level in anything
but name. The situation is just that Ω can appear in a welfare distribution,
and if it occurs in the i th place then it signifies that the i th possible person





Then the question raised by the VoIP is whether it is better for an individual
to have a half-chance of x and a half-chance of y , or a half-chance of a and a
half-chance of not existing. This is again a comparison between two prospects
in terms of their value to an individual. But it is the one kind of case where I
will allow that it is controversial whether the comparison makes sense. Quite
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generally, the VoIP claims that the evaluation of welfare distributions boils
down to what I will call the Risky Existential Question.
The Risky Existential Question. What should we say about the value for
an individual S of a prospect in which there is a chance that S does
not exist?
This generalises the better-known ‘existential question’ (Arrhenius and Ra-
binowicz, 2015): what should we say about the value for S of certain non-
existence? There are two typical answers to this latter question. Comparativists
claim that non-existence is comparable to other welfare levels, amounting
to a ‘neutral’ level of wellbeing. Non-comparativists, in contrast, claim that
non-existence is not comparable to existence at any level of well-being. It is
not clear how the second (in particular) of these answers should generalise to
cases of uncertainty.
Here is a prospectus. In section 2, I review some previous discussions
of the veil of ignorance, as a way of introducing more fully the themes
of this paper. The main message is that these previous discussions have
been hampered and obscured by framing the veil of ignorance in terms of
preferences instead of betterness. The present, purely axiological Veil of
Ignorance Principle sidesteps all these difficulties.
Next, in section 3, I present an argument for the VoIP, based on three
basic dominance principles. The fact that there is such an argument is,
of course, the main positive feature of the VoIP. This argument and the
discussion of section 2 should together revive the veil of ignorance as a way
of understanding a number of issues in distributive and population ethics.
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In that vein, starting in section 4, I explore and evaluate answers to the
Risky Existential Question and their consequences for population ethics.
Although there are a huge variety of potential answers, three basic stories
suggest themselves.
Comparativism. Non-existence is comparable to other welfare levels; for
example, it is better for an individual to have a very good life than
never to exist at all.
In conjunction with the VoIP, comparativism leads to variations on critical-
level utilitarianism (CLU). In fact, it yields an efficient argument for CLU,
significantly weakening the premisses of Harsanyi’s famous aggregation theo-
rem, and extending it to the variable-population setting. (I will introduce
Harsanyi’s theorem in section 2.)
Strong Non-Comparativism. Any prospect in which the individual S is
certain to exist is incomparable for S to any prospect in which S is
not certain to exist.
In conjunction with the VoIP, this leads to extremely widespread incompara-
bility: two alternatives can be compared only if they have the same expected
population size.
Conditionalism: A prospect is exactly as good for an individual S as it is
good for S conditional on S ’s existence.
I think this is the most intuitively satisfying answer to the Risky Existential
Question. In conjunction with the VoIP, however, it leads to problematic
variations on average utilitarianism.
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There are a number of lessons one might draw from this, depending on
one’s attitude towards the Risky Existential Question. First, one can find
here an efficient argument for critical-level utilitarianism – either because one
is antecedently inclined towards comparativism, or because comparativism
leads to the only attractive view overall. Actually, as I explain in section 5, the
argument for CLU also implicates the many non-comparativists who play
down the significance of non-comparativism for overall value. A little roughly,
these ‘mixed’ non-comparativists hold that non-existence is comparable to
other welfare levels when it comes to overall value, even if not when it comes
to value for the individual in question.
Alternatively, one can find here a constructive argument for average utili-
tarianism – about the only such argument I know. As I explain in section 2,
an inference from the veil of ignorance to average utilitarianism is traditional,
but three features are novel. First, I provide an argument for the VoIP itself.
Second, I tie the inference to a particular theory of prudential value (namely,
conditionalism). Finally, the particular form of average utilitarianism comes
along with an unusual, and in some ways attractive, treatment of uncertainty,
which I describe in section 5.
Less sanguinely, however, I think this raises a dilemma for those inclined
to reject comparativism for individual value and (in contrast to the mixed non-
comparativists) overall value as well.3 On the one hand, average utilitarianism
3Such people endorse the view that ‘We are in favour of making people happy, but
neutral about making happy people’ (Narveson, 1973, p. 80), at least at the level of axiology.
The view that we are neutral about making unhappy people is much less popular, leading
to the so-called ‘asymmetry’ between happy and unhappy lives (see e.g. Roberts (2011b)).
From the perspective of this paper, accepting the axiological claim that bad lives are worse
than non-existence puts one in the comparativist camp (or at least among the mixed-
noncomparativists, if the claim is about overall value). That leads to further issues which,
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has become unpopular, and for good reason. So it seems we must reject the
combination of the VoIP and the otherwise intuitive conditionalism. On the
other hand, the VoIP and strong non-comparativism together lead to such
widespread incomparability as to render axiology impotent. Thus the pure
non-comparativist must either give a plausible alternative to the dominance
principles used to support the VoIP, or else answer the Risky Existential
Question in a way that does not lead to an implausible or impotent axiology.
To be sure, I do not claim that this is a fatal dilemma for non-comparativists:
they have many theoretical resources to invoke. But it does illustrate how the
Veil of Ignorance Principle provides a fresh way of looking at a number of
issues in population ethics and the ethics of distribution that have otherwise
grown stale.
2 A Motivating History of the Veil
Vickrey and Harsanyi
Although the phrase ‘veil of ignorance’ was coined by Rawls (1971), the kind
of principle I am considering was articulated earlier (and independently) in
the work of William Vickrey (1945) and John Harsanyi (1953). Although
their treatments of the veil were slightly different, the general thrust of what
I will say applies to both; I will focus on Vickrey for concreteness.4
Vickrey was writing at a time when expected utility theory had gained
new prominence, with the publication of von Neumann’s and Morgenstern’s
however, I will not dwell on in this paper, in part because I think the asymmetry is not best
understood in this purely axiological way.
4See Mongin (2001) for a careful comparison of the two treatments.
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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944. Assuming that the prefer-
ences of an individual S satisfy some natural structural conditions (which
I will consider in section 4), von Neumann and Morgenstern proved that
there must be an ‘individual utility function’ US assigning real numbers to
outcomes and satisfying the following rule:
Expected Utility for Preferences. S prefers an uncertain outcome A to an
uncertain outcome B if and only if the expected value of US on A is
greater than its expected value on B .
So, for example, S is indifferent between an option that guarantees utility
5 and an alternative that gives a half-chance of utility 4 and a half-chance
of utility 6. Moreover, US is all but uniquely determined by S ’s preferences.
One can fix the scale of utility by stipulating arbitrarily that one outcome
has utility 0 and that another, preferred outcome has utility 1, but beyond
that there is no freedom.
It is tempting to speculate that the ‘utility’ of expected utility theory
coincides with the ‘utility’ of utilitarianism, so that the average or perhaps
total utility of an outcome is normatively significant. Vickrey suggested that
the veil of ignorance might vindicate this speculation:
If utility is defined as that quantity the mathematical expectation
of which is maximized by an individual making choices involv-
ing risk, then to maximize the aggregate of such utility over the
population is equivalent to choosing that distribution of income
which such an individual would select were he asked which of
various variants of the economy he would like to become a
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member of, assuming that once he selects a given economy with
a given distribution of income he has an equal chance of landing
in the shoes of each member of it. Unreal as this hypothetical
choice may be, it at least shows that there exists a reasonable
conceptual relation between the methods used to determine
utility and the uses proposed to be made of it. (Vickrey, 1945,
p. 329)
Although in places Vickrey appears to identify ‘aggregate’ with total utility,
this passage must concern averages: the individual’s expected utility, given
the choice of an ‘economy’, will be the average utility within that economy.
However, when the same people exist in every alternative, there is no effective
difference between average and total utilitarianism. In order to separate
distinct issues, I will for now assume that the population is constant in this
way, returning to the variable-population case in my discussion of Rawls
below.
In fact, Vickrey’s ‘reasonable conceptual relation’ is deeply problematic.
For even if the individual behind the veil would seek to maximize average
utility, it does not follow that we have any reason to do so; the formal
observation that an average can be interpreted as an expectation has no clear
normative significance.5 And even the description of the veil raises conceptual
and interpretive difficulties. Reference is made to what ‘an individual would
select’, but which individual? In the first place, it is implausible that any
5On this point see Barry (1989, pp. 334–5); Broome (1991, p. 56–57). A distinct
debate concerns to what extent the ‘utilitarianism’ that supposedly emerges from the veil
argument agrees with utilitarianism as traditionally conceived (see Greaves (MSb) for a
recent overview).
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realistic individual in fact has preferences precisely consistent with Expected
Utility for Preferences. In the second place, it is implausible that any two
expected-utility maximizers necessarily have the same preferences in the
counterfactual circumstances (‘were he asked…’). In particular, it is not clear
why the utilities appearing in the average can be identified with the utilities
recognised by the members of the economy themselves. Suppose Ann is one
such member. Ann (let us accept for the sake of argument) implicitly assigns
utilities to various outcomes, and seeks to maximize the expected utility. The
judge behind the veil also (we have to assume) assigns utilities to various
scenarios in which he finds himself ‘in the shoes’ of Ann. A priori, the latter
utilities are the ones that enter into the average, not those corresponding to
Ann’s own preferences.6
Later discussions of the veil of ignorance recognised difficulties along
these lines. For example, Vickrey himself starts his 1960 discussion with
the heroic assumption that, abstracting from differences in age,
sex, or family status, each individual has preference patterns
6The claim that these utilities coincide is a version of the ‘principle of acceptance’
used by Harsanyi and others to explain interpersonal comparisons of well-being in terms
of preference satisfaction (see Greaves and Lederman (MS) for references and a critical
discussion), as well as by Weymark (1991, p. 293) in his formalisation of Harsanyi’s veil as
the ‘Impartial Observer Theorem’. Note that there are at least two issues here. First, there
is the issue of whether the judge’s preferences over possibilities for each individual agree
with that individual’s own preferences. Even if they do, there is the further question of
whether the judge’s preferences get the interpersonal comparisons right. Remember that
each individual’s utility function can be normalised in different ways; the problem is that
the notion of average utility is only sensible if we choose compatible normalisations for
the individual’s utility functions. Naively, ‘compatible’ means that, for any two individuals
S and T , US (X ) = UT (Y ) if and only if S prefers X just as strongly as T prefers Y (in a
monadic sense of ‘prefers’). The question is whether the judge is then indifferent between
X -in-S ’s-shoes and Y -in-T ’s-shoes, so that he assigns the same utility to these two outcomes.
Issues along these lines have been raised in particular by Sen (1977) and Weymark (1991).
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exactly similar to those of every other individual…. (Vickrey,
1960, p. 524)
But our axiological version of the veil of ignorance completely sidesteps these
problems. To get a preference-based version of the veil, we just need to
posit a connection between what is better and what is preferred. We could
make the heroic assumption that each person actually prefers what is best for
themselves, or, much more plausibly, say that anyone would ideally prefer
what is best for themselves (this being an ideal of self-interested rationality).
We then obtain the following principle.
The VoIP for Ideal Preferences. Welfare distribution (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is bet-
ter overall than (y1, y2, . . . , yn) if and only if some (hence any) individ-
ual would ideally prefer to have equal chances of x1, x2, . . . , xn rather
than equal chances of y1, y2, . . . , yn .
We can then posit that these ideal preferences satisfy expected utility theory,
generating an ideal individual utility function with respect to which betterness
overall (or ‘ideal moral preference’) tracks average utility. (Recall here my
temporary assumption that the same people exist in every alternative.) To
reach such a conclusion, however, we do not have to mention preferences at
all. We can simply posit that the individual betterness relation itself satisfies
expected utility theory: there is a numerical representation of welfare levels
satisfying the following condition.
Expected Utility for Individual Betterness. Prospect A is better for an in-
dividual than prospect B if and only if it has greater expected welfare.
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Vickrey himself seems to have something like the VoIP for actual rather
than ideal preferences in mind. The underlying premiss that people actually
prefer what is best for themselves faces the same difficulties I raised against
Vickrey’s account of the veil: actual preferences, even self-regarding ones, are
very frequently idiosyncratic and irrational. I think the origin of this premiss
is a preference-satisfaction theory of wellbeing, which holds, in its naivest
form, that if S prefers A to B then, for that very reason, A is better for S than
B . The idiosyncracy and irrationality of actual preferences show why at least
this naive form of preference-satisfactionism is so hard to defend.
The diversity of actual and indeed ‘reasonable’ preferences might seem
to pose a problem even for the axiological veil of ignorance. In particular,
consider the view that a wide variety of attitudes towards risk are fully ratio-
nal.7 It may be possible that, even though they are both fully rational, Ann
prefers welfare y to half-chances of x and z , while Bob prefers the latter to
the former. Ann is more risk-averse than Bob, in this instance. This pattern
is possible even if the ideal preferences of Ann and Bob both satisfy expected
utility theory, but it may arise also if some deviations from expected utility
theory are compatible with full rationality. One might conclude from this
that y is better for Ann than half-chances of x and z , while the opposite is
true for Bob. It would then be nonsense to ask (as the VoIP does) whether y
is better for an individual than half chances of x and z , without specifying
which individual.
But this conclusion is the wrong one to draw. After all, it is not that there
is some idiosyncratic attitude towards risk that is right for Ann and wrong for
7See Barry (1977, p. 318) for this as an objection to the veil of ignorance.
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Bob independent of the circumstances in which they find themselves. Rather,
they may have some prerogative, in light of those circumstances, to settle
what the betterness facts leave unsettled. It may be rationally permissible,
but not required, for Ann and Bob to have the preferences they do, and this
is presumably because the betterness facts are themselves indeterminate in
some way. I am using a very broad notion of ‘indeterminacy’ here: all that
matters is that fully rational preferences are not fully constrained. It may be,
for example, that y is on a par with half chances of x and z . The axiological
VoIP is perfectly compatible with this kind of indeterminacy.
Rawls and Kavka
Rawls’s understanding and proposed application of the veil of ignorance was
much more elaborate than Vickrey’s, and he argued that it led ultimately to
his own non-utilitarian principles of justice. But in the intramural dispute
over average versus total, he agreed that the veil differentially supported the
average view (Rawls, 1971, §27). In evaluating a possibility from behind
the veil one should act as if uncertain who one is, but certain that one does
exist in that world. Thus, in agreement with average and in contradiction
to total utilitarianism, a world with one person at welfare level 100 is better
than a world with 100 people each at welfare level 99: one is certain to have
higher welfare in the former. Note that this particular judgment can also
be explained in terms of Rawls’s favoured maximin rule: one distribution is
better than another if the worst-off person in the first is better off than the
worst-off person in the second.
To get to maximin from the veil of ignorance, one must appeal to a
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principle like
Pessimism. A prospect is only as good as its worst possible outcome.
The application of Pessimism and the maximin rule itself have been roundly
criticised by Harsanyi (see Harsanyi and Rawls (1975)). Someone with plu-
ralist tendencies might think that it is rationally permissible to have extremely
pessimistic preferences, but at issue here is the stronger claim that such pref-
erences are rationally required. Pessimism says that a large chance of a large
gain never compensates for a small chance of a small loss. This is clearly too
extreme. However, Rawls’s position is that the judge is in so deep state of
cluelessness (and perhaps there are some other features of the case) that he
cannot assign probabilities at all to each outcome; there is no question of
large chances versus small ones. We should thus not understand Pessimism to
apply to ‘prospects’ in my technical sense of the word – probability measures
over welfare levels – but to situations that involve this deeper cluelessness.
If the question is, as a general matter, how to evaluate prospects involving
some sort of deep cluelessness, then I will agree with Rawls that the equi-prob-
ability assumption and the application of expected utility theory are open to
question, even if Pessimism itself seems too extreme. However, as things stand,
this question is largely irrelevant. To the extent that the veil of ignorance
is merely a recipe for reconstructing moral evaluations, then the rules for
evaluating prospects behind the veil are by and large open to stipulation. The
application of Pessimism can only really be judged on its output, i.e. on the
utter implausibility of maximin. Only when we have a serious independent
argument for some particular version of the veil of ignorance principle –
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linking moral evaluation to some particular kind of ignorance – does it
become relevant to ask how one should evaluate prospects of the requisite
kind.
Our VoIP gives equal chances to each welfare level in the distribution.
In that sense, our argument for the VoIP vindicates Harsanyi and Vickrey
over Rawls. It is neutral in another way: it officially leaves open the question
of how prospects are to be evaluated, given these equal chances. Pessimism
is still on the table, in that sense, and would imply maximin.8 However, the
question that arises is the conventional one about how to evaluate prospects
that involve probabilities, not prospects that involve deep cluelessness. And
Pessimism is a completely implausible answer to that question.
In Rawls’s version of the veil – and those of Vickrey and Harsanyi – the
judge is certain to exist in the prospect under evaluation. Gregory Kavka
noted the significance of this fact:
…Rawls’ conception of the original position involves a (possibly
justifiable) bias in favor of those already existing in the sense
that it favors the interest of existing persons over the interests
which would exist if certain persons who might or might not
exist were brought into existence. (Kavka, 1975, p. 240)
This passage contains two distinct thoughts that ought to be disentangled.
One thought, less relevant here, is that Rawls’s veil improperly focuses on the
present generation, those ‘already existing’. As Kavka later argues, it is at least
8There are different ways to extend Pessimism to answer the Risky Existential Question;
different ways of doing it lead to different versions of maximin.
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sometimes more appropriate to consider all generations together, and that
is what I have in mind throughout. The second, more relevant thought is
that Rawl’s veil discounts the interests of merely possible people, those ‘who
might or might not exist’. The simplest way to explicate this second thought
is to suppose, with Kavka, that non-existence carries with it the utility value
of zero. Then, if one evaluates a world solely in terms of the welfare of the
people who exist in that world, one may not properly take into account the
zero welfare of the people who do not exist.
At a superficial level, it is easy to adjust the veil of ignorance to support
total rather than average utilitarianism, and this is what Kavka does. When
comparing alternatives A and B , we should consider ourselves to have equal
chances of being any individual that exists in A or B .9 Thus if B contains
some individuals who do not exist in A, we should, in evaluating A, take
into account some probability of not existing, and therefore having zero
utility. More generally, if we allowed that non-existence carries with it some
possibly non-zero utility, the veil of ignorance so formulated would support
critical-level utilitarianism.
Quite besides the controversial move of associating a utility with non-exist-
ence, this modification of the veil of ignorance raises the question of whether
one can be less than certain of one’s own existence. Kavka considers this
point and offers several suggestions. The simplest is to give up the idea that
the judge behind the veil is evaluating on the basis of self -interest. Rather,
he can make a choice for the sake of a client individual who might or might
not exist in each alternative, and whose identity is unknown. In the same
9See Tännsjö (2002, p. 343) for a slight variation on this move.
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way do we make choices for the sake of our possible descendents.
This seems about right to me. But at bottom we can get rid of the judge
altogether, by (again) focusing on the purely axiological VoIP. Presumably
the guardian’s judgment is based on a concern for what is good for his client;
insofar as he strays from this criterion, he cannot be said to be choosing for
the client’s sake. More generally, insofar as the figure of the judge or guardian
makes sense, the axiological VoIP delivers the desired result; but we need not
worry if the figure does not always make sense. Of course, thinking about
a guardian’s judgments may still give us a useful way to think about what
is good for the client. Perhaps some would even wish to analyse the client’s
good in these terms.10 The point remains that we can reframe the veil of
ignorance in axiological terms, and then leave it to the others to defend a
‘guardian angel’ view of individual value.
Harsanyi and Broome
Now let us return to John Harsanyi. He had invented the veil of ignorance in-
dependently of Vickrey, with essentially the same purpose in mind (Harsanyi,
1953). But he is justly more famous for the aggregation theorem (Harsanyi,
1955, 1977), which, like the veil of ignorance, gives an account of why the
‘utility’ of utilitarians might coincide with the ‘utility’ of expected utility
maximization. The underlying logic of the theorem is quite different from
the veil-based argument, and, officially, it deals only with a single population
that exists in every alternative. Since the theorem provides a useful point of
10For a discussion and references of this analytic move, see Arrhenius and Rabinowicz
(2015, §22.6)).
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comparison, let me sketch how it goes.11
Like Vickrey, Harsanyi dealt with preferences rather than with value.
However, as John Broome argues inWeighing Goods, the aggregation theorem
can and should be recast axiologically. (Thus we do for the veil of ignorance
what Broome did for the aggregation theorem.) In those terms, the theorem
has three main premisses. First, it assumes that both individual and overall
value satisfy expected utility theory. This means that there are ‘social’ and
‘individual’ utility functions, so that each lottery is ranked by expected social
utility, and each prospect by expected individual utility. (As before, there
is a little freedom in how to normalise these utility functions.) The second
assumption is the Strong Pareto principle:
Strong Pareto. Let L and M be lotteries.
1. If L is at least as good as M for every individual, then L is at
least as good as M overall.
2. If L is at least as good as M for every individual, and better than
M for some individuals, then L is better than M overall.
(Broome calls this ‘the principle of personal good’, to distinguish it from its
traditional formulation in terms of preferences.) The third assumption is
Anonymity, the principle that if L and M differ only by a permutation of
individuals, then L must be just as good as M . The conclusion is that we
can normalise the social utility function so that it assigns to each welfare
distribution its average individual utility.
11My discussion here draws particularly on MMT §5.3 and §5.4.
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Harsanyi’s proof does not derive a form of the veil of ignorance principle
and then note that expected utility theory is the standard account of prudential
value, thus deriving the utilitarian aggregation rule. Rather, he derives
the utilitarian aggregation rule directly, which may optionally be seen as
justifying the veil of ignorance principle post hoc. Indeed, the original
version of Harsanyi’s theorem catered to a widespread skepticism among
economists about the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing
and/or preference strength. (Harsanyi himself thought that this skepticism
was misguided.) Thus his main result was not the simple utilitarian rule
but just the claim that overall value had to be some weighted average of
utility. The undetermined weights reflect the undetermined interpersonal
comparisons. Harsanyi went on to derive the utilitarian rule almost as an
afterthought, only at this stage using Anonymity to set all weights equal. This
last step certainly presupposes interpersonal comparisons.12 But the main
result forgoes such comparisons, and, without them, the veil of ignorance
principle makes little sense. It fundamentally involves including the welfare
levels of different people within a single person’s prudential calculus.13
12To see why Anonymity requires interpersonal comparisons, consider a world w con-
taining only Ann and Bob. Permutation invariance means that w is just as good as a world
w ′ in which Ann’s life is just as good as Bob’s life is in w and Bob’s life is just as good as
Ann’s life is in w .
13It may be added that the project of aggregation makes little sense either. If there really
are no interpersonal comparisons, then there is no sense in which one person’s loss can
outweigh another person’s gain, and we should not expect to say much except in cases of
unanimity. (This is one possible lesson of Arrow’s impossibility theorem.) At best we should
expect a theory of overall value with widespread incomparability. This creates difficulties for
Harsanyi’s basic theorem – the one without Anonymity – since it assumes that the overall
betterness relation (or, in Harsanyi’s terms, the relation of moral preference) is complete.
For a further discussion of this well-known issue see e.g. Mongin (1994, pp. 349–350) and
MMT §5.3. In light of this, it may be best to interpret that basic theorem in the following
terms: if there really are no interpersonal comparisons, then one outcome is at least as good
as another if and only if every weighted average of individual utility functions gives it a
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In principle, Harsanyi’s theorem applies to the variable population con-
text, as long as we are willing to assign an individual utility value to non-
existence. The theorem then yields critical level utilitarianism.14 Remarkably,
Harsanyi himself was unwilling to go this route. Instead, he vehemently
endorsed average utilitarianism, claiming for it ‘incomparably superior re-
sults’ (Harsanyi, 1977, fn. 12). As this phrase suggests, he was impressed
by standard intuitions against total utilitarianism, including considerations
similar to the Repugnant Conclusion, and the general sense that increasing
population size is morally neutral. (These concerns are particularly clear in
his correspondence quoted in Ng (1983).) But of course he also appealed,
without real argument, to the veil of ignorance. This reinforces the point
that Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem originally followed a different line of
thought, unrelated to the veil.
However, the present paper shows that the two lines of thought are closely
related after all. The premisses we use to argue for the VoIP are much weaker
than the ones used in Broome’s reconstruction of Harsanyi’s theorem, and the
basic argument is much less technical. If, in addition, we assume Expected
Utility for Individual Value, the utilitarian conclusion of Harsanyi’s theorem
follows right away.15 Thus the veil of ignorance may well provide the best way
of proving and understanding Harsanyi’s theorem, overcoming its reputation
as the latter’s poor relation.
higher value. But this is just the Pareto preorder (i.e. the one generated by the Strong Pareto
condition in the text).
14Broome (2004) gives a different argument for critical level utilitarianism based on
Harsanyi’s theorem, which does not rely on a ‘utility of non-existence’. The relationship
between these arguments is rather subtle; I will say a bit more in section 5.
15I return to this point in §4 below.
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Summary
At this point we lack two things. First, we lack any real justification for any
version of the veil of ignorance principle that does not already presuppose
that individual and overall value are matters for expected utility theory. This
is especially important because it is much less clear than usual that expected
utility theory is appropriate in cases of possible non-existence. Indeed, the
second thing we lack is a well-justified story about how individual value
depends on the probability of non-existence. In other words, we lack a
well-justified answer to the Risky Existential Question.
3 An Argument for the Veil
In this section, I explain how three plausible principles entail the VoIP. In
fact, they are equivalent to a generalised version of it. What is the status of
these principles? They derive from some well-known examples in distributive
ethics. They can be understood as rejecting certain kinds of egalitarian
and prioritarian concerns. Thus the argument for the VoIP most directly
implicates those broadly in the utilitarian camp – for example, people who
accept utilitarianism in fixed-population cases, and are wondering how to
extend their theory to variable-population cases. However, the three premisses
are much more widely acceptable than any particular utilitarian theory, and
in particular do not require any sort of numerical representation of welfare.16
16The results I discuss in this section are essentially the main Theorems 1.3.1 and 2.3.1
in MMT. There the three principles are called Posterior Anonymity, Anteriority, and Reduction
to Prospects, respectively. Their relation to egalitarianism is briefly discussed in §5.1 of that
work. For the connection to prioritarianism see e.g. McCarthy (MS)
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Moreover, egalitarians and others should still be interested in the argu-
ment, for two reasons. First, they should go along with it at least in cases
when equality, priority, and so on, are not at stake. Second, we can under-
stand the three principles as characterising a kind of impartial but ‘beneficent’
or ‘personal’ value, setting aside the further question of how to combine this
personal value with impersonal values such as equality and priority. The
phrase ‘personal good’ is sometimes used the way in which I here use ‘indi-
vidual good’, i.e. concerning what is good for one individual. For example,
that is how Broome uses the phrase. But there is a different way of thinking
on which overall as opposed to individual evaluations can still be ‘personal’,
concerning perhaps ‘plural facts about personal good’ (Bader, 2014, p. 5).
This idea is hard to pin down, but the three principles may be viewed as one
way of doing so: after all, the VoIP gives a particularly concrete way in which
overall value might be reducible to individual value. I will have more to say
about this ‘personal good’ interpretation of the VoIP as we go, and especially
when I turn to non-comparativism in section 5.
(1) Against Fairness







The notation is meant to suggest that, under L, it is certain that Ann gets
welfare level x and Bob gets welfare level y , whereas, under L1, there is a half
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chance (corresponding to a coin landing Heads) that Ann gets x and Bob
gets y , and a half chance (corresponding to Tails) that Ann gets y and Bob
gets x .
Here is one way to reason about these two lotteries. Under both L and
L1, it is certain that one person will get x and that the other will get y . But
it does not morally matter which person gets x and which gets y : Ann and
Bob have equal status. So L and L1 are equally good. (Note here that x and
y are lifetime welfare levels. This is important because if, on the contrary, x
and y represented one-time benefits, then it might matter who got which.
For example, we might want to award the larger benefit to the person who
was antecedently worse off.)
More generally, we can distinguish between a welfare distribution, which
assigns a specific welfare level to each specific individual, and an ‘anonymised
distribution’, which specifies how many people get each welfare level, but
not which specific individual gets each one. Since a lottery assigns a prob-
ability to each welfare distribution, and each welfare distribution deter-
mines an anonymised distribution, each lottery assigns a probability to each
anonymised distribution. The example suggests the following general princi-
ple of impartiality:
Principle 1. If the same anonymised distributions get the same chances in
L as in L1, then L is just as good as L1.
This principle can be questioned. Diamond (1967) suggested that L1
is, at least sometimes, fairer than L. When distributing goods it is better to
distribute them randomly, as in L1, than in some predetermined manner,
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as in L. With respect to fairness, or, as this type of fairness is sometimes
known, ex-ante equality, L1 may be better than L. Therefore, since other
things appear to be equal, L1 may be better than L overall.
This argument has some plausibility. But several responses are available.
The first kind of response is that the kind of fairness in question is not
ultimately good for anyone, since that would already be reflected in the
welfare levels. So even if fairness is broadly relevant, there is still a person-
affecting respect in which L1 and L2 are equally good. This is one place where
it would make sense to focus on ‘personal’ value, and understand Principle 1
in those terms. Going a little further, it is not clear that this kind of fairness
is axiological at all; it may be best understood as a non-axiological ideal of
justice.
The second kind of response (really a spelling-out of the first) appeals
to a separate principle of stochastic dominance. To consider the case at hand,
suppose we accept Diamond’s suggestion that L1 is better than L. Suppose
we modify L1 by imposing a small cost on each of Ann and Bob. In other
words, suppose that we can find welfare levels x− and y− very slightly worse




If the cost is small enough (i.e. if x− and y− are close enough to x and y ),
then the resulting lottery L−1 is presumably so similar to L1 that it is still better,
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or at least no worse, than L.17 On the other hand, the outcome of L−1 on
Heads must be worse than L, since everyone is worse off. And the outcome
of L−1 on Tails is only as good as the outcome on Heads, since they only differ
by a permutation of individuals. In summary, Diamond’s judgment suggests
that L−1 is no worse than L despite the fact that it is certain to have a worse
outcome. (More broadly: despite the fact that L ‘stochastically dominates’
L−1 .) This is counter-intuitive.
18
(2) Against Equality







Under both L1 and L2, Ann has a half chance of heads and a half chance of
tails: she faces the same prospect either way. So too with Bob. From that
point of view, L1 is just as good as L2. More generally, we might accept
Principle 2. If each person faces the same prospect in L1 as in L2, then L1
is just as good as L2.
17As long as x and y do not correspond to non-existence, it is rather plausible there
exist slightly worse welfare levels, as this argument requires. If x and y both equal Ω, there
is no problem either, since L = L1. If (say) x = Ω and y 6= Ω, then the argument seems
convincing if we take y− slightly worse than y , and x− =Ω.
18In section 5, I will consider a version of average utilitarianism that does not in general
imply that L is better than M if L stochastically dominates M . But it does agree with the
limited principle needed here, that L is better than M if it is certain to be better for every
individual up to permutation.
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This is a very weak ‘person-affecting’ condition. In order for L1 to be dif-
ferent in value from L2, it must be different for some person – not necessarily
different in value for that person, but at least it must make a difference to
the prospect she faces.19
Nonetheless, as Myerson (1981) originally pointed out, under L2, but
not L1, there is certain to be perfect equality. With respect to equality, L2
may be better than L1, and thus, since all else seems to be equal, L2 may be
better than L1 overall.
As in the case of fairness, a response is possible even if we accept that
equality is broadly relevant. Since this kind of equality does not affect
anyone’s prospects, we can focus on personal value. We can also explicate the
intuition in favour of Principle 2 through a dominance argument. Suppose,
in the case at hand, we accept Myerson’s judgment that L2 is better than L1.
Then (as before) we should be able to impose a small cost on each of Ann




However, the prospect faced by Ann under L−2 is certainly worse than her
prospect under L1: she is worse off on Heads, and worse off on Tails. Mean-
while, Bob’s prospect in each lottery is the same as Ann’s. So his prospect
under L−2 must be worse than his prospect under L1. (In short, each person’s
19It has sometimes been claimed that two lotteries can be incommensurable in value for
an individual, even though the individual faces the same prospect in each one. I will return
to this point briefly in section 5.
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prospect under L1 stochastically dominates his or her prospect under L−2 .)
We thus find that L−2 is no worse than L1 despite the fact that each individual
faces a worse prospect. This is counter-intuitive.20
(3) Against Priority







When we look at each of these alternatives, we see that every individual is in
the same position; and they are certain to remain in the same position as each
other. There is no issue of fairness, there is no issue of equality, and there
are no tradeoffs to be made between the interests of different individuals.
There is, I will say, perfect unanimity. It seems that the only question here
is whether the prospect faced by each and every individual is better for that
individual in L2 than it is in M2. That is, the only issue here is whether a
half-chance of x and a half-chance of y would be better for an individual
than a half-chance of a and a half-chance of b . In general:
20This argument is related to the objection to egalitarianism known as ‘levelling down’.
In levelling down, every person is brought down to the level of the worst-off. One form of
the objection claims that levelling down cannot be an improvement in any respect, i.e. not
even pro tanto (Parfit, 1997, p. 211). A more dialectically effective form of the objection
holds that levelling down cannot be better all things considered. Presumably the general
principle is that making everyone worse off cannot make things better all things considered.
That is the principle I have appealed to here.
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Principle 3. In cases of perfect unanimity, L2 is at least as good as M2 if and
only if it is at least as good for each (hence every) individual.
This is a version of the Pareto principle. It is much weaker than Strong Pareto
in one sense: it only makes a claim about cases of perfect unanimity. It
is slightly stronger than Strong Pareto in another sense. For suppose that
having half-chances of x and y is incomparable to having half-chances of a
and b . In that case, Strong Pareto makes no claim about the relative merits of
L2 and M2. In contrast, Principle 3 claims that L2 and M2 are incomparable.
It is hard to see why one would accept the Strong Pareto principle in cases of
perfect unanimity, but deny the claim about incomparability.21
There are two popular ways of denying Principle 3. One has to do with
the Risky Existential Question, and I will discuss it in section 5. The second
has to do with prioritarianism. Prioritarians typically think that overall
value should be more risk-averse than individual value. One way of getting
this intuition appears to me misguided. It may seem that it is permissible
to accept more risk when we are choosing for ourselves than when we are
choosing for other people.22 But this may just illustrate the moral prerogative
we have to make suboptimal choices for ourselves. Prioritarians who wish
to deny Principle 3 should instead appeal to their general notion of priority.
Consider (to make things more concrete) the following lotteries involving
21Cf. discussion of the extended Pareto principle ‘P3’ in MMT (§3.2 and §5.2). The
application of Pareto-like considerations in the presence of incomparability is subtle when
there is not perfect unanimity. Suppose welfare levels x and y are incomparable. Then
the welfare distributions (x , y ) and (y, x ) are incomparable for each individual, but it does
not seem right to claim that they are themselves incomparable. Rather, by Anonymity (or
Principle 1), they are equally good. I will mention some related issues in section 5 below.
22On this thought on the context of prioritarianism, see Parfit (2012, p. 423); for
comments on risk-aversion from behind the veil, see Rawls (1971, pp. 143–144).






Suppose that, as far as Ann goes, we should compare these lotteries based on
expected welfare. They both have the same expected welfare, 1, so they are
equally good for Ann. Nonetheless, prioritarians tend to favour G2 over G1,
because they think the welfare difference between 0 and 1 (on Tails) is more
important to overall value than the welfare difference between 1 and 2 (on
Heads).23
Whatever other critiques there may be of axiological prioritarianism, the
dominance objection here is obvious. If G2 is really better overall than G1,
then we should be able to impose some small cost on Ann. For example:
G−2 H T
Ann 1− ε 1− ε
For some suitably small cost ε, G−2 must still be no worse than G1, even
though it is worse for the only person whose welfare is at stake.24 In these
one-person cases it is particularly clear what it means to focus on ‘personal’
value.
23Prioritarians don’t have to accept this; they could claim that facing a bad prospect
(rather than the possibility of a bad outcome) is the condition for priority. But such an ‘ex
ante’ prioritarian should accept the judgment that G1 is just as good as G2, and similarly
should accept Principle 3.
24The attentive reader may notice that this dominance argument is not quite strong
enough to establish Principle 3; I will discuss the remaining loop-hole in section 5.
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The result
Claim: Principles 1–3 jointly entail the VoIP.25 I have already secretly given















Given the first two principles, L is just as good as L2, and M is just as good
as M2. And according to Principle 3, L2 is better than M2 if and only if
half-chances of x and y are better for an individual than half-chances of a
and b . The general proof follows the same pattern, and is given in detail and
great generality in MMT (Theorem 2.3.1).
In fact, we prove there that the three principles are almost jointly equiv-
alent to the VoIP. They are equivalent to a stronger form of the VoIP that
applies to lotteries (given the kind of background assumptions mentioned in
footnote 25). Suppose that, in lottery L involving n people, the i th individ-
ual faces prospect L(i ). Roughly speaking, we want to say that evaluating L
overall is equivalent to evaluating the prospect faced by an individual who
25The fine print: for the argument to go through, we need certain domain conditions –
conditions to the effect that all relevant lotteries exist – and certain technical assumptions
to make sensible the machinery of probability theory. The way I have phrased Principle 1
also presupposes that all lotteries in question have countable support, but it has a natural
extension to a more general case, which I will omit here.
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has equal chances of subsequently facing one of L(1) through L(n). As a single
prospect – that is, as a probability distribution over welfare levels – this is
represented by the mixture 1n (L(1) + L(2) + · · ·+ L(n)).
The VoIP for Lotteries. Lottery L is at least as good as lottery M overall, if
and only if it would be at least as good for an individual to face the
prospect 1n (L(1)+L(2)+ · · ·+L(n)) rather than the prospect
1
n (M (1)+
M (2) + · · ·+M (n)).
4 Comparativism
Having given the argument for the VoIP, I now turn to consider the Risky
Existential Question, and, in particular, how the VoIP links it to issues in
population ethics. In this section, I explain how comparativism leads to
generalisations of total utilitarianism, and (in light of that) explore different
ways in which comparativists can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, one of
the key objections to total utilitarian axiology.
Problem-Cases for the Risky Existential Question
First, though, let me step back a little, and introduce the issues more fully. The
VoIP has some immediate consequences for population axiology, independent
of the Risky Existential Question. For example, suppose welfare distribution
P is constructed from Q by doubling the population size and, in particular,
doubling the number of people at each welfare level. Suppose that P ′ is
constructed from Q ′ in the same way. It follows immediately from the VoIP
that P is better than P ′ if and only if Q is better than Q ′. More generally,
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according to the VoIP, the betterness relation is invariant under population
scaling: the value relation between two distributions remains the same if we
scale up the population size in each one by the same factor.26 This rules out,
for example, variable value theories, which give judgments similar to those of
total utilitarianism for small populations, and judgments similar to average
utilitarianism when the small populations are scaled up.27
To go further, however, we need an answer to the Risky Existential
Question – and, quite independently of the VoIP, it is natural to wonder
whether, and when, the Risky Existential Question admits a non-trivial
answer. Consider
Certainty. Only one person, Jill, has any chance of existing. In one alterna-
tive, Certain Existence, it is certain that she exists, and that she will
have a very good life. In another alternative, Certain Non-Existence,
it is certain that she will not exist. Which of these is better for Jill?
There are two standard ways of answering this question. Some people are
happy to say that Certain Existence is better for Jill than Certain Non-
Existence; they are existence comparativists.28 But others – non-comparativists
– deny it. It is a category mistake to ask whether the number two is redder, or
less red, or just as red as the sun; being an abstract object, it does not register
on the scale of redness. So too, non-comparativists hold that asking whether
26This is MMT Proposition 5.1.1.
27According to a concrete version of the variable value view described by Ng (1989), a
welfare distribution of n people with average welfare w has aggregate value (1− (9/10)n)w .
Suppose that Q has one person at level 10, while P has 1000 people at level 10; and Q ′ has
two people at level 9, while P ′ has 2000 people at level 9. Then the theory ranks P above
P ′ but Q ′ above Q . Similar theories were proposed by Hurka (1983) and Sider (1991).
28I am simply ignoring for simplicity the possibility of being an existence comparativist
and holding that a ‘very good life’ is not better than non-existence.
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Certain Existence is better for Jill than Certain Non-Existence involves a
kind of category mistake. Non-existence does not register on the scale of
Jill’s wellbeing, and is thus (in particular) neither better, nor worse, nor just
as good for Jill, compared to existing with a very good life.
But what about a chance of non-existence? I will consider non-compar-
ativists starting from section 5. Here I consider comparativists, for whom
there is an obvious answer. In evaluating prospects with chances of non-
existence, one must simply hedge between the value of non-existence and
the values of different states of existence, in whatever way one normally
hedges when evaluating chancy scenarios. In particular, the paradigmatic
comparativist view will hold that individual value satisfies Expected Utility
for Individual Value (see section 2). They will thus grant a numerical rep-
resentation of welfare levels, including a numerical value for non-existence.
This gives antecedently plausible results in many examples.
Vitamin Z. You are in the very early stages of pregnancy. Taking vitamin Z
now will improve the life of the child, Jill, if she is born. It will also
very slightly increase the risk of early miscarriage.
Which of the following would be better for Jill?29
(A) Take the vitamin; there’s a 95% chance that Jill comes to exist,
and if so, she has a very happy life.
(B) Don’t: there’s a 95.01% chance that Jill comes to exist, but if so,
she has a mediocre life.
29Note that the example is set up explicitly to avoid non-identity problems. But even if
we think that the identity of the child is at issue, or is somehow indeterminate, in a simple
case like this we can presumably ask what is better for the child de dicto.
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I and many others think it is obvious that if we are to choose solely for Jill’s
sake, then we are bound to choose (A). Indeed, the choice is not completely
unrealistic. We routinely make early-pregnancy interventions like this, and,
often, I think, make them for the sake of the child. Moreover, it seems
natural to say that (A) is better for Jill, or at least (and I will come back to
this in section 5) that we should prefer (A) for Jill’s sake.
The comparativist has an easy time here. Since non-existence is compara-
ble for Jill to having a mediocre life, there is no real mystery about why (A)
is also comparable to (B). It is even easy to see why a comparativist would, in
particular, judge (A) to be better than (B). The slight increase in the chance
of existence on (B) as compared to (A) can be traded off against the very
likely loss of welfare. More concretely, let’s suppose that the ‘very good’ life
has welfare 10, while the ‘mediocre’ life has welfare 1, and non-existence has
welfare 0. Then (A) has expected utility 9.5, while (B) has expected utility
0.9501.
Intuitions are not universally in favour of comparativism, however. Be-
sides the basic intuition behind non-comparativism in risk-free cases, there
are variations on Vitamin Z like the one that follows.
Pick or Flip? Suppose you have a frozen embryo, and are considering whe-
ther to incubate it. You are sure that, if you incubate it, it will develop
into a person, Jill, and have a happy life. The timing and circumstances
of the incubation, the identity of the person it would create, and the
quality of the life she would have, are not at issue. But you can either
(Pick) decide directly to incubate the embryo, or
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(Flip) flip a coin.







Here the comparativist will say that Pick is better for Jill than Flip (continuing
to assume that Ω corresponds to welfare 0). And even Pick−, in which she is
sure to have slightly lower welfare if she exists, must be better for Jill than
Flip. A small possible loss of welfare on Heads (from 10 to 6) is outweighed
by a larger possible gain of welfare on Tails (from 0 to 6). Once one is in a
comparativist mind-set, this seems fairly reasonable. But I and many others
have a specific counter-intuition here, that Pick is exactly as good for Jill as
Flip is, and that Pick− is worse for Jill than Flip.
Comparativism and the VoIP
With that background in mind, let me consider the implications of com-
parativism with regard to the VoIP. I will continue to suppose that – as the
paradigmatic comparativist view – individual value satisfies expected utility
theory. If we then combine comparativism with the VoIP, we obtain critical
level utilitarianism.30 To see this in our basic two-person example, note that
having half chances of x and y is exactly as good as getting 12 x +
1
2 y for
sure. (Here I freely use the numerical representation of welfare levels given
by expected utility theory.) So we find that L is better than M just in case
30Cf. Example 2.5.1 and Proposition 3.3.1 in MMT.








2 b , or equivalently, just in case x + y > a + b . In general,
a welfare distribution (x1, . . . , xn) will be better than (y1, . . . , yn) just in case
x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn > y1 + y2 + · · ·+ yn. This is a comparison of total utility,
but notice that the sum includes contributions from non-existent people,
i.e. some of the summands may be the numerical value of Ω. This numerical
value may not be zero; it is the so-called critical level.31
We can take all this as an argument for critical level utilitarianism, starting
from the three basic principles and an expected-utility approach to individual
value. Indeed, this argument is closely related to Broome’s reconstruction
of Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem, which I described in section 2. Recall
that the aggregation theorem officially applies only in fixed-population cases,
but, given comparativism, we can treat Ω just like any other welfare level.
Harsanyi’s argument then assumes expected utility theory for individual and
overall value, the Strong Pareto principle, and Anonymity. Our argument
here depends on much weaker principles: expected utility theory for individ-
ual value only, and Principles 1–3.32 However, Harsanyi and Broome both
31In general, I take the critical level to be the point on the welfare scale above which the
addition of lives contributes positively to overall value. Given a numerical representation of
the welfare scale, we can interpret the critical level as a number, here the numerical value
of Ω. We will only get an ordinary total utility representation if we stipulate that Ω is
represented by utility value 0. Conceptually, though, what makes this theory ‘critical level’
rather than ordinary total utilitarianism is not merely that Ω may have non-zero numerical
value. After all, the numerical value of Ω is open to stipulation insofar as the axioms of
expected utility theory do not uniquely determine the utility function. Rather, the point
is that it may have non-zero value even if we normalise the utility function in such a way
that good lives get positive numerical values and bad ones get negative utility values. To put
it another way, the critical level may not be the level of a neutral life. Having said that, it
seems strange that good lives might be worse than Ω or that bad lives might be better. If
one follows the comparativist in attributing individual value to non-existence, it certainly
seems natural to identify that value with the value of a neutral life.
32In this footnote, I spell out the weakening of the premisses in a bit more detail. I have
generally assumed that individual betterness is ex post in the sense that the value of a lottery
for an individual only depends on the probability distribution over welfare levels faced by
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reject comparativism, and so would consider this argument to be unsound.33
Variations on CLU, and the Repugnant Conclusion
Although critical level utilitarianism is the paradigmatic comparativist view,
interesting variations are available. They are interesting particularly as re-
sponses to the Repugnant Conclusion, which I consider below.
One of the advantages of our approach over that of Broome and Harsanyi
is that the VoIP itself does not rely on any element of expected utility theory.
All it relies on are the three principles explained in section 3. The VoIP
tells us how to aggregate welfare whatever the correct story about individual
value might be. Since expected utility theory, in the cast of von Neumann
and Morgenstern, relies on three main axioms, this opens up three main
directions for generalising critical level utilitarianism.
The three main axioms are completeness, continuity, and strong indepen-
dence.
that individual. Similarly say that the overall betterness relation is ex post if the evaluation
of a lottery only depends on the probability distribution over social welfare levels, where
a social welfare level is an equivalence class of welfare distributions under the relation of
overall indifference. Expected utility theory, as well as just about every concrete alternative
to expected utility theory, requires that the ordering in question is ex post. Now, Principle
1 is much weaker than the conjunction of Anonymity and the overall ex post condition;
Principle 2 is much weaker than the first part of Strong Pareto and the individual ex post
condition; and Principle 3 is much weaker than the conjunction of Strong Pareto and the
Completeness axiom of EUT for overall value. More conceptually, in the fixed-population
case, Principles 1–3 are compatible with any individual betterness relation that satisfies
the ex post condition, and they are also compatible with any overall betterness relation on
welfare distributions that satisfies Anonymity. Further comments in relation to Harsanyi
can be found in MMT (§5.4 and passim).
33In the terminology I will adopt in section 5, Broome seems to be an impersonal mixed
non-comparativist, who is thereby led to a version of critical-level utilitarianism. Harsanyi
was closest to being a conditionalist (as in section 5 below), and was thereby led to average
utilitarianism, although it is doubtful that he would have been happy with the kind of
average utilitarianism that follows from conditionalism and the VoIP. I consider Broome’s
own way of extending the aggregation theorem to variable populations in section 5.
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Completeness. For any prospects x , y , x is at least as good as y or y is at
least as good as x (or both).
Continuity. For any prospects x , y, z such that x is at least as good as y and
y is at least as good as z , there is a probability α such that the mixture
αx + (1−α)z is exactly as good as y .
Strong Independence. For any prospects x , y, z , and any probability α ∈
(0, 1), x is at least as good as y if and only if αx + (1−α)z is at least
as good as α y + (1−α)z .
Dropping the first two axioms still retains the ‘expected utility’ flavour. For-
mally, there is a utility function with values in a ‘preordered vector space’ such
that prospects are ranked by expected utility. Correspondingly, the aggregate
value of a welfare distribution will be given by total utility, understood in
this way.34
A more serious deviation from expected utility theory would deny Strong
Independence (SI). Violations of SI are commonplace in people’s actual
preferences, as the Allais paradox shows. But some have suggested that
violations are indeed rationally permissible (e.g. Buchak (2013)). The rule
Pessimism from section 2 would be an extreme case. In principle, permitting
violations of SI is entirely compatible with the VoIP. However, these non-
expected utility theories may seem to pose a problem. The reason is that they
34This is strictly true so long as we are considering finitely supported prospects; using
more general probability measures introduces technical complications, since the notion of
expected value will not be so easily defined. SeeMMT §3.4 for the most general results along
these lines. §3.3–§3.5 of that work give an in-depth discussion of violations of completeness
and continuity in the context of VoIP, while §4 and Example 1.5.4 are devoted to violations
of SI.
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tend to be ecumenical, allowing for a wide variety of permissible preferences,
corresponding to a wide variety of ways of violating SI. They also usually
allow that satisfying SI is permissible. It is therefore not clear that the VoIP
can presuppose a single way of comparing prospects for ‘an individual’.
Alternatively, in Principle 3, what I called ‘perfect unanimity’ may be far
from perfect, since the same prospect may have different values for different
individuals.
I have two responses to this line of thought. First, let us accept for the
sake of argument that rational preferences need not satisfy SI. Still, this may
not tell us much about the structure of prudential value. For one thing,
it depends what ‘rational’ means. One way in which preferences can be
‘rational’ is that they are internally coherent, or in some sense ‘interpretable’.
I think it is quite plausible that preferences can violate SI without being
rational in this minimal sense. For example, Buchak (2013) explains how to
interpret certain violations of SI in terms of a specific kind of risk aversion,
and perhaps that is enough. But this tells us very little about axiology, since
the criterion for this weak rationality is purely internal. On the other hand,
there is a thicker notion of rationality according to which rational preferences
match up with external axiological facts – at least at a first pass, one prefers
X to Y if and only if X is better than Y . If preferences that are rational in
this sense can violate SI, that might tell us something about axiology. But it
is a much stronger claim that they can.
Second (and I rehearsed this response in section 2), even with the thicker
notion of rationality, if there are many rationally permissible sets of prefer-
ences, we need not conclude that the axiology of prospects must be relativised
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to particular individuals. It more plausibly means that axiology does not
determine a unique system of rational preferences. So, overall, the denial of
SI as a requirement on rational preferences does not pose any problem for
the VoIP.
While some people object to comparativism per se, total utilitarianism
– the simplest comparativist view – is often criticised because it leads to
the Repugnant Conclusion. Let me conclude this discussion by explaining
how the above considerations relate to the usual discussions in population
ethics.35
Recall that the Repugnant Conclusion claims that even a large population
of blissful lives would be worse than some sufficiently large population of
lives ‘barely worth living’. We can use the VoIP to translate this into a claim
about individual value:
Repugnance. A sufficiently small chance of a blissful life (and non-existence
otherwise) is worse for an individual than a life that is barely worth
living.
Critical level utilitarians can avoid Repugnance in the following way. They
can claim that the critical level is above the level of lives that are barely
worth living. This ensures that a prospect that hedges between a blissful
life and non-existence is always better than a life that is barely worth living.
However, it smacks of inconsistency to hold that a life that is ‘worth living’
is nonetheless worse than non-existence.36
35We give a related discussion in MMT (§2.6).
36A version of CLU that I consider in section 5 escapes this apparent inconsistency.
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Denying either of Completeness or Continuity gives another way to
avoid Repugnance. By denying Completeness, we can hold that having a
small chance of a blissful life, and non-existence otherwise, is incomparable
to having a life that is barely worth living. If we still maintain Continuity,
this requires that lives barely worth living are incomparable to non-existence.
At the level of population ethics, the ‘incomplete critical-level utilitarianism’
of Blackorby et al. (2005) is a version of this view. This picture is different in
principle from what I have called non-comparativism, since we could still
hold that the ‘blissful’ lives are better than non-existence. Moreover, the kind
of incomparability is arguably different: on the present view, comparing
blissful lives with non-existence does not involve a category mistake.37
Alternatively, if we accept Completeness but deny Continuity, we can
hold that a life that is barely worth living is better than non-existence, but
still an arbitrarily small chance of a blissful life (and non-existence otherwise)
is better than a life that is barely worth living. At the population level, larger
and larger populations of of lives barely worth living are better and better, but
never better than any population of blissful lives. This is a ‘lexical’ utilitarian
view like the one described in chapter I of this thesis.
Denying Strong Independence does not particularly help to avoid Repug-
nance. Most plausible violations of Strong Independence involve risk aversion.
Compared to SI, they under-emphasise the value of a chance of blissful life,
and over-emphasise the value of a chance of non-existence (the worst available
outcome). Taken to an extreme, they approximate Pessimism. Thus they
37This sort of consideration leads Chang to distinguish parity (‘incomparability’ in my
loose sense) from incomparability properly speaking. See especially the chaining argument
(Chang, 2002, p. 673).
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tend to even more strongly favour certain but mediocre existence over a small
chance of blissful existence. It is true that (on the other hand) risk-loving
violations of SI may mitigate Repugnance, by emphasising the posibility of a
good outcome and de-emphasising the possibility of non-existence. However,
since in Repugnance the chance of a blissful life is arbitrarily small, we can
only avoid Repugnance altogether if we take on the extreme version of a
risk-loving view, to the effect that a prospect is just as good as its best possible
outcome.
5 Non-Comparativism
It is much less obvious, even in outline, how non-comparativists should
answer the Risky Existential Question. Here I will consider three figures.
First, I will consider what I call the strong non-comparativist, who denies the
intuitive result in Vitamin Z. Then I consider the conditionalist, who endorses
the intuitive result in Vitamin Z and the (more controversially)intuitive result
in Pick or Flip. Finally, I consider non-comparativists (including strong non-
comparativists and conditionalists) for whom the Risky Existential Question
is of diminished importance: they claim that Certain Existence is better
than Certain Non-Existence even though it is not better for Jill. These I call
‘mixed’ non-comparativists.
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Strong non-comparativism
If we accept that non-existence is incomparable to any state of existence,
then it is quite natural to suppose that a prospect that contains some chance
of non-existence must be incomparable to any state of certain existence,
and more generally that two prospects are incomparable if they contain dif-
ferent chances of non-existence.38 For example, consider Pick or Flip. The
outcomes on Heads are exactly as good for Jill on Heads. But then, by Strong
Independence, the value relation between the two prospects is the same as the
value relation between the two outcomes on Tails. According to pure non-
comparativists, 10 is incomparable to Ω, and therefore Pick is incomparable
to Flip. As this reasoning suggests, the present strong non-comparativist view
is compatible with Strong Independence and hence with the generalisation
of expected utility theory obtained by rejecting Completeness.
This looks initially like a principled way to go, but I find it troubling,
because it results in very widespread incomparability. At the level of prospects,
it results in incomparability where the Risky Existential Question has intu-
itively positive answers (for example, in Vitamin Z). At the level of lotteries,
two lotteries come out to be incomparable whenever they differ, however
slightly, in expected population size.Axiology is impotent to guide action, if
incomparability is widespread in either, let alone both, of these ways.
The problem may be even worse than just mentioned. I have assumed in
38Given the VoIP, this more general claim follows from the preceding one, at least when
we are dealing with rational probabilities. This is because individual betterness must satisfy
a condition we call Omega Independence (see MMT §2.2). According to this condition, the
value relation between any two prospects P and Q does not change if we mix both of them
with the same rational probability of non-existence.
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this whole discussion that we can speak of the individual betterness relation
as a relation on prospects, where a prospect is a probability measure over
welfare levels, including Ω. Call this view Prospectism (a term which is used
in a different but related way by Hare (2010)). A non-comparativist may
have good reason to reject Prospectism. Consider the following example.
State Permutation. A coin will be flipped, and Jill will exist on one of the
outcomes but not the other. However, you can determine ahead of
time on which of the outcomes she will exist, and what her welfare







I think that everyone should accept that On-H+ is better (for Jill and overall)
than On-H. Pre-theoretically, I also find it hard to believe that On-T is not
just as good as On-H+, and better than On-H. But strong non-comparativists
might be led to think otherwise. After all, On-T is not better for Jill on
Heads, nor is it better for Jill on Tails. We can be certain that the outcome
of On-T will not be better for Jill than the outcome of On-T. So it is hard
to see how On-T could be better for Jill than On-H. The difficulty here
is particularly one for strong non-comparativists. They are motivated by
state-wise reasoning to say that to say that Pick is incomparable to Flip, but
similar state-wise reasoning suggests that On-T is incomparable to On-H.
This line of thought has been levied against the use of expected utility
theory whenever there is the possibility of incomparability (Temkin, 2012;
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Schoenfield, 2014; Bales et al., 2014). On the face of it, we can replace Ω in
the above reasoning by any outcome x that is incomparable to both 6 and
10. However, I am using the word ‘incomparable’ in a broad way, and for
some sorts of incomparability, there are plausible ways of explaining why the
above state-wise reasoning is inappropriate.
Suppose, for example, that the incomparability is a matter of weighing
indeterminacy. That is, outcome x involves certain features, and it is (broadly
speaking) indeterminate how these features weigh up. On some plausible
ways of weighing things, x is better than 10, while on others it is worse than
6; but there is no determinately right way to do the weighing, and that is
the sense in which x is incomparable to 6 and 10. It may help to think
about what this might mean for rational preferences. Let us suppose that
when two things are incomparable, it is permissible to prefer either one to
the other. However, that doesn’t mean that it is permissible to prefer 6 to x
and simultaneously prefer x to 10. For one thing, it is not rational to have
such intransitive preferences. But there is another explanation that does not
appeal explicitly to transitivity. The basic permission is not about preferences,
but about weighing. When there is weighing indeterminacy, it is rationally
permissible to weigh things up however one likes, at least within some range.
But there is no way of weighing things up so that 6 comes out better than x
yet x comes out better than 10. So there is no rational permission to have
such intransitive preferences. Similarly, there is no way of weighing things
up so that On-T comes out anything but better than On-H. So there is no
rational permission to prefer On-H to On-T, and this reflects an axiological
fact that On-T is better than On-H.
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However, strong non-comparativism does not fit well with this kind of
story. The reason Ω is incomparable to 6 and to 10 is not supposed to be that
there are different factors that weigh in different directions. Non-existence
doesn’t even register on the scale of Jill’s welfare, and there is no stand to take
about where it registers.39
Thus non-comparativists who are attracted to strong non-comparativism
may well go further. In denying the intuitive judgments about State Permu-
tation, they deny Prospectism. In the end they are bound to reject the VoIP,
or to think that it is incoherently stated. But their view is very difficult to
maintain. First, I do not know of any worked-out, principled alternative
to expected utility theory that denies Prospectism in the way strong non-
comparativists would like. Second, even if there is such a theory, it is almost
bound to yield enormous incomparability. On my initial version of strong
non-comparativism, there was only necessarily incomparability when two
situations gave different probabilities to existence. Now we should expect
incomparability unless existence is guaranteed on the very same states of
affairs, as seen in the incomparability of On-H and On-T. Such a theory of
individual value would not appear to have much use for population ethics,
even if it were true.40
39Rabinowicz (MS) gives a structurally similar defense of Prospectism, using fitting
attitude theory. In related work, he uses fitting attitudes to distinguish parity from
incomparability-strictly-speaking (Rabinowicz, 2012). He proposes that a variety of prefer-
ential attitudes are fitting in cases of parity, whereas incomparability requires a ‘preferential
gap’.
40As something close to an example, consider the ‘deferentialism’ sketched by Hare
(2010). Hare presents deferentialism as providing a link between incomplete preferences
and choice. But we can reinterpret it as providing a link between incomplete value and
choice (and I have an easier time comprehending the theory in these terms). In the current
setting, deferentialism implies that either of two prospects can be permissibly chosen for
the sake of the individual if there is some state of nature of non-zero probability in which
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In the next two subsections, I consider two moves open to non-compar-
ativists who are bothered by widespread incomparability. They can give up
the state-wise reasoning that leads to strong non-comparativism. Or they
can deny Principle 3, thus denying the importance of non-comparativism
to overall evaluation. (In the terms I introduced at the beginning of section
3, this is one way of denying that overall betterness is a matter of personal
betterness.)
Conditionalism
Here is an initially attractive alternative to strong non-comparativism. Rank
prospects by their value conditional on existence – that is, rule out non-
existence and rescale the probabilities accordingly.41 Call this rule condition-
alism. It gives what I claimed were the intuitively correct answers in Pick or
Flip and Vitamin Z, and also in State Permutation. That is a strong point in
its favour.
Before analysing conditionalism, let me note a variation on it which
may now spring to mind. The alternative is to rank prospects by their value
conditional on existence and then weighted by the probability of existence.
Concretely, we might take expected utility conditional on existence, and then
multiplied by the probability. For example, the value of Flip for Jill would
be the utility 10 she gets conditional on existence, times the probability
the individual exists on one option but not the other. This widespread permissibility is
analogous to the widespread incomparability described in the main text, and problematic to
the same extent.
41Views of this sort are considered by Harsanyi in his correspondence quoted in Ng
(1983), and by Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey (2016).
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1/2 of existence; hence, Flip would have value 5. This ‘weighted’ version of
conditionalism is in most cases formally the same as supposing that Ω has
utility value 0, and then calculating expected utility. The one case in which it
differs is whenΩ has probability 1, and so the operation of conditionalising on
existence does not make sense. Weighted conditionalism can thus coherently
maintain thatΩ itself is incomparable to any outcome on which the individual
exists. I take it the attraction of weighted conditionalism is that it gives a
plausible-sounding way to reconstruct the verdicts of comparativism (and
thence total utilitarianism) without actually giving Ω a utility value.
However, I think weighted conditionalism is not as attractive as it initially





According to plain conditionalism, Pick− is worse for Jill than Flip, and this
seems about right. According to Weighted conditionalism, however, Pick−
is better for Jill than Flip, having value 6 instead of 10 × 1/2 = 5. Not
only is this, I think, counterintuitive, but, more importantly, the weighted
conditionalist cannot justify this judgment using expected utility theory.
Observe that the outcome on Heads is much worse for Jill under Pick− than
under Flip. That seems to be one respect in which Pick− is worse than Flip.
If the outcome on Tails were much better for Jill under Pick− than under
Flip, that would be a countervailing respect in which Pick− would be better
than Flip. So we might reason: yes, on Heads, Flip is better for Jill, but, on
Tails, Pick− is better to an even greater degree; thus Pick− is better overall.
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The weighted conditionalist cannot argue this way, because he maintains that
6 is not better than Ω. But then it is simply not clear to me why Pick− is
better for Jill than Flip.
Now let me return to the basic, unweighted version of conditionalism.
The paradigmatic version of this theory is the one that evaluates prospects
by expected utility conditional on existence. Given VoIP, this corresponds to
evaluating welfare distributions in the manner of Vickrey: evaluate as if for
the sake of an individual whose identity is uncertain, but who is certain to
exist. The paradigmatic moral theory is therefore average utilitarianism.42 In
general, conditionalists will avoid Repugnance, just as average utilitarians
avoid the Repugnant Conclusion.
Beyond that, however, average utilitarianism faces very serious problems
(see e.g. Hurka (1982a,b)). The main point I wish to make is that this
produces a dilemma. On the one hand, the three principles leading to the
VoIP seem plausible, as does conditionalism. But average utilitarianism seems
unacceptible. What should we give up? (And how?)
In negotiating that dilemma, it may be worth pointing out that the kind
of average utilitarianism recommended by the VoIP has some curious features,
which may make it more acceptable than the ordinary kind. The best-known
problems for average utilitarianism involve situations in which the outcome
is certain. But further problems become clear when we ask what average
utilitarians should say about chancy situations. Consider, for example, the
following lotteries involving 100 people.
42Cf. MMT Example 2.5.2.











· · · · · · · · · · · ·
Bob99 −20 Ω
The most obvious way for an average utilitarian to compare these two lotteries
is by expected average utility.43 By this criterion, L100 and M100 are equally
good. This judgment is extremely implausible, since M100 is worse (on any
account I have considered) for all the Bobs, and better only for Ann.
One might instead think to rank lotteries by average expected utility, where
the expectations are calculated conditional on existence. This yields the more
plausible result that L100 is better than M100. On the other hand, consider
the following two lotteries, in which H, T1,…,T99 are 100 equiprobable
outcomes:
L′100 H T1 · · · T99
Ann Ω 10 · · · 10
Bob −20 Ω · · · Ω
M ′100 H T1 · · · T99
Ann Ω −20 · · · −20
Bob 10 Ω · · · Ω
These lotteries have the same average expected utility, despite the fact that
L′100 is almost certain to create a world with a single well-off person and M
′
100
is almost certain to create a world with a single badly-off person. This is
again implausible.
43Since average utility does not make sense for empty worlds (i.e. worlds in which no
one exists), it is not clear what ‘expected average utility’ means when there is a chance that
no one exists. But let us suppose that this is dealt with in some way, e.g. by stipulating
a value for empty worlds, or by conditionalising on the proposition that the world is not
empty.
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The form of average utilitarianism recommended by conditionalism and
the VoIP does not rank lotteries by expected average utility, nor by average
expected utility. The former of these theories violates Principle 2, and the
latter violates Principle 1. Instead, we obtain a theory that ranks lotteries by
expected total utility divided by expected population size. Call this theory veiled
average utilitarianism (VAU). VAU vindicates the intuitive judgments in the
just-considered cases; it ranks L100 above M100 and L′100 above M
′
100.
Now, one entirely reasonable reaction to all this is that the failure of
expected utility theory (and especially the failure of Strong Independence)
counts strongly against VAU. But there are two counterbalancing consid-
erations. First, the VoIP, and the three principles justifying it, articulate a
way in which overall value reduces to individual value. Insofar as we have a
non-EUT theory for individual value (e.g. conditionalism), then of course
we must have a non-EUT theory for overall value. Moreover, insofar as the
non-EUT theory for individual value is a principled one, we should count
the theory for overall value as principled as well. This is just to say that
the committed non-comparativist should be ready and willing to bite some
bullets. The second point is that the problems with expected average value
are severe enough that someone generally sympathetic to average utilitari-
anism may prefer veiled average utilitarianism overall. One way in which
VAU’s violation of SI might not be so bad is that it still licenses a kind of
case-by-case reasoning similar to that given by expected utility theory. While
a value function on lotteries that satisfies EUT satisfies
V (αL+ (1−α)M ) = αV (L) + (1−α)V (M )
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the value function of VAU satisfies
V (αL+ (1−α)M ) = 1
NL +NM
αNLV (L) + (1−α)NM V (M ),
where NL and NM are the expected number of people under L and M . Thus
the value of a mixture of lotteries can be easily calculated in terms of some
simple statistics of those lotteries. This is not true of standard non-expected
utility theories.
It must nonetheless be clear that these observations about veiled average
utilitarianism have more the character of consolation than of defence.
Mixed Non-Comparativists
Consider again the example Certainty (p. 131). This is a case of perfect
unanimity, so Principle 3 may apply. According to that principle, Certain Ex-
istence is better overall than Certain Non-Existence just in case it is better for
Jill. Non-comparativists deny that it is better for Jill. The non-comparativists
I have considered so far accept Principle 3, at least in this case, and therefore
that Certain Existence is not better overall than Certain Non-Existence. But
what I call mixed (as opposed to pure) non-comparativists allow that Certain
Existence is better than Certain Non-Existence overall. Thus they reject
Principle 3, and must reject the VoIP as written. However, I will argue that
these mixed non-comparativists can accept a modification of Principle 3
and of the VoIP, and, with respect to this modification, they fall into the
‘comparativist’ camp. In particular, we obtain a non-comparativist version of
the argument for critical level utilitarianism.
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Two Varieties of Mixed Non-Comparativism
To get a handle on the mixed non-comparativist view, let me revisit the
dominance argument for Principle 3. I mentioned in footnote 24 that the
argument contains a loophole. What it shows – convincingly, in my view – is
that, in cases of perfect unanimity, L2 is at least as good as M2 if it is at least
as good for each individual. The converse amounts to the claim that L2 is
incomparable to M2 if it is incomparable for each individual. But this is less
compelling, and anyway is not supported by the dominance argument. There
could be something else besides individual betterness that decides between
L2 and M2 when individual betterness is silent, as it is when we compare
Certain Existence and Certain Non-Existence.
With that in mind, we can distinguish two kinds of mixed non-compar-
ativists. Some, whom I will call ‘personal’, think that we should favour
Certain Existence over Certain Non-Existence for Jill’s sake. For example,
they may think that the former is better than the latter because Jill would
be ‘non-comparatively benefited’ by having a very good life.44 The fact
that Certain Existence is good for Jill counts in its favour, and there is no
Jill-related fact that counts for or against Certain Non-Existence. It is this
goodness for Jill that is decisive even when there is no question of betterness
for Jill.
Other mixed non-comparativists, whom I will call ‘impersonal’, think
that we should favour Certain Existence over Certain Non-Existence overall,
44See Bykvist (2007) for a discussion of non-comparative benefits. He is officially neutral
about what the import of non-comparative benefits are, but expresses what I take to be a
personal mixed non-comparativist view in his discussion of guardian angels (pp. 353–356).
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but, seeing as how the former isn’t better for Jill, we cannot do so strictly for
Jill’s sake. What is decisive here is the impersonal value of the life Jill would
have on Certain Existence, perhaps correlated with but not simply a matter
of that life being good for her. (See the discussion of ‘neutral’ wellbeing in
Broome (2004, p. 142) for a clear example of this view.)
In case the difference between these views appears obscure, here are two
ways to pull them apart a little. First, the personal version begins with a
distinction between lives that are good and those that are bad for the people
living them. But impersonal mixed non-comparativists need not be com-
mitted to any such distinction. Fundamentally at issue for them is whether
Jill’s life in Certain Existence has the right character to make it better overall
that it be lived than not lived, but this need not be a matter of the life being
good rather than bad for Jill. Second, consider the combination of mixed
non-comparativism with conditionalism. Since mixed non-comparativists
accept that Certain Existence is better overall than Certain Non-Existence,
they are very likely to think that Pick is better overall than Flip (p. 134). But
conditionalists think that Pick and Flip are equally good for Jill. It is then
not true that we should prefer Pick for Jill’s sake: as far as she goes, we should
be indifferent. Thus conditionalism is most compatible with the impersonal
version of mixed non-comparativism. On the other hand, this combination
is not very attractive, since it falls prey to the dominance argument used to
support Principle 3.
Recall that in section 3 I proposed understanding the three principles,
and hence the VoIP, as characterising a kind of ‘personal’ (but not merely
individual) value. From that point of view, mixed non-comparativists can
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endorse Strong Non-Comparativism and VoIP as stories about personal value,
but hold that when it comes to overall moral evaluation, there is a further
story to be told. What distinguishes personal mixed non-comparativists is
that they still try to tell that further story in terms of what we ought to do
for the sake of individuals, for example by appealing to categorical rather
than comparative judgments about the personal value of individual lives.45
Mixed Non-Comparativism and Critical Level Utilitarianism
Having got the different views on the table, let me now explain how mixed
non-comparativists can accept a version of the VoIP, and are thereby pushed
towards critical level utilitarianism.
Consider first the personal mixed non-comparativists. They recognise a
Jill-regarding, not merely overall sense in which Certain Existence is more
choice-worthy than Certain Non-Existence, even if they are reluctant to call
this ‘betterness for Jill’. For example, Bykvist (2007, p. 355) recognises a
‘preventive’ value in preventing someone from existing if they would have
a bad life, and this value is relevant to deliberations for the sake of that
possible person. One can therefore formulate new versions of Principle 3
and the VoIP that invoke not value for an individual but choice-worthiness
regarding that individual. These modified versions should be as acceptable to
personal mixed non-comparativists as the original versions were acceptable
to comparativists.
45I should note that while personal mixed non-comparativism can be detected in the work
of Bykvist and others, I do not know of anyone who has unambiguously and systematically
endorsed such a view. Still, it is worth seeing how the view works out. In contrast, Broome
is unambiguously an impersonal mixed non-comparativist.
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Before, the VoIP provided an argument from comparativism to critical
level utilitarianism, in which the utilities being summed represented bet-
terness for individuals. Now we obtain an argument from personal mixed
non-comparativism to a form of critical level utilitarianism in which the
utilities being summed represent choice-worthiness regarding individuals.
However, betterness for Jill coincides with choice-worthiness regarding Jill
as long as Jill is certain to exist. So the numerical representation of choice-
worthiness regarding Jill is also a numerical representation of individual value
for Jill, excepting only that it assigns a numerical value to her non-existence.
In this way, we can interpret the critical level utilitarianism on offer as aggre-
gating individual value. This is so similar to the comparativist picture that
the only mystery is why the personal mixed non-comparativist declines to
use the phrase ‘better for’ to mean ‘more choice-worthy regarding’.
As for impersonal mixed non-comparativists, there are a few moves avail-
able. Perhaps the simplest is to consider Robinson Crusoe lotteries: lotteries
in which only one person has any chance to exist. Call him ‘Crusoe’ (sorry,
Friday). Given any lottery L, we can consider the corresponding Crusoe
lottery LC in which Crusoe faces the same prospect that Jill faces in L. We
can say that L is ‘Crusoe-better for Jill’ than M if and only if LC is better
overall than MC . We can more generally talk about the ‘Crusoe value’ of
a lottery or prospect for Jill. So we again obtain a sense of Jill-regarding
choice-worthiness, to which now impersonal mixed non-comparativists can
subscribe.46
46In Bader’s terms, Crusoe value is a version of individual but impersonal value, just as
there may be overall (or in his terminology, ‘general’) but personal value.
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At this point, the discussion runs parallel to the discussion of personal
mixed non-comparativism. First, we can formulate modified versions of
Principle 3 and the VoIP that invoke Crusoe value instead of individual
value. From this Crusoe version of VoIP, and the hypothesis that Crusoe
value satisfies expected utility theory, we obtain a version of critical level
utilitarianism in which the utilities being summed represent Crusoe value
rather than individual value.47 Moreover, it seems that Crusoe value must
coincide with individual value when the individual is certain to exist.48
So, again, the numerical representation of Crusoe value merely extends the
numerical representation of individual value by giving a numerical value to
non-existence. Once more, the critical level utilitarianism on offer has a
direct interpretation as aggregating individual value.
While I suggested that the personal mixed non-comparativist’s view was
but a minor variant of comparativism, the impersonal version of the view
does have an important distinguishing feature. The impersonal mixed non-
comparativist’s version of the VoIP no longer involves a reduction of overall
value to individual value.49 From one point of view, according to which it
must be personal value that matters morally, the absence of this reduction
appears mysterious. On the other hand, it provides an advantage in respond-
47Note that if overall value satisfies expected utility theory, then so does Crusoe value,
since it is just a matter of the overall value of one-person lotteries.
48For example, we get this result from the original version of Principle 3, applied to
Robinson Crusoe lotteries in which Robinson is certain to exist. Alternatively, we can derive
it from Strong Pareto plus the assumption that individual value completely preorders such
lotteries.
49Remember why: on the personal version of the view, the value of the critical level
can be explained in terms of choice for the sake of particular individuals, or in terms of
categorical rather than comparative judgments of individual value. On the impersonal
version of the view, the critical level is just a feature of overall value, not to be explained in
terms of value for individuals.
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ing to the Repugnant Conclusion. In my discussion of comparativism, I
complained that it smacks of inconsistency to hold that a life that is ‘worth
living’ is worse than non-existence when it comes to individual value. On the
current impersonal view, to say that some individually good lives fall below
the critical level only commits one to the view that these lives contribute
negatively to overall value – a strange view, but not an inconsistent one.
John Broome’s position inWeighing Lives is naturally interpreted as an
impersonal mixed non-comparativist view. Let me conclude this discussion
of non-comparativism by relating what he does to the picture just described.
The upshot is that our argument for the VoIP, adapted to impersonal mixed
non-comparativism, yields a streamlined version of Broome’s argument for
critical-level utilitarianism.
Broome uses his version of Harsanyi’s theorem to derive fixed-population
utilitarianism. To extend the result to variable populations without accepting
comparativism, Broome appeals to a separability condition. To state a version
of this, suppose that we divide all possible people into two groups, P and
Q. For any lottery L, we can consider the ‘restriction’ L|P of L to P . This
is a lottery in which no one outside P can exist, and everyone in P faces
the same prospect as in L.
Separability. Suppose that L|P is just as good as M |P . Then L is at least as
good as M just in case L|Q is at least as good as M |Q .
There are several ways of motivating such a principle. But the main idea is the
obvious one, that since the P people are unaffected by the choice between
L and M , we should be able to ignore them. This thought is especially
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compelling when the P people are located far away, or in the distant past.
But if we do not think that spatiotemporal location is morally relevant, we
should accept Separability in general.50
How does Broome use Separability to argue for critical-level utilitari-
anism? Here is a reconstruction, in slightly different terms from the ones
he uses. First, Separability implies a modified version of Strong Pareto that
involves Crusoe value instead of individual value.51 Suppose that Anonymity
holds and that overall value (hence Crusoe value) satisfies expected utility
theory. Then we have the main premisses for Harsanyi’s theorem, in terms
of Crusoe value instead of individual value. We thereby obtain a version of
critical level utilitarianism in which the utility values to be summed represent
Crusoe value. But we can again reinterpret this critical level utilitarianism as
aggregating individual value, as in footnote 48.
How does this compare to my suggestion above, that the impersonal
mixed non-comparativist like Broome can adopt the Crusoe version of the
VoIP? First of all, Broome’s assumptions of Anonymity and expected utility
theory for overall value entail Principle 1, and Separability entails Principle 2.
Separability and Completeness for overall value together imply the Crusoe
version of Principle 3. Thus a subset of Broome’s crucial premisses can be
used to justify first the Crusoe version of the VoIP, and thence critical level
utilitarianism. On the other hand, one might accept the relevant versions of
Principles 1–3 without appealing to the full force of Separability.52 To echo
50A more extended form of this argument is particularly clear in Blackorby et al. (1995),
in which the authors appeal to ‘independence of the utilities of the dead’.
51Specifically: if L is at least as Crusoe-good as M for every individual, it is at least as
good overall; if, in addition, it is Crusoe-better for some individual, then it is better overall.
52We give a complementary discussion of Separability in §3.2 of MMT. Roughly, we
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my remarks in section 2, the veil of ignorance turns out to be an efficient
way of understanding Broome’s argument for utilitarianism, rather than a
misguided alternative.
6 Conclusion
My first goal in this paper was to rehabilitate the veil of ignorance by laying
out more basic normative principles to which the VoIP is equivalent. These
principles reflect an ideal of impartial but personal value, to which ideals
of fairness, equality, or priority could in principle be adjoined. The VoIP
forcefully raises the Risky Existential Question, in answer to which my second
goal has been to provide a rough map of the terrain. Comparativists and
the related mixed non-comparativists find here an efficient argument for
critical level utilitarianism, greatly simplifying the work of Harsanyi and
Broome; conditionalists find a positive argument for average utilitarianism;
but pure strong non-comparativists find a theory of overall value laid waste
by incomparability.
show that Separability is equivalent to Strong Independence, given the VoIP. This is a
powerful observation which, however, I do not exploit here.
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IV | Time-Relative Interests and
Population Ethics
I was of three minds,
Like a tree
In which there are three blackbirds.
—Wallace Stevens
. Discussions in population ethics most often concern
distributions of lifetime welfare among persons. On the other hand,
Parfit’s work has made popular the idea that what is normatively rele-
vant is not personal identity but psychological connectedness (and/or
continuity). Moreover, it is often thought that psychological con-
nectedness, unlike personal identity, comes in degrees. How can we
reimagine population ethics in light of these ideas? That is the broad
question I consider here, but it is motivated by a narrower one: how
best to systematize and understand certain ethical verdicts associated
with Jeff McMahan’s theory of time-relative interests.
1 Introduction
Jeff McMahan’s time-relative interests or TRI account (McMahan, 2002) is
most often considered to be an account of the badness of death. But in
the first instance it is a general view about prudential value. The account
is naturally formulated in terms of person-stages, or persons at times. I take
161
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it that each person-stage has a welfare level, reflecting how well things are
going at the time in question. But the prudential deliberations of one person-
stage typically take into account the welfare of some other person-stages, in
the quotidian sense that I now take into account my happiness tomorrow.
In these terms, the TRI account answers the following question. Consider
person-stages S and T . What weight should considerations about T ’s welfare
have in S ’s prudential deliberations, or in deliberations on behalf of S ? As I
will put it: what stake does S have in T ’s welfare?
The most obvious answer to this question is that S has a full stake in
T ’s welfare just in case T is the same person as S , and none otherwise.
What matters is personal identity, interpreted as a relation between person-
stages. In contrast, the TRI account claims that S ’s stake in T ’s welfare
tracks the degree to which S and T are psychologically connected. What
matters is psychological connectedness, and this is a matter of degree.1 So,
for example, if a newborn baby is only loosely psychologically connected
from one week to the next, then, at any given time, it has only a small stake
in its future wellbeing. In contrast, a typical adult has strong psychological
connections from one decade to the next, and therefore a big stake in her
future wellbeing. Thus a human can at one time, as a newborn, have a weak
interest in continuing to live, and a strong interest at another.
The TRI account of prudential value is also supposed to have certain
1In formulating the account, McMahan (2002, p. 80) writes generically in terms of
‘prudential unity relations’, which include psychological as well as potentially other kinds of
relations. (He of course develops a view of what these are.) The archetype is Parfit’s ‘Relation
R: psychological connectedness and/or continuity, with the right kind of cause’ (Parfit, 1986,
p. 215). I will stick to psychological connectedness for the sake of brevity and concreteness;
one can easily adapt the discussion to a more complicated account of the prudential unity
relations.
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implications for ethics, which I will refer to as the orthodox verdicts. For
example, suppose we face the choice between saving the life of the newborn
or that of the adult. Letting the newborn die would preclude (let us suppose)
60 years of good life; letting the adult die would preclude only 40 years of
good life. This may make it seem that we should save the newborn and let
the adult die, thus maximizing the number of years of good life that are lived.
But these are only the headline figures. The adult has a big stake in his future
wellbeing; he would really be deprived of those 40 years. The newborn has
very little stake in its future wellbeing. Compared to the adult, it would
hardly be deprived by death. We ought to save the adult.2
Although this story (which I will introduce more fully below) has a certain
plausibility, it faces an array of problem-cases (several of them introduced
by McMahan himself ). These by and large do not raise problems for the
TRI account narrowly construed as an account of prudential value. But
together they raise doubts about whether this account of prudential value can
be incorporated into a coherent moral theory that vindicates the orthodox
verdicts. One aim of this paper is to allay those doubts. A bit more generally,
McMahan has explicated the TRI account largely case-by-case, leading to
a wonderfully nuanced but somewhat indeterminate picture. We are to be
‘guided’ by time-relative interests, but what does that mean in general?3 I
2I note that there are two plausible ways of talking about deprivation here. One might
say that the newborn faces a greater deprivation (60 years of welfare instead of 40), but the
deprivation matters less to him. Or one might say that a loss is only a deprivation to the
extent that it matters to the person so deprived at the time of evaluation. Then the adult
faces greater deprivation. I prefer this second way of talking, but I admit it is not completely
standard.
3Note that the big picture may well involve considerations that go beyond the broadly
welfarist focus of theTRI account. But in this paper I will focus purely on whatever guidance
can be had from considerations of welfare and psychological connectedness.
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will sketch some relatively systematic ways of understanding the view, and
indeed go to the opposite extreme of presenting a simplistic but anyway
specific decision rule. I do not claim that this is the best possible way of
capturing the orthodox verdicts – though I have not seen better. But it is
enough to see off the basic worry of incoherence, and, I hope, to move the
literature beyond examples and putative counter-examples back towards a
more fundamental mode of theorising.
After describing the TRI account and the problem cases more fully in
sections 2 and 3, I develop the basic strategy in section 4. The rough idea
is to think of psychological connectedness as a degreed version of personal
identity. The claim is that the problems of the TRI account then become
simple generalisations of certain well-known problems in population ethics.
Although I develop this point more systematically than it has been heretofore,
the basic picture is already widely known. However, I use it to motivate
a novel ‘population ethics first’ strategy for developing the TRI account.
Schematically, this involves two steps:
Step 1. Settle on a theory of population ethics.
Step 2. Adapt it to deal in degrees of psychological connectedness rather
than all-or-nothing personal identity.
In contrast, the more usual strategy is to start from the notion of time-relative
interests and to figure out how they should guide ethical judgments. Let
me explain this a little more. What I will call ‘standard’ normative theories
are those that deal in distributions of lifetime welfare among persons. In
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particular, the standard account of prudential value is the one according
to which the prudential value of an outcome A for a person-stage S is the
lifetime welfare in A of the person to whom S belongs. In these terms, the
thought behind the usual strategy is something like this:
On the standard account, prudential value is a matter of lifetime
welfare. On the TRI account, it is a matter of time-relative
interests. On standard accounts of population ethics, we should
be guided by considerations about lifetime welfare. So on the
TRI account, we should be guided by considerations about
time-relative interests.
From my point of view, the TRI account of prudential value is just what
you get when you adapt the standard account of prudential value to deal in
degrees of psychological connectedness. We want to adapt standard accounts
of population ethics in the same way, but there is no fundamental reason the
result must be expressed directly in terms of time-relative interests. This is,
again, more a point of strategy than a conceptual one. It would of course
be implausible if the end result had no relationship whatsoever to the TRI
account of prudential value. But we need not, and perhaps in the first
instance should not, theorise directly about the form of that relationship.
Neither of the two steps in this programme is trivial. Indeed, finding an
adequate theory of population ethics is famously intractable. But we cannot
lay that problem at the door of the TRI account. The programme suggests
that however one solves the problems of population ethics, essentially the
same considerations will overcome the problems of the TRI account. This
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may be true even if the solution is to reject some of the trouble-making
intuitions.
Indeed, I should emphasise that the issues raised by Step 2 are of very
general interest. Many people reject the intuitions in population ethics that
correspond to the orthodox verdicts of the TRI account, while remaining
sympathetic to the idea that degrees of psychological connectedness are what
matter. How, for example, can average utilitarianism or prioritarianism
incorporate this idea?
Starting in section 5, I explore some options for carrying out this pro-
gramme. Perhaps it will not be surprising that I am able to complete neither
of the two steps in a fully satisfactory way. As far as the first step goes, I do
present a theory of population ethics that gives the desired answers in all the
most relevant cases. I explain this theory, which I call complex necessitarianism,
at the end of section 5, and use it as an example in what follows. What about
the second step? How can one adapt one’s favourite theory of population
ethics to deal in degrees of psychological connectedness? Here I explore two
general approaches.
Standard theories of population ethics suppose that each available option
gives rise to a set of people, whose lifetime welfare levels form the basis for
moral evaluation. The first general approach, explored in section 6, is to
reconsider which entities should count as ‘people’ when interpreting these
theories. Insofar as this strategy succeeds, we do not really have to adapt
our favourite theory of population ethics, so much as to reinterpret it in
terms of the normatively relevant entities. We would thus obtain a recipe
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for completing Step 2 of the programme that would not depend on how we
complete Step 1.
My first example of this approach posits that personal identity is some-
times indeterminate, and the degree of psychological connectedness deter-
mines the degree of indeterminacy. Crucially, this picture allows that personal
identity is a transitive relation, thus maintaining that each outcome contains
a set of persons, even if it is indeterminate which person-stages compose
which people. The main problem with this picture is that the facts about
personal identity do not properly supervene on the psychological facts, or at
least I do not see how to ensure that they do.
A second picture, which I consider more briefly, holds that personal
identity is sometimes partial. For two person-stages at different times to
be stages of the same person is for them to have the same psychological
constituents, and this overlapping is a matter of degrees. An advantage of
this picture is that the sense in which identity comes in degrees is more closely
tied in concept to psychological connectedness. However, it relies on a highly
speculative psychological picture, which may simply be untenable.
A third picture would rely on David Lewis’s view that posits overlapping
four-dimensional persons. However, I will argue that these Lewisian persons
are not fit subjects for population ethics, in part because of their overlapping
nature.
The second general approach appears more promising. I take it up in
section 7. There I consider a counterpart-theoretic treatment of personal
identity. This ‘prudential’ counterpart relation is an on/off relation like
personal identity, but it is not usually an equivalence relation. It therefore
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does not group person-stages into persons. So this approach is not directly
compatible with standard normative theories. However, it is sometimes
possible to adapt these theories in such a way that the prudential counterpart
relation functionally replaces the personal identity relation. In the case of
prudential value, we recover theTRI account, because of the way in which the
prudential counterpart relation supervenes on psychological connectedness.
In the case of complex necessitarianism, we obtain an ethical theory that
systematically reproduces the orthodox verdicts of the TRI account. Mission
accomplished!
Be that as it may, one of the advantages of the viewpoint I adopt in
this paper is that it allows our thinking about the TRI account to be in-
formed by the wide range of theoretical and intuitive considerations that
arise in population ethics. To illustrate this point, I conclude in section 8 by
suggesting an alternative to the orthodox verdicts, still broadly in line with
McMahan’s development of the view. The alternative I suggest is driven in
part by theory and in part by intuition. The main theoretical issue is the
justification of the so-called asymmetry in population ethics, which plays a
big role in the preceding discussion. The point of intuition is that I think it
can be permissible to create additional good lives even at some cost to people
who exist independently of the choice to do so. In terms of the TRI account,
this corresponds to denying that, in the initial motivating case, we must save
the adult over the newborn; it is merely permissible to do so. Or if we must,
that is not something to be explained by time-relative interests alone. The
resulting theory amounts to a positive proposal for understanding the TRI
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account and its ethical implications, with the suggested emendation.
For critics of the TRI account, this is at least a fixed target. For advocates,
it illustrates a methodology that holds out some hope. As serious as the
problems of population ethics may be, we need not think that the TRI
account adds further insuperable difficulties to an already difficult project.
One point of terminology. The TRI account is often described in axiolog-
ical terms. It is, after all, an account of the badness of death. When it comes
to prudential value, I have no qualms about this emphasis on axiology. But
when it comes to the TRI account as a general normative theory, it seems to
me that many of the relevant issues are not best understood axiologically. For
example, suppose that one option ought morally to be chosen over another,
when those are the only two options. Then I will say that the first option is
morally preferable (or sometimes just preferable) to the second. The ortho-
dox verdicts of the TRI account strongly suggest that the relation of moral
preferability is intransitive. There are three options A, B , and C , such that,
out of A and B , one ought morally to choose A; out of B and C , one ought
morally to choose B ; but out of A and C , one ought morally to choose C .
This pattern cannot be the outcome of a rule to maximize value, and at least
in that sense it cannot (pace Temkin) be a matter of axiology. For this and
other reasons I will often speak in terms of what one ought to do, or what is
preferable, rather than what is best.












Table 1: Emergency Room. In these diagrams, time moves forward to the
right. The vertical line (‘Now’) represents the time at which the decision is
to be made. The height of each rectangle represents welfare over time; the
numbers to the right are the ages at time of death. The dotted diagonal lines
schematically represent psychological transitions (here between infancy and
adulthood).
2 The Life-Comparative and TRI accounts
In this section, I explicate more fully the TRI account of prudential value,
and give an initial discussion of why it is difficult to use it as the basis for a
theory of ethics. Consider:
Emergency Room (Table 1)4
A doctor can treat only one of two patients; the other dies. In
alternative A, the doctor treats a newborn, Teddy; in alternative
B , the doctor treats a 20-year-old, Robert. In either case, who-
ever is treated goes on to live to 60, gaining welfare at a constant
rate of ten units per year.
4See McMahan (2002, p. 185) for a similar case, ‘Choice between Lives’.
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One way to think about this case is that, if she saves the newborn, the
doctor will grant someone 60 years of good life. If she saves the 20-year-old,
she will grant only 40 years of good life. Now, 60 is more than 40. Therefore:
(ER-LC) Death would be worse for the newborn than it would be for the
20-year-old, because it would deprive him of more lifetime welfare.
(ER-LC) is the judgment of the life-comparative (LC) account of the badness
of death. It identifies the badness of each death as the difference between
the lifetime welfare of the person who dies and what their lifetime welfare
would have been in the salient alternative. As I understand them, both the
LC account and the TRI account are (at least in the first instance) accounts
of the ‘personal’ or ‘prudential’ badness of death – how much death in the
way specified makes things worse for the person who dies, when compared
to the salient alternative. More precisely, we should understand them as
accounts of how heavily the prospect of death should weigh in prudential
deliberations by or on behalf of a person at a time: here, Teddy at birth or
Robert at 20. From this perspective, the LC account of the badness of death
is an application of what I called the ‘standard’ account of prudential value
in section 1. It assumes that personal identity is the relation that underpins
prudential interest. It also assumes that a human remains the same person
more or less from conception until death.
There is a closely related judgment that the outcome A is morally prefer-
able to the outcome B : the doctor ought to save the newborn. This judgment
might be reached in various ways, but I wish to focus on the following two
simple ones, which I will call the lifetime-utilitarian and the person-affecting
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explanations.
(LU) The doctor ought to save the newborn, because what matters is which
outcome would, on balance, give the newborn and the 20-year-old
more lifetime wellbeing.
(PA-LC) The doctor ought to save the newborn, because what matters is
which outcome would be worse on balance for the newborn and the
20-year-old, and (ER-LC) is true.
These two ways of explaining the judgment are mathematically equivalent
– they both boil down to the fact that 60 is more than 40 – but only the
person-affecting explanation (PA-LC) depends on (ER-LC). In principle, one
could accept (LU) as the right explanation of which outcome is better overall,
or which outcome the doctor ought to choose, while denying (ER-LC). I
will produce an example very soon.
In contradiction to the life-comparative account, many people have the
intuition that death is not as bad for the newborn as it is for the 20-year-old.
There is much one could say about this intuition, but there is at least one
prima facie plausible justification for it, which is the basis of the TRI account.
The idea is that the typical newborn is only weakly psychologically connected
to his future self. Although he has many years of good life ahead of him,
he does not have a real stake in them. If we want to know how much the
newborn is harmed, we must only count the 60 years to the degree to which
he has a stake in them. In contrast, the 20-year old has a full stake in his
adulthood. He really would be deprived of 40 years of good life, without any
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discount, or perhaps with only a small discount. The question is not whether
60 is more than 40, but whether it is still more once we have applied the
appropriate discounts.
It may help to see how this could work with a simplistic but concrete
calculation. Suppose we divide the potential lives of these patients into three
acts: infancy, from ages 0 to 3; childhood, from 3 to 15; and maturity, from




Outcome A Teddy 30 120 450
Robert 30 120 50
Outcome B Teddy 0
Robert 30 120 450
Perhaps a newborn has a full stake in the welfare of his infancy, a 1/2 stake
in the welfare of his childhood, and no stake in the welfare of his maturity.
Since the infant would have three good years of infancy (at 10 units of welfare
a year), 12 good years of childhood, and 45 good years of maturity, his death
effectively deprives him of
30× 1+ 120× 1/2+ 450× 0 = 90
units of wellbeing. But the 20-year old may have a full stake in the welfare
accrued during the rest of his maturity. Thus death would deprive him of
400 units of wellbeing. The newborn is less harmed by death.
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Thus, if we accept this calculation as representative, the TRI account
yields:
(ER-TRI) Death would be worse for the 20-year-old than it would be for
the newborn, because it would deprive him of more welfare (weighted
by his stake in it).
One might conclude from this that doctor ought to save the 20-year-old. In
particular, one might reason as follows.
(PA-TRI) The doctor ought to save the 20-year-old, because what matters
is which outcome would be worse on balance for the newborn and the
20-year-old, and (ER-TRI) is true.
On the other hand, one might still accept (LU). In particular, one might
reason like this.
Yes, A is worse than B on balance for the newborn and the
twenty-year-old, and yes, in a sense this accounts for all of the
relevant people. But it doesn’t account for all the relevant person-
stages, nor for all of the relevant welfare components. Consider,
in A, the twenty-year-old who the newborn eventually becomes.
This twenty-year-old (a person-stage) has a whole year of good
life (a positive welfare component), and surely that contributes
to how good A is overall, even if we rightly discount it when
asking how much ‘the newborn’ is harmed by the choice of B
over A.
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Proponents of the TRI account tend to accept (PA-TRI). That is, they
not only see TRI as giving an account of the badness of death for a person
at a time, they also take a specific stance on how the account feeds into
judgments about what one ought to do, at least in simple cases like this. The
conclusion that one ought to save the 20-year-old is one of the orthodox
verdicts of the view. However, it has proved quite difficult to see how the
TRI account can fit into a coherent moral theory, generalising (PA-TRI).
To get an initial diagnosis, let us consider more formally what the TRI
account actually involves. The account depends on the idea of a person having
a stake or interest in various welfare components. Here is how I interpret this
idea. Suppose that I might have a three-hour headache tomorrow, or I might
have a headache today. Suppose that, either way, the headache will make no
difference to anything beyond my hedonic experience at the time it occurs.
It will just make life less pleasant, to the tune of 1 unit of welfare per hour. If,
as a matter of prudential rationality, I ought to be indifferent today between
having a three-hour headache tomorrow and having a three-hour headache
today, this indicates that I today have a full stake in my welfare tomorrow. If,
rather, I ought to be indifferent today between having a three-hour headache
tomorrow and having a two-hour headache today, this indicates that I today
have a two-thirds stake in my welfare tomorrow. I will also say that the strength
of my interest today in avoiding the headache tomorrow is the amount of
welfare I could rationally give up today to forestall it tomorrow. This is
essentially the eventual welfare-cost of the headache (three units of welfare
for a three-hour headache) weighted by my stake in it. So if I have a full
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stake, then the strength of my interest amounts to three units of welfare; if
I have a two-thirds stake, then the strength of my interest amounts to two
units of welfare. In general, we might have something like this:
Time-Relative Interests. Person-stage S has an interest of strength i in
outcome A over outcome B iff, as a matter of prudential rationality, S
ought to be indifferent between A and the combination of B with an
additional immediate welfare benefit to himself of size i , all else equal.
While the objects of time-relative interest are outcomes, states of affairs, or
whatever else in general the objects of prudential preference might be, the
things in which people have stakes are welfare components. In particular,
the basic issue is the extent to which one person-stage has an interest in the
welfare of another.5
Time-Relative Stakes. Person-stage S has a stake of size s in the welfare w
of person-stage T in outcome A if and only if, as a matter of prudential
rationality, that welfare counts in favour of A for S just as much as
would an immediate welfare benefit to S himself of size s w , all else
equal.
It follows that, if the only relevant difference between A and B is T ’s welfare,
then the strength of S ’s interest in A over B is S ’s stake in T ’s welfare times
5Remember that when I speak of the welfare of a person-stage, I always mean the welfare
that accrues to the person-stage as such, rather than anything like the lifetime welfare of
the person of which the stage is a part. Note that the basic TRI account does not explain
how to deal with welfare components that do not simply affect the welfare of person-stages.
(Examples might include goods that arise from patterns of welfare within a life, and perhaps
also goods that are not temporally localised, like the success of long-term projects.) However,
this may just be because the basic account is incomplete. Indeed, the views I describe in
section 6 are able to handle these holistic goods; I will say more about it then.
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the size of the benefit to T of A compared to B .
This picture may be a little rough, but it is enough to give us a handle on
what is going on. There are three important points about the formulation.
First, the unexplained notion of ‘prudential rationality’ is doing a lot of
work. It means, first of all, that the strength of S ’s interests at t is a normative
matter, not simply a descriptive matter of what S happens to be interested in.
It also means that I am focusing on what we might call self -interest. I might
rationally give up one unit of welfare in order to ensure that my friend gains
two. In a general sense, this shows that I have a stake in my friend’s welfare.
But the reasons I have for accepting such trade-offs are not primarily a matter
of self-interest. Indeed, prudential rationality requires me not to benefit my
friend in this way (absent any knock-on effects on my wellbeing).6
The second point is that the strength of the interest I have today in my
welfare tomorrow is not a matter of how much anything affects my welfare
today. There is, perhaps, a sense in which now having a ‘frustrated interest’
can reduce my current wellbeing, but that is not what is going on here.
My headache tomorrow is not painful to me now, but even a hedonist can
recognise the sense in which I have a strong interest now in avoiding that
headache. The headache should weigh heavily in my current prudential
deliberations.
6I claim one can also have self-regarding preferences that are not egoistical or self-
interested. If so, then I would also want to exclude from the domain of prudential rationality
whatever standards govern such preferences. I suspect this distinction is important to
understanding ‘adaptation’ cases, like that of the blind child who ‘may rationally prefer to
have been born blind’ (McMahan, 2002, p. 295). That preference may not be based on the
sense that one is better off being blind; though rational and self-regarding, it need not be
prudent. Another ingredient in this case is the improper focus on the child’s actual interests;
I discuss the problems with actualism further below.
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Third, the strength of my interests may indeed be time-relative. Tomorrow
I will have a full stake in avoiding the three-hour headache, even if I have only
a two-thirds stake today. Of course, we might hold that the strength of an
interest is necessarily time-independent. Perhaps, in the relevant normative
sense, I have now a full stake in the welfare of my organism at every other
time. In that case, we could still talk about interests and stakes this way, but
there would be no discounting. (For some ways of filling in the details, we
would recover the LC account.) However, the teleological motivation for
the TRI account is to justify intuitions in cases like Emergency Room in
which the LC account seems to go wrong, and in particular this justification
presumes that the strength of an interest can change with time. Specifically,
the main thesis of the TRI account is
Psychological Reduction. S ’s stake in T ’s welfare in A measures the degree
to which S is psychologically connected to T in A.7
Here is a point on which my formulation takes sides. Suppose that S exists
in both outcomes A and B . Suppose also that S and T are strongly psy-
chologically connected in outcome A, but not in outcome B . One might
think that, contrary to my formulation of Psychological Reduction, if B
actually occurs, then S does not have a big stake in T ’s welfare in A, because
he is not actually strongly connected to T . This thought seems to reflect
what McMahan says in some cases, like that of Prenatal Retardation, which I
7Why ‘measures’ instead of ‘equals’? I am not sure there is an independent way of
quantifying degrees of psychological connectedness with respect to which the claim of
equality would make sense. However, we can certainly make qualitative comparisons, and
the thought is that qualitative increases are suitably correlated with increases in stakes. This
thought is made a little more precise in footnote 34 below.
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discuss more in fn. 13 below. However, consider the basic Emergency Room
case. There we clearly want to say that, even if Robert will actually die, he
has a strong present interest in continuing to live. This interest can only be
grounded in the psychological connections Robert would have had, had he
lived.
We can now anticipate the basic difficulty for fitting theTRI account into
a general normative theory. In Emergency Room, we identified the badness
of death for the 20-year-old with the strength of his interest in avoiding death.
But this was only the strength of his interest at a particular time. When he
was a newborn, he did not have such a strong interest in the welfare of his
maturity. If we want to know what the doctor ought to do, at what time
should we evaluate the patient’s interests? The time of the doctor’s decision?
The time of death? In the example, these times more or less coincide, but
they need not in general, and, anyway, it is unclear why either of them is
uniquely relevant. It may seem rather that we should somehow combine
or aggregate the interests of different people at different times. That may
be right, but note the following difficulty. In simple cases it is intuitively
appropriate to aggregate the welfare of different people at different times. But
the strength of an interest at a time is not the same as the impact on welfare at
that time. So it is unclear whether we can reconcile interest aggregation with
welfare aggregation in cases where the latter gives intuitive results. Returning
to the example, suppose I today have a full stake in my welfare tomorrow.
The headache will eventually cost me three units of welfare, so I have today
and will have tomorrow a three-unit interest in avoiding the headache. But
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if I simply add up these interests, I double count: I get a disproportionate six-
unit interest. The longer the strong interest persists, the larger the aggregate
interest, even though the impact on welfare remains the same. It then seems
absurd to focus on the aggregated interests rather than on the welfare effect.
The same considerations rule out averaging instead of adding. Of course,
there may be some other sort of aggregation rule that does a better job. My
point is only that it isn’t obvious what the right rule really is.
3 Problem Cases
Let us see how these general consideration play out in key cases. Return to
Teddy the newborn and Robert the adult. Remember that each one will live
to 60 at latest, gaining 10 units of welfare per year. But Teddy has only a
small stake in his welfare after age 15, while Robert has a full stake in his.
Choice Between Deaths (Table 2)8
A doctor can either (A) save Teddy the newborn, or (B ) let him
die today. If the doctor saves him now, Teddy will foreseeably
die when he reaches age 20. Sadly, there is no possibility that
(C ) Teddy lives a full life.
In Emergency Room, we said that Robert’s death at 20 was worse than
Teddy’s death at birth. In Choice Between Deaths, we have to choose between
Teddy’s death at 20 and his death at birth. Blindly applying the earlier
judgment that death at 20 is worse than death at birth, it seems we should
8A similar example is considered in McMahan (2002, p. 185)








Table 2: Choice Between Deaths. The outcome C is unavailable.
let Teddy die at birth. But this must be wrong, given that Teddy’s twenty
years would be filled with happiness.
The problem is caused by insisting that death at 20 will be bad for Teddy.
It will, of course, be bad compared to the unavailable option C in which
Teddy survives and has a long and happy life. And of course, were C available,
then the doctor ought to choose C over either A or B . But that is not the
situation, and the comparison to C is irrelevant. We are asking whether A is
better than B , or anyway whether A may be chosen over B .9
McMahan’s view is that newborn Teddy has an interest in continuing to
live, and what matters in the choice between A and B are Teddy’s present
9McMahan’s own diagnosis might appear to be different:
Preventing the frustration of that later possible time-relative interest [i.e
the death at 20] is important, though only certain means of prevention
are acceptable. Others are self-defeating. If we could prevent the death at
[20]…by saving the individual at that time…, our reason to do so would
indeed be stronger than the reason the doctor has to save the infant now. But
it is not a reasonable way of preventing the later time-relative interest from
being frustrated to ensure that the individual will not then exist.McMahan
(2002, pp. 187–8)
But I understand this to be compatible with what I have said about the case. McMahan is
explaining why we might get a different answer when we compare A and B from the one we
get when we compare them each separately to C .










Table 3: Delayed Choice
interests. Now, I agree that this must be the upshot of theTRI account in this
case. C must be morally preferable to A, and A must be morally preferable
to B , and these verdicts coincide with Teddy’s present interests. But the claim
must not be that in general people’s present interests are decisive. That is
what the next case shows.
Delayed Choice (Table 3)10
Teddy the newborn and Robert the 20-year-old are each such
that, unless they are treated now, they will die in 20 years’ time.
The doctor can only treat one, and whoever is treated will live
until age 60.
If, as in Choice Between Deaths, we are guided by present interests, Robert
has a stronger interest in remaining alive than Teddy does. We should
therefore save Robert. One difficulty is that it seems at least permissible to
save Teddy. A related difficulty is inconsistency over time. Twenty years in
the future, Teddy may have a stronger interest in staying alive than Robert
10A similar case is considered in Broome (2004, pp. 249–251); he presents it as a decisive
counterexample to the TRI account.
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will (400 units versus 200, on my simple model). So it seems that the doctor
will regret a decision to save Robert, and ought to reverse his decision if he
can, despite having no new information.
If we are to avoid inconsistency over time, Delayed Choice must be just
like an ‘Emergency Room’ choice between saving the life of a 20-year-old (fu-
ture Teddy) and a 40-year-old (future Robert). When I discussed Emergency
Room, the decisive factor was the strength of the patients’ present interests,
which coincided with their interests at the time of premature death. Thus,
in Delayed Choice, the decisive factor must be the patients’ interests twenty
years in the future. But we have to be a little careful. Suppose we modify the
case so that, on option A, in which Teddy is saved, the first year of Teddy’s
life will be full of suffering. This must count against option A, but how?
The suffering goes against his present interests, but not against his interests
twenty years from now. We saw that it could not just be Teddy’s present
interests that count, and now we see that it cannot just be his interests twenty
years in the future that count. It is obvious in any case that we cannot just
look at the point of death, since the TRI account must be able to handle
cases that are not cases of premature death. What counts must be some sort
of amalgamation of interests at different times.11
McMahan’s response to cases like Delayed Choice was to emphasise the
importance of all actual interests, including but not limited to present ones.
But even if it were clear what it meant to take all such interests into account,
focusing on actual interests leads to a kind of modal inconsistency even worse
11Contrast Millum (2015, p. 292); he says of Delayed Choice that we must simply look
at the time of death. While it may be that the interests at the time of death end up being
decisive in Delayed Choice, that can’t be the fundamental story.
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than the temporal inconsistency mentioned above. In Emergency Room,
if Robert is actually saved, then Teddy has only a weak actual interest in
continuing to live, and we ought to save Robert; but if Teddy is actually
saved, it turns out we are allowed to save him in order to satisfy the strong
interest he eventually gains in the welfare of his childhood and maturity.12
There are really two problems here. First, what we ought to do depends on
what we actually do – that is the modal inconsistency I mentioned. Second,
if we actually save Teddy, then the orthodox verdict in Emergency Room is
mistaken. Similar points are explained clearly by Holtug (2011). I will make
some further comments as we go, and especially in section 8, but I will not
press this line of objection, since McMahan’s commitment to actualism was
never consistent, and he has more recently disavowed it.13 Suffice to say that,
in combination, Emergency Room, Choice Between Deaths, and Delayed
Choice render it mysterious how the TRI account is to be understood. I
think that the problems raised by the next examples are even more telling.
These next few examples involve patterns of psychological connections
that are more extreme than those of Teddy and Robert. It is plausible that
12As I said, it is not clear in general what being guided by actual interests may entail.
Here I rely on a piece of dominance reasoning, which ought to be relatively uncontroversial.
Since Teddy’s life is actually longer than Robert’s, the interest that Robert has in B over A at
any given age can be matched against the interest that Teddy has in A over B at the same
age. So A satisfies Teddy’s actual interests at least as well as B would satisfy Robert’s actual
interests. (Remember that, in this scenario, Robert’s actual interests are the ones he has
before he dies at 20.)
13Here is an example not noted by Holtug in which McMahan may be led astray by
actualism. He is greatly troubled by the case of ‘Prenatal Retardation’ (McMahan, 2002,
p. 323). His treatment of the case trades on the claim that if (as actually happens) a mother
causes a foetus ‘to have cerebral deficits sufficient for severe retardation, it will never have a
significant time-relative interest in being a person’ and therefore it appears that harming the
foetus in this way is not very wrong. But if the mother didn’t harm the foetus then it would
eventually have very strong time-relative interests in being a person; actualism improperly
prevents us from considering this fact.









Table 4: Choice Between Horses. The dense diagonal lines schematically
represent the assumption that a horse’s prudential interests stretch no more
than a year into the future.
many animals have limited psychological connections from one year to the
next. Suppose Tommy the Horse and his sister Tammy have a large stake at
any given time in their welfare over the next year, but no stake in anything
beyond that. In these examples, Tammy and Tommy have just been born.
Choice Between Horses (Table 4)14
Tammy and Tommy are seriously ill, and the vet can save only
one. Whichever one she saves will live until 20. If (A) Tammy
is saved, she will accrue ten units of welfare per year. If (B )
Tommy is saved, he will accrue ten units of welfare per year
until age 19. But in his last, twentieth year, Tommy will accrue
zero units of welfare.
14The character Tommy the Horse is drawn from Harman (2011) and discussed in
McMahan (2015); but as far as I know, the problem raised by Choice Between Horses has
not been previously considered in the literature.
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This case looks similar to Emergency Room. However, Tammy’s present
interest in A over B has the same strength as Tommy’s present interest in B
over A. Going by present interests, it looks like the vet may as well save either
horse. But this is quite odd. Surely she ought to save Tammy. Of course, we
have already seen that we should not go by present interests alone, in general.
On the other hand, it is not clear why this case is different from Emergency
Room, in which present interests sufficed. Specifically: we claimed that the
welfare that Teddy might have in middle age does not count in favour of
saving him as a newborn, since he has no present stake in it. If that is correct,
then the welfare that Tammy might have in her twentieth year should not
count in favour of saving her either. But then it is hard to see what does
count in favour of saving her over Tommy: their welfare in the twentieth
year is the only potentially relevant fact.
A different kind of problem is raised by the following case.
Suffering Later (Table 5)15
In outcome A, Tommy the horse will die imminently. In out-
come B , Tommy will have two years of slightly good life (one
unit of welfare per year) followed by 18 years of miserable life
(−10 units per year).
Following the logic of Choice Between Deaths, option A is worse for
Tommy than option B . Although there is a great deal of misery in his
future, he has no present interest in avoiding it, and, on the model of Choice
Between Deaths, it is this present interest that is decisive. But it seems wrong
15A similar case is considered in McMahan (2015, p. 71)





Table 5: Suffering Later
to prolong his life and so ensure immense suffering later on. We really ought
to choose A.
Notice that this is a case in which the premature deaths occur more or
less at the present moment. So it again shows that we cannot simply evaluate
interests at the point of death, any more than we can simply evaluate interests
at the present moment.
Suffering Now (Table 6)16
One would ordinarily expect Tommy to live for 20 more years
(outcome A). The first 18 years would be very pleasant (10
units of welfare per year), but the last two would be full of
suffering (−10 units per year). However, as it happens, Tommy
has acquired a rare disease, which (B ) will kill him imminently.
The only treatment (C ) will cause suffering for one year right
away, but he will then have 19 years of very pleasant life.
16A similar case is considered in McMahan (2015, p. 72)









Table 6: Suffering Now
Going by Tommy’s present interests, death now would be bad, compared
to the ordinary expectations. It foils his strong present interest in the first year
of very pleasant life, while he has no present interest in avoiding the suffering
later on. On the model of Choice Between Deaths, A is morally preferable
to B . What about treating Tommy? Stepping back, the consequences of
treatment are clearly preferable to the ordinary expectations; they involve
only two years of suffering, rather than the expected three. So C should
come out preferable to A. Harman (2011) claimed that the TRI account
could not deliver this verdict. After all, treatment is against Tommy’s present
interests, which emphasise his wellbeing over the first year. But the choice
between A and C does not have the same structure as Emergency Room or
Choice Between Deaths, in which present interests supposedly sufficed. So it
is open to us to take into account Tommy’s future interests. We lack a general
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story of how to do so, but in this case it is obvious what the upshot must be:
Tommy’s interest during the first year of life in A over C must be dominated
by his interest during the last two years of life in C over A. So, as McMahan
notes, the right judgment seems to be at least heuristically compatible with
the TRI account.
Granted this result, C is morally preferable to A, and A is morally prefer-
able to B . Surely, then, C is morally preferable to B : the cure is preferable
to Tommy’s death. However, the choice between B and C again has the
structure of Choice Between Deaths. As in that case, we should compare
B and C on the basis of Tommy’s present interests. But Tommy’s present
interests favour B over C : death now would allow Tommy to avoid a year of
suffering in which he has a large prudential stake.
If this is all correct, we have obtained a certain kind of intransitivity. If C
is to be chosen over A, and A is to be chosen over B , it does not follow that C
is to be chosen over B . The ordinary expectations are preferable to death now,
and death now is preferable to treatment, but ordinary expectations are not
preferable to treatment. As I mentioned in the introduction, this intransitivity
is one reason I tend to talk about which options are morally preferable,
rather than about which options are morally best. But, terminology aside,
intransitivity causes problems when all three outcomes are available. We
cannot simple-mindedly sort the options by the relation of preferability.
Doing so would only drive us around in circles. Instead, we need an additional
story about what to do in multi-option cases. It is less clear than ever what
the TRI account amounts to.17
17McMahan (2015) considers a version of Suffering Now, but he does not explicitly
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Recap
The main point of this discussion is just how hard it is to make sense of the
TRI account, once we have moved beyond prudential value to questions
of ethics. Doing so would, at a minimum, involve producing a reasonably
natural moral theory that systematizes the recommended verdicts in the
examples considered so far. Most of these recommendations were obtained by
adapting the interest-based reasoning that underpins the orthodox verdict in
Emergency Room. In that sense, they are also a part of the ethical orthodoxy
associated with the TRI account. In other cases – in particular, in Choice
Between Horses and Suffering Later – I appealed to strong theory-neutral
intuitions. The overall pattern of verdicts is summarised in the following
table, in which ‘’ denotes the relation of moral preferability.
Case Verdicts
Emergency Room B  A
Choice Between Deaths C  A, A  B , C  B .
Delayed Choice A  B
Choice Between Horses A  B
Suffering Later B  A
Suffering Now C  A, A  B , B  C .
One natural objection is that, absent an actual theory, some of the interest-
based reasoning used in the examples is not well motivated. For example,
in Suffering Now, we appealed crucially to present time-relative interests.
We know that we must not, in general, go by present interests alone. So
note the intransitivity, and this leads to some problems in his argument which I take up in
section 8.
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why may we do so in this case? Besides, the theory-neutral intuitions in
Choice Between Horses and Suffering Later seem to directly contradict our
understanding of what interest-based reasoning requires! Perhaps, then, the
best way of systematising the interest-based reasoning would yield different
verdicts from the ones I have, following McMahan, suggested here. However,
until section 8, I will take these orthodox verdicts for granted. The question
until then is how to incorporate them into a coherent moral theory.
4 The Different-Person Heuristic
In this section and the next, I explain how the problems faced by the TRI
account are related to controversies in population ethics. The key issue in
population ethics is whether creating a new person can make things better
or worse overall. A connection to the TRI account may be drawn in several
ways.
One way, which I point out only to set aside, involves a sequence of
scenarios in which a person dies earlier and earlier. Naively, at least, the
limiting case is one in which the person never exists at all. On the life-
comparative account, dying as a newborn or a foetus is much worse than
having a long and happy life. The earlier the death, the worse. This at least
suggests that the limiting scenario is the worst one of all. It is very bad
to prevent happy lives from coming into existence. On the time-relative
interests account, dying as an infant, or as a foetus, is not much worse than
having a long and happy life. (This is true in terms of the prudential interests
of the foetus, and also true at the ethical level, given the orthodox verdict in
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Emergency Room.) At a certain point, the sequence of scenarios gets better
and better, in a way that suggests that the limiting scenario may not be bad
at all. In other words, it is neither good nor bad to prevent happy lives from
coming into existence.
However, this way of drawing the connection to population ethics is
misleading. The application of the TRI account here depends on the person
having less and less of a stake in its future welfare as the sequence proceeds.
This is plausible for normal humans. A human foetus might not have much
of a stake in its future welfare. But, in principle, a being could come into
existence with a strong stake in its future welfare, right from the beginning.
The TRI account would agree with the LC account about such creatures.
Dying early would be much worse than having a long and happy life. So
even if we countenance non-existence as the limit of shorter and shorter
periods of existence, this application of the TRI account does not suggest
any general lesson about the value of creating happy lives.
A second possible connection is the analogy between people and person-
stages. Extending a life (thus adding person-stages) is in some ways akin to
enlarging a population (thus adding people). However, this analogy does
not seem to help with the TRI account. In ordinary cases, anyway, we have
no prudential interest in the welfare of other people, but we do have at least
some prudential interest in the welfare of future person-stages.
This section is devoted to developing a third point of view. As I explained
in the introduction, it is a question of importing into ethics the idea that
psychological connectedness is what matters. Since this question is of very
broad interest, I will consider a wide range of examples. Then, in the next
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section, I will focus in on the intuitions in population ethics that corresponds
to the orthodox verdicts of the TRI account.
Methuselah
Consider Methuselah (Lewis, 1976), who lives until the ripe old age of 969.
His psychology gradually changes over time, so that none of his memories
reach more than 137 years into the past, nor does he plan more than 137
into the future. In general, the psychological connections within his life
are limited to that extent. Although Methuselah may be always the same
person in an ordinary sense, there is at least an informal sense in which
Methuselah at 100 is ‘a different person’ from Methuselah at 900.18 The idea
I want to consider here is that this sense is normatively relevant. When two
person-stages are psychologically unconnected, we ought to treat them as if
they belong to different persons. I will call this the different-person heuristic.
It may be more than a heuristic. Perhaps it can be explained in terms of a
normatively relevant notion of personhood, or at least of personal identity.
That is the sort of picture I will consider in sections 6 and 7, but for now I
want to leave the matter open.
Of course, the different-person heuristic is a version of the idea already
introduced, that it is psychological connectedness rather than personal iden-
18Recall that I consider personal identity as a relation between person-stages, and so
often ask whether two person-stages ‘are’ the same person, rather than whether they ‘belong
to’ the same person. This is just a matter of terminology, but I find it helps me to bracket
certain irrelevant distinctions. Note also that Methuselah is very much like Tommy the
horse, drawn out over a longer timescale. Tommy at 1 and Tommy at 19 are different
persons (or different horses?) in just the same sense that Methuselah at 100 and Methuselah
at 900 are different persons. But here I focus on Methuselah, because a richer variety of
moral considerations plausibly apply in the case of a long-lived human being.
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tity that matters. It reframes that idea in a useful way. Suppose we have a
standard normative theory, one that gives persons a fundamental role. That
gives us a reference point for what it means to treat two person-stages as if
they belong to different persons, or to the same person. This reference point
can help us find a revised theory that satisfies the heuristic.
All this is best understood through examples. Some of these pertain
directly to the TRI account, but others do not. They show that the project of
reconciling normative theories with the different-person heuristic is of very
broad interest.
Let me begin with prudential value. The different-person heuristic sug-
gests that Methuselah at 100 should prudentially be indifferent about what
happens to Methuselah at 900, in the same way that in general what happens
to other people is not a matter of prudential concern. This is not to deny that
Methuselah at 100 might have some special reasons to help Methuselah at
900. He may rightly privilege the wellbeing of Methuselah at 900 over that
of other people at other times. But, the thought goes, we can legitimately
separate these reasons from prudential reasons, reasons of narrow self-interest.
They are more like the special reasons we may have to care for our own
children.
In particular, killing Methuselah at 100 would frustrate his prudential
interests to the extent of at most 137 years of wellbeing, counting to the
outer limit of psychological connectedness, not anything like 900 years. A
little more precisely, Methuselah at 100 should prudentially regard dying
immediately as at least no worse than living on with an immediate one-time
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loss of 137 years’ worth of welfare. That is the extent of his interest in
continuing to live. The reader will recognise here a judgment compatible
with the TRI account of prudential value.
What about ethics? Again, killing Methuselah at 100 prevents Methuse-
lah at 900 from ever existing. More than that, insofar as Methuselah at 900
is ‘a different person’, killing Methuselah at 100 prevents that person from
ever existing. Many people think that preventing someone from ever existing
is morally neutral, a view I will consider in detail in the next section. On this
sort of view, the fact that Methuselah at 900 will not exist, and hence will
not have whatever welfare he could have had, cannot count morally against
killing Methuselah at 100. The moral cost of killing Methuselah at 100 is
again a matter of at most 137 years of wellbeing. Again, this is the kind of
ethical claim that is orthodox to the TRI account.
I earlier mentioned an analogy between persons and person-stages. That
is not quite what is going on here. The thought is that Methuselah at 900 is
(at least heuristically) a different person from Methuselah at 100, i.e. that
these person-stages do not stand in a relation of personal identity. But
Methuselah at 101 presumably is the same person as Methuselah at 100, or
perhaps mostly the same person, even if they are different person-stages. So
I am not drawing out an analogy between persons and person-stages, but
rather gesturing towards a normatively salient identity-like relation.
As a different sort of example, consider the intuition against replacement :
roughly speaking, two forty-year lives that occur in sequence do not seem as
good as a single eighty-year one, even if the welfare facts at each moment
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are the same.19 Taking this idea seriously, it would have been better had
Methuselah at 100 been the same person as Methuselah at 900. All else equal,
it would have been better had Methuselah been strongly psychologically
connected from birth until to death, even if it made no difference to his
welfare from one day to the next. Then the 969 years of life would have been
had by a single person, in the sense towards which I am gesturing, rather
than being shared by the person who is Methuselah at 100 and the person
who is Methuselah at 900, and whomever else.
Here is an example that is not simply concerned with welfare. Consider a
case in which I impose a cost on you, in order to give you a greater benefit in
five minutes. Contrast this with a case in which I again impose a cost on you,
but this time give the greater benefit to someone else. The second case strikes
me as potentially unjust in a way that the first case does not. Although from
a general point of view the harm is compensated by a benefit in either case,
it is a matter of justice whether your harm is compensated by your benefit.
If that’s right, then it may be unjust in this same way to harm Methuselah
at 100 in order to give him a greater benefit him at 900. The person who is
harmed is not the person who benefits.
Or suppose you are deciding whether to confer a certain benefit on me
now, or to do it in five seconds. It does not seem to matter which one you
choose, or whether you flip a coin to choose. But if you are choosing between
conferring the benefit on me or on someone else, it may be fairer to flip a
19See e.g. Broome (2004, §7.2). He concludes that we ‘intuitively value longevity’, but
there may be better ways to conceptualise the intuition in question.
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coin. So too, it may be fairer to flip a coin when deciding whether to benefit
Methuselah at 100 or at 900.
Some philosophers are prioritarians, and this might be understood ax-
iologically (as is common) or deontically (as seems more plausible to me).
Roughly speaking, they think that badly-off people have a stronger claim than
well-off people do to a benefit of any given size (Parfit, 1997). According to
one common version of the view, whether someone is ‘well off’ or ‘badly off’
is a matter of her lifetime welfare. Even if someone is suffering now, she may
not have a strong claim to priority, since her suffering may be compensated
by happiness at another time. But insofar as Methuselah will be a different
person at 900, his happiness then cannot compensate his suffering at 100.
Contrast Methuselah with Methuselah’s Twin, who is psychologically like
Methuselah, and has the same birth-to-death aggregate welfare, but suffers
more from age 0 to 500 and prospers more from 500 to 969. Would it be
better to give a benefit to Methuselah at 100, or a same-sized to Methuselah’s
Twin at 100? Going by birth-to-death welfare, Methuselah and Methuselah’s
Twin both have the same claim to priority. But the different-person heuristic
suggests that Methuselah’s Twin at 100 has priority over Methuselah at 100.
He suffers more, and his suffering is not compensated by later happiness, so
he has a stronger claim.20
These examples show that the different-person heuristic may have wide-
20This is essentially the kind of ‘prudential’ prioritarianism defended by Holtug (2010).
I discuss it more in section 7. Yet another kind of prioritarianism claims that people receive
priority based on their welfare at the time in question, so that a low-welfare person-stage
has a stronger claim than a high-welfare one. One could tweak the example given in the
text to distinguish prudential prioritarianism from this alternative view.
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ranging consequences. But there is a difficulty that I was able to ignore
in the examples given so far. It is plausible enough that we should treat
Methuselah at 100 and Methuselah at 900 as distinct persons. But what
about Methuselah at 100 and Methuselah at 230? They are psychologically
connected, but only to a low degree. Their relationship is not very different
from the relationship between Methuselah at 100 and Methuselah at 900,
but there is still a difference. Presumably, this means we should treat them
to some extent as if they are distinct persons, and to some extent as if they
are the same. But what that amounts to is unclear.
In some cases, it is relatively clear what to do. In the case of prudence,
we have the standard life-comparative theory on which the prudential value
of an outcome A to a person-stage S is the lifetime welfare of the person
of whom S is a part. There is a fairly natural way to adapt this theory in
light of the different-person heuristic. To treat my future person-stages ‘to
some extent’ as if they belong to different persons is to partially discount
their welfare in my prudential deliberations. This is how the different-person
heuristic suggests the TRI account of prudential value.
The argument, though, is only suggestive for now. We lack a proper
theoretical understanding of the heuristic, and how to implement it, especially
for intermediate degrees of psychological connectedness. Once we have that
deeper understanding, we can apply it to ethics as well, and thus embed the
TRI account into a broader normative theory. That is the issue I explore in
sections 6 and 7.
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5 The Principle of Neutrality
First, however, let me consider a different question. The plan is to revise a
standard theory of ethics in light of the different-person heuristic. But what
standard theory should we choose? What features should the theory have in
order to reproduce the orthodox verdict of the TRI account in Emergency
Room, and to give the recommended answers in the problem cases of section
3?
The principle of neutrality
Let us look at Emergency Room again. The heuristic I am working with is
that Teddy as a newborn is a different person from the one he will be if and
when he reaches maturity. Let us call these persons Young Teddy and Old
Teddy. (I will keep it vague what happens in between Young Teddy and Old
Teddy; that is where we will have to revisit the issue of degrees.) Similarly,
I can talk of Young Robert and Old Robert. Both Old Robert and Young
Robert exist, on either outcome. Thus Emergency Room is analogous to the
following case.
Harmful Creation
Three people, Young Teddy, Young Robert, and Old Robert
currently exist, and the question is whether to create a fourth
person, Old Teddy. Creating Old Teddy will benefit Young
Teddy, but harm Old Robert to a greater degree. More precisely,
the following outcomes are available:
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Outcome
A B
Young Robert 90 90
Old Robert 110 510
Young Teddy 90 0
Old Teddy 510
Table 7: Harmful Creation. Each entry gives the lifetime welfare of the
person in question. The blank indicates that Old Teddy does not exist in
outcome B . The reason for these specific welfare values will become clear in
section 6.
Total utilitarianism, for example, rules that outcome A is preferable to out-
come B . But the orthodox verdict in Emergency Room corresponds to the
verdict that B is preferable to A. The most plausible and robust explanation
is that Old Teddy’s good life on A does not count in favour of A over B .21
This is presumably because Old Teddy’s very existence is contingent on the
choice between A and B .
The principle of neutrality, as I will call it, is the rough principle that
there is no moral reason to create additional people, like Old Teddy, with
good lives. (In Narveson’s famous formulation, ‘We are in favour of making
people happy, but neutral about making happy people’ (1973, p. 80).) This
is a popular intuition in population ethics, but it faces notorious difficulties.
At the end of this section I will sketch one theory that overcomes them, by
and large. But the immediate task is to relate them to the problem cases
described in section 3.
21It could just be that Old Teddy’s welfare counts to a diminished extent. However, the
basic logic of the TRI account seems to be that it counts not at all, because Young Teddy
has no stake whatsoever in Old Teddy’s welfare.
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Simple Necessitarianism
When thinking about the principle of neutrality, it will help to have in mind
the simplest theory of population ethics that satisfies it. I call this simple
necessitarianism. Suppose that we are comparing options A and B . LetN
be the group of people who exist in both A and B , the ‘necessary’ people.
(The other people are ‘contingent’.) Simple necessitarianism says that A is
preferable to B just to the extent that the total welfare of the people inN is
greater in A than in B .
To illustrate: in Harmful Creation, N consists of Young Robert, Old
Robert, and Young Teddy. Their total welfare in A is 290 and their total
welfare in B is 600, so B is preferable to A. A similar analysis works for
analogues of Choice Between Deaths and Delayed Choice. For example, the
analogue of Choice Between Deaths is a situation in which Young Teddy
necessarily exists, and we are deciding whether to create Old Teddy. Creating
Old Teddy slightly benefits Young Teddy. In such a case, simple necessitar-
ianism says that Old Teddy’s welfare is irrelevant, but since creating him
benefits the only relevant necessary person, we ought to do so. This cor-
responds to the orthodox verdict that we ought to save Teddy in Choice
Between Deaths. Simple necessitarianism also supports the orthodox verdicts
in Choice Between Deaths and Delayed Choice. I will leave the details to
the reader. Since we were initially puzzled by how to reconcile these two
cases with Emergency Room, it is an important observation that they can all
three be explained by the combination of simple necessitarianism with the
different-person heuristic.
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In choosing to begin with simple necessitarianism, I have interpreted the
principle of neutrality as discounting the welfare of contingent people. There
are some closely related interpretations, which, however, are ultimately less
plausible.22 The way they go wrong is instructive in light of the point just
made: they lead to bad results in Emergency Room and Delayed Choice, of
a type we have already seen. One interpretation holds that only the welfare
of presently existing people matters. In Harmful Creation, the explanation for
why Old Teddy’s welfare does not count is that he does not yet exist (whether
or not he ever will). But suppose we could set in process a chain of events
that would eventually harm Old Teddy, without affecting anyone else. On
this ‘presentist’ view, it would not be wrong to do so. Once Old Teddy came
to exist, however, we would surely regret our past action, and want to undo it
if we could. This is the same kind of temporal inconsistency that threatened
the TRI account in Delayed Choice. Indeed, the focus on presently-existing
people corresponds to a focus on present time-relative interests, given the
different-person heuristic.23 Alternatively, one might think that we should
not count Old Teddy’s welfare if he does not actually exist. Assuming that
we do not actually create him, it would be wrong to do so. This leads to the
sort of modal inconsistency we encountered in section 3: if we do actually
create Old Teddy, then it turns out we were obliged to do so. One problem is
the inconsistency, and another problem is that this latter verdict contradicts
the principle of neutrality.
22See Arrhenius (2013, ch. 10) for a more comprehensive discussion.
23The correspondence between presently existing people and present time-relative inter-
ests (or between actually existing people and actual interests) is not quite on-the-nose; after
all, presently existing people may have different interests in the past or future, and actual
people may have merely possible interests.
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Outcome
A B C
Adam 0 0 0
Eve 0
Steve 10
Table 8: Adam and Steve
In summary, presentist and actualist interpretations of the principle of
neutrality lead to temporal and modal inconsistency. We should reject these
interpretations of the principle, for the same reason that we must reject
ethical elaborations of the TRI account that rely only on present or actual
interests.
The Non-Identity Problem
Now I will raise three crucial problems for the principle of neutrality. After-
wards I will relate them to the problem cases described in section 3.
Consider first the following case.
Adam and Steve (Table 8)
God can create either Adam and Eve, or Adam and Steve. Steve
would have a good life; Adam’s and Eve’s lives would be neither
good nor bad.
The principle of neutrality puts us under pressure to say that neither A nor
C ought to be preferred over the other. And this is the verdict of simple
necessitarianism, which only cares about the welfare of the necessary person,
Adam. But intuitively A is preferable to C , because Steve is better off in A
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than Eve is in C . The pressure here is both formal and substantive. Formally:
if the principle of neutrality holds that A and B are equally good, and B
and C are equally good, then, by transitivity of ‘equally good’, A and C are
equally good.24 Substantively: one typical justification for thinking that A
is not preferable to B , in line with the principle of neutrality, is the ‘person-
affecting’ consideration that no one would be benefited by the occurrence
of A instead of B . (Since Steve doesn’t even exist in B , the thought goes, he
can’t be better off in A than in B ). But this type of argument also seems to
show that A is not preferable to C , since no person would benefit from the
occurrence of A instead of C .
Intransitivity
One way to avoid the formal version of the non-identity problem, above, is
to deny that ‘equally good’ is transitive. The person-affecting considerations
about harm also seem to suggest intransitivity of choice. Consider, for
example, the following case.
Threesome (Table 9)
God has created Adam and is wondering whether to create Eve
and Steve. He can either (A) create them in a way that benefits
Adam, although they themselves would have neutral lives; (B )
not create them at all; or (C ) create them in a way that harms
Adam, yet gives them good lives.
24Let me say that two outcomes are equally preferable to mean that, given a choice between
only the two of them, either option is permissible. There are many well-known cases that
show that ‘equally preferable’, rather than ‘equally good’, need not be transitive. But the
point remains that the most obvious axiological treatment of the principle of neutrality will
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Outcome
A B C




The person-affecting considerations suggests that A is preferable to B (it
benefits Adam), B is preferable to C (it again benefits Adam), but C is
preferable to A (the benefits to Eve and Steve outweigh the harm to Adam).
This is indeed the verdict of simple necessitarianism. Such intransitivity is
not automatically fatal; it does mean that we cannot simply use pairwise
comparisons to choose when all three options are available. It also shows that
permissibility cannot be a straightforward matter of maximizing value.25
Asymmetry
Although many people have the intuition that we have no moral reason to
create happy people, few people have the intuition that we have no moral
reason not to create unhappy people. There is an asymmetry between creating
good lives and creating bad ones.26 For example:
Long-Suffering Eve
God has already created Adam, and is wondering whether to
not work here.
25There are further potential problems arising from intransitivity beyond the reduced
effectiveness of pairwise comparisons, but I will not consider them here. An additional
point is that the verdict that B is strictly preferable to C may seem too strong. I will return
to this consideration in section 8.
26See McMahan (1981) for an early discussion of this problem, and Roberts (2011b)
for a more recent survey.





Table 10: Long-Suffering Eve
create Eve. Doing so will slightly benefit Adam, but Eve’s life
will be full of suffering.
Simple necessitarianism suggests that A is preferable to B , since it benefits
Adam, and Eve’s very existence is contingent on the choice. But it is hard to
believe that the modest gain for Adam makes it obligatory, or even permissible,
to create Eve with a miserable life.
Strictly speaking, the principle of neutrality is silent about this case,
because the principle only concerns the creation of good lives. However, the
example is still a problem for the principle, because the asymmetry is hard to
maintain. First, the intuitive judgment in Long-Suffering Eve undermines
the person-affecting motivation for the principle of neutrality. If Old Teddy
cannot be benefited in Harmful Creation, then Eve cannot be harmed in
Long-Suffering Eve. More generally, it is hard to justify the asymmetry
theoretically, or to obtain it without putting it in by hand. Second, the
obvious ways of putting in the asymmetry by hand make it too strong. For
example, suppose you are considering creating a new person, and there is a
99.99% chance she will have a great life, and a 0.01% chance that she will
have a slightly bad life. A naive application of the asymmetry suggests that
one ought not to create the person, since the possibility of a great life provides
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no reason to create her, and the possibility of a bad life provides a reason not
to do so. But this is a very high standard for permissibility which most acts of
procreation cannot meet. As a slightly different example, a naive application
of the asymmetry suggests that it would would be best for humanity to throw
in the towel, since some people in the future are otherwise bound to have
bad lives, and this cannot be outweighed by the fact that many people in the
future are bound to have good ones.
The Problem Cases Revisited
I claim that the problems I just raised for the principle of neutrality corre-
spond exactly to the problem-cases described in section 3, given the different-
person heuristic. I have already mentioned the connection with Choice of
Death and Delayed Choice; we should not formulate the principle of neu-
trality in terms of presently existing people, nor in terms of actually existing
people.
According to the different-person heuristic, Choice Between Horses is
an instance of the non-identity problem. It is closely analogous to Adam
and Steve. Saving Tammy involves creating a future person (the one who
is Tammy-aged-19) with high welfare; saving Tommy involves creating a
different person (the one who is Tommy-aged-19) with lower welfare. Sim-
ple necessitarianism problematically suggests that either of these options
is permissible. In contrast, if we have a population ethics that treats basic
non-identity cases in the right way – favouring the creation of Steve over the
creation of Eve – then the different-person heuristic will advise us to save
IV-5 THE PRINCIPLE OF NEUTRALITY 208
Tammy.
The problem in Suffering Later is the problem raised by the asymmetry.
Just as in Long-Suffering Eve, saving Tommy involves a modest benefit to a
person who already exists (the person who is Tommy at birth) but also the
creation of a person, or indeed several people, with negative welfare. Any
population ethics that reproduces the asymmetry – ruling against the creation
of Eve in Long-Suffering Eve – will say that we ought to let Tommy die.
Suffering Now illustrates at least two points. One is that the asymmetry
must be moderated. Given the different-person heuristic, the choice of A
(the ordinary expectations) over B (death as a newborn) would involve a
benefit to Tommy, but also the creation of a series of future persons, a few of
which would have bad lives. I take it that A is pre-theoretically preferable to
B , yet the number of bad lives seems sufficient to outweigh the small benefit
to Tommy. Thus the additional good lives in A must somehow count in its
favour, at least in the sense that they offset or defeat the reasons we have not
to create the bad lives.27
Second, setting aside the asymmetry, Suffering Now illustrates the in-
transitivity that arises from the principle of neutrality. The case has the same
structure as Threesome. (In Threesome I have made the welfare levels positive,
in order to bracket the role of the asymmetry.) When we compare outcomes
A and B in Threesome, Eve and Steve count as contingent people, and their
welfare does not matter. So too when we compare B with C . But when we
compare A with C , Eve and Steve no longer count as contingent, and their
27In McMahan’s terminology, the creation of good lives must have ‘offsetting’ but not
‘reason-giving’ weight (McMahan, 2015, p. 76).
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welfare matters. That is the source of intransitivity. In Suffering Now, the
welfare of Tommy at age 19 does not matter when we compare A with B
or B with C . By the different-person heuristic, he is a contingent person.
But when we choose between A and C , the existence of Tommy at 19 is no
longer contingent on the choice. His welfare must matter, and we obtain
the intransitivity once more.
Suppose we can find a theory of population ethics that respects the
principle of neutrality sufficiently to give the desired answer in Harmful
Creation, but also handles the non-identity problem and the asymmetry,
and gives plausible verdicts even in choices involving more than two options.
Suppose further that we can combine this theory with the different-person
heuristic, just as we adapted the standard theory of prudential value to get the
TRI account of prudential value. In applying this adapted theory, we may not
end up directly aggregating or otherwise appealing to time-relative interests.
However, we will have a unified conceptual framework that includes the TRI
account of prudential value, and, we can hope, makes clear how time-relative
interests prove to be decisive in simple cases like Emergency Room.
A Theory of Population Ethics
It is possible to modify simple necessitarianism to handle the problem cases
adequately. But it is not so easy to find a way that is really plausible overall,
and that does not feel irredeemably ad hoc. I will now describe the best
simple theory I know that does the trick, partly as a proof of principle, and
partly to use as an example later on. For lack of a better name, I will call the
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theory complex necessitarianism.
Let me first explain the structure of the theory. Given a pair of options
{A, B}, the theory associates values V{A,B}(A) and V{A,B}(B ) to each of them.
Given a choice between A and B , one ought to maximize this value. There
are several different basically plausible ways to extend this rule to a choice
among many options. I do not know which one is most plausible, and it does
not matter very much for my current purposes. One can either try to define
the multiple-choice rule directly, or one can construct it out of the pairwise
comparisons. The most plausible rule of the latter kind is defended (indeed,
axiomatically derived) by Schwartz (1972). Here is a simple reformulation
of his rule. Let me say that a non-empty subset S of the available options
is deliberatively stable if no available option outside S is preferable to an
option inside S . Schwartz claims that an option is permissible just in case it
is contained in a minimal deliberatively stable subset of the available options.
This amounts to optimization when preferability happens to be transitive. In
the simplest intransitive case, when A is preferable to B and B is preferable
to C but C is preferable to A, and no other options are available, any one of
the three options is permissible. In this matter, I may as well go along with
Schwartz.28
It remains to define the value V{A,B}(B ). Here is the main idea; afterwards
I will write down some formulae. The idea is to use a counterpart relation
between the people in A and the people in B . The counterpart relation must
satisfy two constraints. First, it should extend the relation of transworld
28See Ross (2015, §5) for a discussion of similar principles specifically in the context of
person-affecting population ethics.
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identity. That is, if a person is necessary, existing in both outcomes, he must
be his own counterpart. Second, the counterpart relation must pair up as
many people as possible from B with people in A. (In other words, if A has
more people than B , then everyone in B should have a distinct counterpart
in A; otherwise, everyone in A should have a distinct counterpart in B .)
Relative to such a counterpart relation, the value of B is the total welfare of
the people in B who have counterparts in A. The idea is that, relative to the
counterpart relation, these people count as necessary people. In the spirit
of simple necessitarianism, their welfare counts in favour of B . However,
there are usually many counterpart relations meeting the two constraints.
To get the final value V{A,B}(B ), we just average the value of B relative to
all candidate counterpart relations.29 There is one exception to this rule, to
handle the asymmetry. If the contingent people in B (those who do not exist
in A) have negative total welfare, then this must count fully against B . In
such a circumstance, V{A,B}(B ) is just the total welfare in B .
The upshot of this construction can be expressed in terms of the following
statistics:
Tnec(B ), the total welfare of the necessary people in B ;
Ncon(B ), the number of contingent people in B ;
Tcon(B ), their total welfare.
Simple necessitarianism evaluated B purely in terms of the welfare Tnec(B )
of the necessary people. Complex necessitarianism introduces an extra term
29This approach has a family resemblance to the ‘saturating counterpart’ theory of
Meacham (2012). Instead of averaging over many admissible counterpart relations, he
introduces an extra ‘harm-minimizing’ constraint that effectively picks out a unique one.
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to overcome the non-identity problem and to account for the asymmetry:
V{A,B}(B ) = Tnec(B ) +X .
To define X , there are two cases. First, suppose that the contingent people
in B have negative or neutral total welfare. Then
X = Tcon(B ), if Tcon(B ) ≤ 0.
Otherwise,
X =min(Ncon(A), Ncon(B )
Tcon(B )
Ncon(B )
, if Tcon(B ) > 0.
Here min(Ncon(A), Ncon(B )) is either the number of contingent people in A
or the number of contingent people in B , whichever is smaller.
I can finally explain how complex necessitarianism respects the principle
of neutrality, and handles the problems for that principle. In Harmful Cre-
ation, there are no contingent people in outcome B , and the sole contingent
person in outcome A has positive welfare. In such a case, complex necessitar-
ianism compares the options using the total welfare of the necessary people.
It agrees with simple necessitarianism: only B is permissible.
In Adam and Steve, the non-identity case, Adam is the sole necessary
person, for any pair of options, and any contingent people have non-negative
welfare. Given a choice between A and B only or between B and C only,
the decision is determined simply by the welfare of the necessary person, so
either option is permissible. So far, this agrees with simple necessitarianism.
But given a choice between A and C only, the view balances Eve’s welfare
against Steve’s. They are treated as counterparts of each other. Specifically,
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we have V{A,C }(A) = 10 and V{A,C }(C ) = 0, so only A is permissible. That is
the verdict we desired. What if all three options are available? The delibera-
tively stable sets of options are {A, B , C }, {A, B}, {A}, and {B}. Thus the
permissible options are A and B . I find that intuitions in multi-option cases
are harder to sort out, but this seems a satisfactory verdict.
In Threesome, the example of intransitivity, A is preferable to B and
B is preferable to C . In each of these cases, the decisive factor is Adam’s
welfare. But C is preferable to A, because, with respect to these two options,
all three people are necessary, and they have higher total welfare in C . So far,
these verdicts coincide with those of simple necessitarianism. The only new
ingredient here is Schwartz’s rule, when all three outcomes are available. It
says that any one of them is permissible. I do not know whether that is the
right verdict, but it is at least not clearly wrong.
Finally, in Long-Suffering Eve, B has a slight advantage with regards
to Adam’s welfare, but Eve’s suffering counts strongly against it. We have
V{A,B}(B ) = −9 and V{A,B}(A) = 0. Thus only A is permissible. Moreover,
the asymmetry here is a moderate one. Suppose in general that A differs from
B only by the addition of some new people. Complex necessitarianism says
that not adding them is always permissible, and adding them is permissible
if and only if their welfare will be positive on average. Humanity need not
throw in the towel.
Complex necessitarianism is a bit too ad hoc to be satisfactory – especially
in its treatment of the asymmetry – but it is fairly simple and matches the
desired verdicts in these problem-cases as well as any theory I know.30
30As far as the standard intuitions of population ethics go, there is one place where
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I will present a theory which I slightly prefer in section 8, but for now
let us turn to the question of how to adapt a standard theory of population
ethics, and complex necessitarianism in particular, to deal with degrees of
psychological connectedness.
6 Recasting the ‘Person’ Role
What I have called ‘standard’ normative theories presuppose that each out-
come contains a set of people, and that the people are composed of non-
overlapping sets of person-stages. Thus two person-stages either belong to the
same person or they do not. Sticking to prudential rationality, and assuming
that prudential concern is self -interest, this means that a person-stage S has
a full stake in the welfare of person-stage T if T is the same person as S , and
no stake otherwise. There seems to be no question of S having only a partial
stake in T ’s welfare.
The default way of interpreting these theories takes a ‘person’ to be
something more or less coextensive with a human organism. Lifetime welfare
is accumulated more or less from conception until death, even in the case of
Methuselah. But suppose we could identify some other entities to play the role
complex necessitarianism falls down. It leads to one form of the ‘sadistic conclusion’. The
basic form of the sadistic conclusion, which sounds particularly bad, is that it is sometimes
obligatory to create bad lives instead of good ones. But that is not the form that follows
from complex necessitarianism. Instead, suppose you can create two groups of people, the
P s and the Q s, or two other groups, the X s and the Y s. No one in one option is identical
to anyone in the other. Suppose that the P s are equinumerous with the X s, with the same
welfare levels instantiated. Suppose the Q s all have good lives, and the Y s all have bad ones.
Then complex necessitarianism says that it is sometimes obligatory to create the X s and the
Y s instead of the P s and the Q s. This is because the X s and Y s may have higher welfare on
average than the P s and Q s. This judgment is defended by Kath (2016, pp. 176–8), and I
am sympathetic to what she says. The theory she advocates, ‘shortfall utilitarianism’, is one
inspiration for complex necessitarianism.
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of persons, in a way compatible with the different-person heuristic. Having
chosen a standard normative theory – for example, complex necessitarianism
– we could then apply it to these entities. We would not really have to adapt
the theory at all, except to reinterpret it in this way.31 In this section, I
consider three ways this might work.
Indeterminate Persons
The simplest way to take the different-person heuristic seriously is to suppose
that, at some point, the person who is Methuselah at 100 ceases to exist,
and a new person’s life begins. The various person-stages who make up
Methuselah are grouped into persons. How they are grouped may be rife
with indeterminacy. Perhaps Methuselah at 100 is a different person from
Methuselah at 300, but we cannot expect there to be a determinate point at
which the first person is replaced by the second.
How might this picture depend upon degrees of psychological connect-
edness? Determinacy itself comes in degrees, often called degrees of truth.
There will be some determinate cases of personal identity – those of full
psychological connectedness – and some determinate cases of non-identity,
and a spectrum of borderline cases. We may posit that the degree to which it
is determinate that S and T are the same person equals the degree to which
S and T are psychologically connected.
How can a standard normative theory cope with this kind of indetermi-
nacy? To begin with prudential value, if it is indeterminate whether T is
31In other contexts, other entities may count as persons. The thought is only that there
may be a normatively relevant way of talking about persons that validates the different-person
heuristic.
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personally identical to S , how should considerations of T ’s welfare figure in
S ’s prudential reasoning? There are many possible answers. But if the project
is to interpret the TRI account in these terms, then we know what the answer
must be. It must work out that the weight that ought to be given to T ’s
welfare in S ’s prudential deliberations tracks the degree to which S and T
are psychologically connected, or the degree to which it is determinate that
they are the same person. And it is quite natural to think of this weight as
an objective probability.
How so? A standard idea from decision theory is to identify one’s credence
in a scenario with the weight that one gives to considerations about one’s
welfare in that scenario. If there is an objectively correct weight, or objectively
correct credence, then that weight has the status of an objective probability.32
So it is natural to try to understand the stake that S has in T ’s welfare as an
objective probability governing S ’s credence in the scenario that T ’s welfare
is a matter of self-interest for S , or that T is the same person as S . If this is
right, we can set indeterminacy aside, and focus on uncertainty.33
To start afresh: suppose that it is objectively uncertain whether T is the
same person as S . There might be a time somewhere between S and T where
one person ends and another begins, but it is unknown, and unknowable,
whether and where this happens. Then considerations of T ’s welfare ought
to have only intermediate weight in S ’s prudential deliberations. Assume
in particular that S ’s prudential deliberation is governed by expected utility
32I follow Lewis (1980) in thinking that chances are functionally characterised by the
way in which they norm credences, through something like his ‘Principal Principle’. Here
the issue is the correct credences to have about personal identity, conditional on a complete
specification of the psychological connections between person-stages.
33A similar line of thought is pursued by Williams (2014b).
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theory, and suppose that there is a 2/3 chance that T is the same person as
S . Then S ought to be prudentially indifferent between a three-unit benefit
to T and an immediate two-unit benefit to himself. That is, relative to
the objective probabilities, S has a 2/3 stake in T ’s welfare. In general, a
version of the TRI account of prudential value will arise automatically on
the hypothesis that the objective probability that T is the same person as
S coincides with the degree of psychological connection between T and S .
Call this the probability hypothesis.34
On the probability hypothesis, the TRI account just is the standard
account of prudential value, interpreted in terms of the normatively relevant
notion of personal identity. We do not have to adapt the standard account.
We just use a resource already implicit in it: decision theory under uncertainty.
The same move will work when we go beyond prudential value to ethics.
Any well-developed theory of population ethics will tell us what to do in cases
of uncertainty.35Given uncertain personal identity, it may be uncertain how
many people there are and hence uncertain which lifetime welfare levels are
instantiated. But as long as our favourite population ethics explains how to
handle uncertainty, we can still apply it to these cases. This is a universal way
of taking the different-person heuristic seriously, and extending it to cases
34My preferred way of understanding the probability hypothesis is that that the numerical
representation of degrees of psychological connectedness is defined by its link to credences
about personal identity, and thus to the size of prudential stakes; cf. footnote 7. The
hypothesis is nonetheless a substantive constraint, as I will explain in my discussion of fission
cases below.
35Unfortunately, few theories count as ‘well-developed’ by this criterion. There is often,
at best, a vague gesture towards expected utility theory. But at some point the details matter.
For example, I have already explained why it is difficult to reconcile the asymmetry with
expected utility theory: it makes procreation impermissible. I have not yet explained how
complex necessitarianism should incorporate uncertainty, but I will make a suggestion about
that below.
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of intermediate psychological connectedness. This universality is itself an
important feature. It means we can understand the different-person heuristic
while remaining neutral about the normative theory, and, in particular,
whether or not we accept the orthodox verdicts of the TRI account.
Such flexibility even remains important when we focus on theories of
prudential rationality. In my discussion of prudential value I have mainly
focused on the welfare of person-stages. For example, I have explained what
it means for one person-stage to have a stake in the welfare of another. But
many people think there are considerations of prudential value beyond the
welfare of person-stages. Suppose a life starts off badly and gets better. That
may be better overall than a life in which the welfare of person-stages occurs
in the opposite order, starting off well and getting worse. But this purported
difference in lifetime welfare, or prudential value, cannot be attributed to the
welfare of any person-stage. Or perhaps there are welfare components, like
long successful projects, that make a life go well, but which do not contribute
to the welfare of any person-stage in particular. If time-relative interests are
just a matter of uncertainty about personal identity, then factors like these
can be included automatically in the TRI account of prudential value. We
can take the notion of lifetime welfare as a black box, even if it is uncertain
which lives there are.
Examples
Before explaining the main difficulties for this approach, let me illustrate
it with another visit to Emergency Room. Consider a simple model on
which any human being starts off as one person and becomes another, and
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remains that other person until death. On this model, the transition happens
somewhere between ages 3 and 15, but otherwise we are uniformly uncertain
about when. To connect with my discussion of Harmful Creation, I will
use ‘Teddy’ and ‘Robert’ simpliciter as names of the human organisms,
individuated by physical continuity over time. In contrast, let ‘Young Robert’
be the person who Robert is as a newborn and ‘Old Robert’ the person
who Robert is as an adult. Similarly for ‘Young Teddy’ and ‘Old Teddy’.
Young Robert’s life has already ended no matter who is saved, but his lifetime
welfare is uncertain. It consists of 30 units of welfare accrued in infancy plus
some amount between 0 and 120 units accrued in childhood. (Despite my
comments above, I will assume that lifetime welfare is just the total welfare
of the relevant person-stages.) In expectation, Young Robert’s total welfare is
90. If Robert is saved, then Old Robert has 510 units of expected welfare
(450 from adulthood, and 60 in expectation from childhood); Young Teddy
has zero, and Old Teddy does not exist. If Teddy is saved, then Old Robert
has 110 units of expected welfare; Young Teddy has 90, and Old Teddy has
510. In other words, the expected welfare of the four persons is exactly as in
the case of Harmful Creation.
What do these calculations mean for prudential rationality? The standard
account says that the prudential value of each outcome for Teddy at birth
should equal the expected lifetime welfare of Young Teddy. In other words,
outcome A in which the doctor saves Teddy has value 90, and outcome B
has value 0. Death would deprive Young Teddy of 90 units of welfare, in
expectation. Similarly, death would deprive Old Robert of 400 units of
welfare in expectation, and this represents the strength of interest that Robert
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at 20 has in B over A. So we have successfully reconstructed the values given
by the TRI account in section 2.
So much for prudential value; what about ethics? One might guess from
the calculations so far that we can just decide Emergency Room by looking
at what our standard ethical theory says about Harmful Creation. But that is
not quite automatic. The lifetime welfare values given in Harmful Creation
coincide with the expected lifetime welfare values in Emergency Room. Some
ethical theories can reach a verdict based on expected lifetime welfare, but
others cannot.
As an example of the first kind, suppose that our axiology is the most
common version of total utilitarianism.36 The value of an outcome with no
uncertainty is the total lifetime welfare contained therein; the value of an
uncertain outcome is the expected total welfare, in line with expected utility
theory. However, expected total welfare coincides with total expected welfare.
(At least, this is true if there is no uncertainty about who exists, or if we may
attribute zero welfare to non-existence, as total utilitarians are often happy
to do.) On this view, therefore, the verdict in Emergency Room will be
parallel to the verdict in Harmful Creation. Namely, we should save Teddy,
since that results in 800 rather than 600 units of total expected welfare. This
re-emphasises a point made in section 2: the lifetime utilitarian verdict in
Emergency Room is formally compatible with the TRI account of prudential
36As an example of the second kind, consider the version of average utilitarianism that
values an uncertain outcome by the expected average lifetime welfare. In general, expected
average lifetime welfare cannot be deduced from the facts about expected lifetime welfare.
As it happens, this form of average utilitarianism will still give parallel verdicts in Emergency
Room and Harmful Creation. Giving an example that distinguishes them would take me
too far afield.
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value.
To get the more orthodox verdict, we can adopt complex necessitarianism.
Now, I did not explain what complex necessitarianism says in cases of uncer-
tainty. The simplest thing is to appeal to expected value. Let me say a little
more, since the details are a bit finicky. Suppose we are choosing between
two options A and B , each of uncertain outcome. Model this uncertainty
in the following way. There is a set S of states of nature. Each s ∈ S bears a
probability Pr(s ), and each option, like B , assigns to each s a distribution
B (s ) of lifetime welfare levels over persons. We can then define the value of




Pr(s )V{A(s ),B (s )}B (s )
where V{A(s ),B (s )}B (s ) is calculated in the earlier, risk-free way. (Of course, we
can replace the sum by an integral, as appropriate.)37
In my toy model of Emergency Room, each state of nature s corresponds
to a length of time after the third birthday at which the transition from one
person to another might occur. Effectively, 0 ≤ s ≤ 12. For any given value
of s , we have the following analogue of Harmful Creation:
37The general question of how to combine the principle of neutrality with uncertainty is
a vexed one, which I cannot hope to settle here. And though I think that, for the particular
kind of uncertainty I am presently concerned with, the standard expected value calculation
may be right, there is another way of handling uncertainty which seems preferable for more
ordinary cases of empirical uncertainty. Let me explain this briefly. I originally gave a
formula for V{A,B}(B ) in terms of the statistics Tnec(B ), Ncon(B ), and Tcon(B ). In cases of
uncertainty, we could use the same formula, but interpret Tnec(B ) to be the expected total
welfare of necessary people, Tcon(B ) to be the expected total welfare of contingent people,
and Ncon(B ) to be the expected number of contingent people. The main reason for preferring
this method is that it gives a better account of the asymmetry (recall my worry about the
permissibility of procreation).
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Outcome
A(s ) B (s )
Young Robert 30+ 10s 30+ 10s
Old Robert 50+ 10(12− s ) 450+ 10(12− s )
Young Teddy 30+ 10s 0
Old Teddy 450+ 10(12− s )
We then have V{A(s ),B (s )}(A(s )) = 230+ 10s and V{A(s ),B (s )}(B (s )) = 600 (in
either case, the total welfare of the necessary people). Averaging over values
of s , we find V{A,B}(A) = 290 and V{A,B}(B ) = 600, so only B is permissible.
We can run a similar analysis in other problem cases, to recover the verdicts
recommended in section 3.
Supervenience and Fission
However, the indeterminacy-based account faces serious difficulties. The
picture underlying the TRI account is that certain normative facts should be
understood in terms of patterns of welfare and psychological connectedness.
But the picture of uncertain or indeterminate person-boundaries invokes facts
about personal identity, and these facts do not appear to supervene properly
on facts about psychology. If we must appeal to irreducible facts about
personal identity, then at best we are considering a rival to the TRI account,
and a mysterious one at that. Here is one version of the supervenience claim
that fails.
(S) If S is psychologically connected to T to the same degree that S ′ is
psychologically connected to T ′, then S is the same person as T if
and only if S ′ is the same person as T ′.
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The failure of (S) can already be seen in the case of Methuselah. He changes
gradually over time, but the degree to which Methuselah-100 is psycho-
logically connected to Methuselah-101 is the same as the degree to which
Methuselah-101 is connected to Methuselah-102, and so on. At least, it
seems we can stipulate this. According to (S), either Methuselah-100 is the
same person as Methuselah-900, or, for every n, Methuselah-n is a different
person from Methuselah-(n + 1). We must deny both of these alternatives.
A natural response to such examples is to observe that (S) is stronger than
we need in order to capture the idea that the normative facts depend on the
psychological facts and not on additional facts about personal identity over
time. For one thing, (S) requires that personal identity facts depend only on
facts about degrees of psychological connectedness. But there are finer-grained
ways to individuate psychological relations between person-stages. To give a
crude example, it could be that S and T are connected by virtue of sharing
certain memories, while S ′ and T ′ are connected by virtue of sharing certain
intentions. Then even if the degrees of psychological connection are the
same, the psychological facts vary in a way that could reasonably underpin
variations in the facts about personal identity.
A more interesting way in which (S) may be unreasonably strong is that,
according to the current picture, ethical judgments are guided not by the
facts about personal identity per se, but rather by the distribution of objective
probabilities over different ways the personal identity facts might be resolved.
For normative facts to supervene on psychological facts, all we need is that
this distribution is determined by the fine-grained psychological facts. The
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resulting picture of personal identity might be interpreted in terms of the
theory of metaphysical vagueness developed by Wasserman (2015). On his
view, indeterminacy is analogous to indeterminism. He urges that grounding
relations can be probabilistic in the same way as causal relations. In our
case, the facts about personal identity will be probabilistically grounded in
the psychological facts. On Wasserman’s view, this is what constitutes their
indeterminacy.
I find the picture just described interesting and in many ways attractive.
But it requires a great deal of further development. We need a more specific
theory of how the probability distribution is determined by the psychological
facts. There may be many probability distributions satisfying what I called
‘the probability hypothesis’. Which one is the one upon which the normative
facts depend? At the same time, the probability hypothesis puts non-trivial
conditions on the pattern of psychological connectedness, and it is not clear
that these conditions must be met.
That second sort of difficulty becomes acute in fission cases. (Unsurpris-
ingly so: it was this sort of case that drove Parfit (1986, ch. 12) to focus on
psychological connectedness instead of personal identity.) Suppose Albert’s
brain is surgically divided and the two halves are transplanted into separate
bodies, forming new person-stages Lefty and Righty. It is apparently possible
for pre-fission Albert to be strongly psychologically connected to both Lefty
and Righty – perhaps even fully psychologically connected to each of them.
On the probability hypothesis, there is in such a case a high probability that
Albert and Lefty are the same person, and a high probability that Albert and
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Righty are the same person. If these two probabilities are each greater than
1/2, then there must be some probability that Lefty and Righty are the same
person. But most people think that Lefty has no prudential stake in Righty’s
welfare, and vice versa. They are certainly not the same person.
I find it hard to know what to make of these fission cases.38 Even if
Albert were fully psychologically connected to Lefty and Righty, it is not
clear that he would have a full stake in the welfare of each. Many people
intuit that he would have only half a stake. So perhaps the lesson is just that
there are outré exceptions to the probability hypothesis, and to the claim that
I called ‘Psychological Reduction’ in section 2. At the same time, I am not
even sure that Lefty has no stake in Righty’s welfare. The situation is such a
peculiar one that it is hard to know whether and how the notion of prudential
interest applies. It is true that Lefty is not in the position of anticipating or
remembering what happens to Righty, in a first-person sense, but they are
still related to each other in another and extraordinary way. Alternatively,
perhaps Lefty and Righty are the same person, but personal identity is not a
sufficient condition for prudential interest. This is a difficult area to sort out,
but the obstacles are not yet insurmountable, as far as I can see.
Where does this leave us? The framework of uncertain person-boundaries
gives some hope that the different-person heuristic can be maintained with
respect to a wide variety of normative theories. It gives at least a toy model
38See Ross (2014) for difficulties raised by fission cases for a wide range of theories.
Williams (2014b, §3) combines a version of the probability hypothesis with a ‘subvaluational’
theory of indeterminacy to yield some intuitive results in fission cases. However, the non-
classical logic associatied with subvaluation does not work well with standard ethical theories.
(Williams only considers the prudential case.) Indeed, Williams is trying to interpret Lewis’s
theory of overlapping persons, and faces the same kind of over-counting problems I will
describe below.
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for dealing with degrees of psychological connectedness, and this may be
helpful in thinking about examples like Emergency Room. But to turn it
into a genuine theory, or even to analyse examples systematically, we need
a more complete story about how the person boundaries emerge, however
indeterminately, from psychological connections.
Partial Persons
Now I turn, much more briefly, to two other ways in which one might try to
ground the different-person heuristic casting other entities in the person-role.
The first depends on the following psychological fairytale. Think of a
person, or a person at a time, as being composed of psychological constituents
that persist from one time to another. McMahan considers a picture like this
in relation to the beginning and end of life:
It is quite natural to think of the person as going out of existence
gradually as the mind is increasingly eroded, with its constituent
psychological states and capacities disappearing as the tissues of
the brain atrophy and die. (McMahan, 2002, p. 279)
During this phase of erosion, the person only ‘partially exists’. If persons
can be understood in this way, then perhaps we can conceptualise personal
identity as a matter of psychological overlap. That is, two person-stages
are personally identical to the extent that they have the same psychological
constituents.39 This relation will come in degrees, because the psychological
39What does it take for psychological constituents (e.g. states or capacities) of different
person-stages to be ‘the same’? Should we think of them as types or tokens? I don’t know.
But if we intuitively grasp what McMahan means when he talks about such constituents
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constitutions of two person-stages can overlap to a greater or lesser extent. A
mind, on this picture, is like the ship of Theseus. First it is built up plank
by plank, and during this phase, there is only part of a ship. Then as time
passes, planks slowly get replaced. In one sense, the same ship persists from
one time to another. But in another sense – for my purposes the relevant
one – the ship that is present at one time is only partially present at another,
and after enough time, the ship that there is will be entirely distinct from
the original. In the end it is left to rot on the beach.
Can this picture of shared psychological constituents be parlayed into
a version of the TRI account? At the level of prudential value, the picture
might look like this. A person-stage S will share some portion of T ’s psy-
chological constituents; on that basis, it may have some proportionate stake
in T ’s welfare. This stake could depend not only on the amount of psycho-
logical overlap, but also on what kinds of constituents are shared, and on the
relationship between those constituents and T ’s sources of welfare. In the
limiting case when S and T do not overlap at all, then S will have no stake
in T ’s welfare.
What about ethics? My suggestion is that the psychological constituents
could play something like the ‘person’ role in population ethics – or, a little
more precisely, the role of partial persons. Roughly speaking, a psychological
constituent c counts as a fraction of a person in proportion to the prominence
it would have in an ordinary adult’s psychological constitution. If the above
account of prudential value works out, then we can effectively assign to c a
‘lifetime welfare’: for each person-stage T with constituent c , we can assign
‘disappearing’, we must also have some grasp on what it means for them to persist.
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to c a portion of T ’s wellbeing.
In contrast to the preceding picture of indeterminate or uncertain per-
sonal identity, the current picture suggests a fairly concrete view about how
personal identity is grounded in psychological facts. The main problem
is its obviously speculative nature. I do not know whether this picture of
psychology is really tenable. A narrower problem is again how it might work
in fission cases. Albert divides into Lefty and Righty; what should we say
about how their psychological constitutions overlap? One view is that all of
Lefty’s psychological constituents are shared with pre-fission Albert, as are all
of Righty’s. But if we want to deny that Lefty and Righty psychologically
overlap, it must turn out that pre-fission Albert had a rich enough psychology
to account for two persons all along.40 The resulting picture – in fission
cases only – bears a close resemblance to David Lewis’s picture of overlapping
persons, to which I now turn.
Overlapping Persons
Lewis (1976) presented a theory on which personal identity tracks psycho-
logical connectedness. That may seem promising for our current purposes.
On his theory, persons can overlap as four-dimensional entities, sharing
person-stages. Because of this, there is no sense in general in asking whether
person-stages S and T belong to the same person. Rather, the question is
40The analogy with the ship of Theseus may help: how can we take the planks from one
ship and build two new ones? Only if the new ships are smaller than the original. What is
puzzling in our case is that Lefty and Righty are not intuitively ‘smaller’ than pre-fission
Albert. Note this is different from the fission-like scenario most commonly considered in
the literature on the ship of Theseus, in which new planks are brought in (Hobbes, 1655,
§11).
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whether there is a person to whom S and T both belong. On his view, it is re-
ally this relation of co-belonging (Lewis called it ‘the I -relation’) which tracks
psychological connectedness. More precisely, if S and T are pyschologically
connected to an intermediate degree, then it is indeterminate whether S and
T co-belong, but the degree to which it is determinate that they co-belong
equals the degree of psychological connectedness.
Is there a way to use Lewis’s overlapping persons to make sense of the
different-person heuristic, and thus to develop the TRI account? I do not
think there is a straightforward way to do so.
Let me start with prudential value. Again, we have the standard person-
based theory of prudential value, the lifetime-comparative account. It says
that the prudential value of an outcome B to a person-stage S equals the
lifetime welfare in B of the person to whom S belongs. This formulation does
not sit well with Lewis’s picture. One reason is that there is, in general, no
single person to whom S belongs. Perhaps we could get around this by some
sort of averaging. There is a subtler underlying problem. Consider a case in
which, in outcome A, Methuselah lives a full life to 969, while in outcome
B , he dies at 500. Let me recall Lewis’s characterisation of when a collection
of person-stages composes a person. We can say that two person-stages are
strongly connected if they are psychologically connected to a sufficient degree,
surpassing some particular but indeterminate threshold. According to Lewis,
a collection of person-stages composes a person if and only if all the person-
stages are strongly connected to each other, and the collection is maximal
with respect to this property. The problem is that there is then no person in
A whose life is cut short in B .
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Why not? Suppose, for illustration that the threshold for strong connect-
edness is such that, at any given time, Methuselah is strongly connected to
person-stages up to 100 years into the past and 100 years into the future.
So, for example, one person who exists in both outcomes A and B is the
composition of Methuselah-100 through Methuselah-200. What about the
composition of Methuselah-450 through Methuselah-550? This is a person
in outcome A, and superficially his life is cut short in outcome B . But in
fact he simply does not exist in outcome B . In B there is the composition
of Methuselah-450 through Methuselah-500, but this collection of person-
stages does not compose a person. It is not maximal with respect to the
condition of strong connectedness. So it turns out that the composition of
Methuselah-450 through Methuselah-550 is a contingent person.
Because of this, it does not seem to be in any person’s interest that
Methuselah lives on, unless we admit, against the grain of the principle of
neutrality, that contingent people have an interest in coming to exist.
Similar problems arise when we turn to ethics. Again, Lewis’s theory
looks like it might help us. It delivers a set of persons in each outcome, so, to
evaluate that outcome, we could try to aggregate the lifetime welfare of those
persons. But it seems wrong to do this in any ordinary way, precisely because
the persons overlap. The welfare of a person-stage will be over-counted if it
belongs to many different persons, compared to others. For example, the first
year of Methuselah’s life belongs to only one person, whereas his hundredth
year belongs to many. It is implausible that what happens in his hundredth
year is enormously more important than what happens in his first year. A
second problem is a version of the one I mentioned for prudential value. The
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outcome B in which Methuselah dies at 500 does not harm any Lewisian
person who exists in A. So, given the principle of neutrality, there is no
reason to prefer A over B .
Perhaps there is a way to finesse these problems. (The picture I present in
the next section could be interpreted in this way.) But at any rate we cannot
just plug Lewisian persons into a standard normative theory.
7 Prudential Counterparts
The main view I considered in the previous section claimed that personal
identity between person-stages is often indeterminate, and that the degree of
determinacy matches the degree of psychological connectedness. The basic
problem was spelling out how the facts about personal identity could be
determined, probabilistically or not, by the psychological facts. The picture I
consider here is a variation on that one, but it appears more promising. I give
a counterpart-theoretic treatment of personal identity over time. The key
point is that I can adapt some of Lewis’s ideas to explain how the counterpart
relation supervenes on psychological connections. This gives a huge advantage
over the earlier view.
The bad news is that the counterpart relation is not an equivalence rela-
tion. As a result, it does not partition person-stages into persons. So there is
no general recipe that combines the counterpart relation with a wide variety
of ethical views. We cannot simply claim to have identified the normatively
relevant ‘persons’. Still, in many cases there are some plausible ways to
proceed. I will illustrate this with a few examples, including complex neces-
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sitarianism. We thereby get a fairly concrete ethical theory that reproduces
the orthodox verdicts of the TRI account.
Prudential Value
Let me start with prudential value. Throughout this section I am going
to assume that all welfare is a matter of the welfare of person-stages, so
that, on the ordinary way of thinking, lifetime welfare is the total welfare
of the relevant person-stages. (The need for this assumption is a significant
disadvantage of the present approach, in comparison to the approaches
in the previous section. But since the TRI account seems to rely on this
assumption – see footnote 5 – it may be admissible here.) The standard
theory of prudential value therefore says that the value of an outcome B for
a person-stage S is the total welfare of the person-stages in B who stand in
the relation of personal identity to S .
I claim that we can formulate the TRI account of prudential value in
essentially the same way, replacing the relation of personal identity with
what I will call the prudential counterpart relation. Like personal identity,
and unlike psychological connectedness, this will be an on/off relation, not
one that comes in degrees. Namely, T is a prudential counterpart of S in B
just in case T is strongly connected to S in B . Recall from my discussion
of Lewis that this means that the degree to which they are psychologically
connected exceeds some particular but indeterminate threshold. In fact, in
the terminology I used there, the prudential counterpart relation, strong
connectedness, co-belonging, and Lewis’s I -relation are all coextensive. The
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different names suggest different applications, and ‘the prudential counterpart
relation’ suggests that it underpins prudential interest.
Now, at a first pass, the proposal is that the prudential value of B for S is
the total welfare of the person-stages in B who are prudential counterparts of
S . However, we have to remember that the prudential counterpart relation is
indeterminate, because it depends on the threshold for strong connectedness.
As in section 6, I suggest that the appropriate response to this kind of inde-
terminacy is to average over precisifications of the prudential counterpart
relation. We could take this averaging as primitive, or, as I prefer, interpret it
in terms of objective probability. Indeterminacy rationally demands uncer-
tainty about the value of the threshold for strong connectedness, and thus
uncertainty about the extension of the prudential counterpart relation. We
will recover the TRI account of prudential value as long as the following
condition holds: the objective probability that T is a prudential counterpart
of S equals the degree of psychological connectedness between them.
Can we ensure that this condition holds? In Lewis’s discussion of the
I -relation, he effectively shows us how. Lewis assumes that we can measure
degrees of psychological connectedness using numbers between 0 and 1. So
a precisification of the threshold for strong connectedness is just given by
a number in this interval. Lewis shows that, with respect to the uniform
probability measure on the interval, the proportion of precisifications on
which T is I -related to S equals the degree to which T is psychologically
connected to S . The upshot: the TRI account follows from the hypothesis of
uniform objective uncertainty about the location of the threshold for strong
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connectedness.41
To summarize the picture so far, let me say that the proportion of precisi-
fications on which T is a prudential counterpart of S is the degree to which
they are prudential counterparts. (More strictly, though, it is the degree
to which it is determinate that they are prudential counterparts.) The TRI
account says that, to calculate the value of B for S , add up the welfare of every
person-stage in B , weighting the welfare of each one by the degree to which
it is a prudential counterpart of S . The key difference from the earlier picture
of indeterminate personal identity is that the prudential counterpart relation
need not be transitive, so it need not divide up what person-stages there
are into disjoint groups.42 As I have said, Lewis interprets the prudential
counterpart relation as a relation of co-belonging, which leads to overlapping
persons for this very reason. But what I am suggesting does not rely on the
idea that prudential value involves harms and benefits to persons. The theory
of overlapping persons does not do any work here, and may be a distraction.
Ethical Theories
What if we go beyond prudential value? We can try the same basic strategy.
Given a standard theory of population ethics, we can try to reformulate it in
terms of person-stages and the personal identity relation, rather than in terms
41For Lewis’s argument, see Lewis (1976, p. 70) and Williams (2014b, Appendix A).
The use of the uniform measure may seem unjustified. But it is natural if we we think that
the numerical representation of degrees of psychological connectedness is defined by its link
to credences about the prudential counterpart relation; cf. footnotes 7 and 34.
42Here is an example of the intransitivity. Assuming that the threshold for strong
connectedness is not very high, Methuselah at age n + 1 is a prudential counterpart of
Methuselah at age n, for any n between 100 and 900; but Methuselah at age 900 is not a
prudential counterpart of Methuselah at age 100.
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of persons per se. And then we can substitute the prudential counterpart
relation for the personal identity relation. I will now illustrate this with a
few examples, working my way up to complex necessitarianism.
Utilitarianism
As usual, there is no difficulty with total utilitarianism, on the standing
assumption that lifetime welfare is the total welfare of person-stages. The
value of an outcome is just the total welfare in that outcome. Personal
identity plays no role in the theory, so the substitution is trivial. Average
utilitarianism is a harder case. Let us take the most obvious way to apply
average utilitarianism in cases of uncertainty: the value of an option is
its expected average utility. (This matters insofar as we are going to treat
indeterminacy in the prudential counterpart relation as giving rise to objective
uncertainty.) The average utility is the total utility divided by the number of
persons. Interpreting the total utility is no problem, but what of the number
of persons? On the views I considered in the previous section, we had a set of
persons (or else parts of persons), and therefore a number of persons. Here
the explanation cannot be so simple. But there are still some things to try.
Here is one. To count persons in the standard framework, using personal
identity, choose as many person-stages as you can such that no two of them
stand in the relation of personal identity. The number you get is the number of
persons. But now we can do the same thing, using the prudential counterpart
relation. For each outcome, we get a number n, a version of ‘the number of
persons’ based on psychological connectedness. The value of the outcome
is the total welfare in it divided by this number n. That is the answer
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relative to any precisified threshold for strong connectedness. To resolve
the indeterminacy in the threshold, use the expected value: average over
precisificiations.
There are other ways to count persons. Divide up the person-stages into
groups, such that the stages within each group stand pairwise in the personal
identity relation. What is the least number of groups we need? That is the
number of persons. Or: count how many person-stages there are, weighting
each one, S , in inverse proportion to the length of the life to which S belongs.
How long is that life? It’s the total temporal extension of the person-stages
that stand in the relation of personal identity to S . Each of these options
suggests a subtly different adaptation of average utilitarianism.
Which way of ‘counting persons’ is the right way? It depends. Why
did you want to average over persons in the first place? Answer that, and
you may see what to do. There is no substitute, in the end, for building the
theory from the ground up. For now I am content to say that there are some
basically plausible ways to modify average utilitarianism, as well as other
theories, in light of the different-person heuristic.
Prioritarianism
The upshot of prioritarianism is often explained in the following terms: the
value of an outcome is given by weighted total lifetime welfare. What is the
weight given to the welfare of a each person? That is itself a function g of
the person’s lifetime welfare. If the lifetime welfare is low, the person gets
relatively high weight; if the lifetime welfare is high, the person gets relatively
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low weight.43 The story so far assumes there is no uncertainty. When the
outcome is uncertain, the most standard move is to use its expected value.
It is easy to reformulate prioritarianism in terms of person-stages and
personal identity. The value of an outcome A is the weighted total welfare
of the person-stages in it. The weight of a person-stage S is a decreasing
function g of the prudential value of A for S . That is, we apply g to the
total welfare of the of the person-stages that stand in the relation of personal
identity to S .
Now we can formulate the analogous view using the prudential counter-
part relation instead of personal identity. Explicitly, the value of A relative
to a precisification is the weighted total welfare of the person-stages in it,
with the weight of S a decreasing function g of the total welfare of the
person-stages that are prudential counterparts of S . At the end, we average
over precisifications.44
43Often the value function of prioritarianism is presented as first transforming each
lifetime welfare by an increasing, concave function f , and then adding up the values. In
other words, the contribution of a person with welfare w is f (w ). But we can usually write
f (w ) = g (w )w , where g is the weight function I mention in the text. (Here I am setting
the zero of the welfare scale so that f (0) = 0. In other words, I am assuming there is no
‘critical level’.)
44The result appears to be a version of the ‘Prudential Prioritarianism’ defended by
Holtug (2010, §10.6) – although I have trouble understanding the details of his view. In
any case, note that there is an obvious alternative. We could just declare that the weight
given to a person-stage S is a decreasing function of the prudential value of A for S as given
by the TRI account. This alternative view corresponds to a different (‘ex ante’) extension of
prioritarianism to situations of uncertainty, in which one applies the prioritarian aggregation
rule to expected lifetime welfare. I hope to examine these variations in more detail in other
work.
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Simple Necessitarianism
According to simple necessitarianism, the value of an outcome B in a choice
between A and B is the total welfare in B of the necessary people. To put it
another way, it is the total welfare of the person-stages in B who stand in the
relation of personal identity to person-stages in A. On the new, modified
version of simple necessitarianism, the value of B is the total welfare of the
person-stages in B who are prudential counterparts of person-stages in A.
That’s the answer relative to any precisification of the threshold for strong
connectedness. To get an answer overall, we can again appeal to expected
value.
Complex Necessitarianism
It is not much harder to get a version of complex necessitarianism. As with
average utilitarianism, the real problem is that there are several ways one
could proceed, and it is not clear which of them is most reasonable. But for
my current purposes it does not matter much, either. Here is one possibility.
Remember that, in complex necessitarianism, the value of B relative to
A was expressed in terms of the three statistics Tnec(B ), Tcon(B ), Ncon(B ).
(On page 221 I discussed how to extend this to cases of uncertainty.) So,
first we can redescribe these statistics in terms of person-stages and personal
identity. As in the preceding discussion of simple necessitarianism, we can
redescribe Tnec(B ) as the total welfare of the person-stages in B who are
personally identical to stages in A. Similarly, Tcon(B ) is the total welfare of
the person-stages in B who are not personally identical to stages in A. Finally,
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we can redescribe the number Ncon(B ) of contingent people in any one of
several ways, just as in the case of average utilitarianism. For example, we
can identify it as the largest number of person-stages in B , no one of which
is personally identical to a stage in A and no two of which are personally
identical to each other.
Finally, we can modify complex necessitarianism in light of the different-
person heuristic. Use the same formula to define the value function V{A,B},
but define Tnec, Tcon, and Ncon in terms of the prudential counterpart relation
instead of personal identity.
It may be objected that the theory I have just sketched is extremely ad hoc,
and that is true. One big source of adhockery is complex necessitarianism
itself. I have not properly justified the way it handles the non-identity
problem and (especially) the asymmetry. Another source of adhockery is the
way I defined a proxy for ‘the number of contingent people’. The best way to
think through that latter issue is presumably to revisit the original counterpart-
theoretic explanation of complex necessitarianism, on page 210.45 But
getting the best possible version of the view is not my ambition here. For
now, the conclusion is just that there is no fundamental barrier to making
sense of the orthodox verdicts of the TRI account, modulo the admittedly
formidable problems of population ethics. For these purposes, we can treat
the modified version of complex necessitarianism as a useful model. It is
internally consistent, it gets the main heuristics right, it is not too complicated,
45The idea would be to balance the welfare of the person-stages in A against the welfare of
those in B , by averaging over counterpart relations between person-stages. These counterpart
relations should satisfy certain constaints. As an initial proposal, they should (i) extend the
relation of transworld identity; (ii) respect the prudential counterpart relation; (iii) pair as
many person-stages as possible subject to (i) and (ii).
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and perhaps it is not too far from the truth. It can serve as a guiding light in
the quite general project of building a credible moral theory from the ground
up.
8 An Alternative to the Orthodox Account
I’ve argued that complex necessitarianism can give a reasonable version of
the principle of neutrality, with intuition-friendly consequences for the non-
identity problem and the asymmetry. Moreover, it can formally be adapted
in light of the different-person heuristic to give a coherent normative theory
encapsulating the orthodox judgments of the TRI account.
But are those judgments right? The confusion that arose from the
problem-cases in section 3 suggests that those initial verdicts were under-
theorised. For example, in Emergency Room, Choice of Deaths, and Suffer-
ing Now, the suggested ethical verdicts were inspired by considerations of
the present time-relative interests of the patients involved. But we also know
that present interests are not the only ones that matter; why should they be
decisive in these cases?
One of the advantages of the population-ethics-first strategy developed
in this paper is that it invites us to balance these initial verdicts against
considerations, both intuitive and theoretical, arising from population ethics
itself. We see this in the case of the non-identity problem and, perhaps more
especially, in the case of the asymmetry. The need to provide a theoretical
justification for the asymmetry is so pressing that a plausible solution may
lead us to revise some of our initial verdicts, especially in examples which,
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on a second look, do not appear so clear.46
I claim that Emergency Room may be such an example.
In this section I present a theory of population ethics that is both formally
simpler than complex necessitarianism and offers a conceptually more natural
treatment of the asymmetry. It also resonates with the actualist strain in
McMahan’s discussion of the TRI account, without the fatal modal variance
that actualism entails. The theory, which I call regret minimization, uses
the same ingredients as complex necessitarianism, and so can be adapted
to the different-person heuristic in essentially the same way. In short, it
speaks to many of the core preoccupations of the TRI account, and deserves
serious consideration from those who share in them. The reason I started
with complex necessitarianism rather than regret minimization is that the
latter gives an unorthodox answer in Emergency Room, and in a few other
cases. It says that it is permissible to save either the newborn or the adult.
Let me begin by explaining the view, and its approach to the asymmetry.
Then I will go on to argue that its departures from orthodoxy should be
welcomed by proponents of the TRI account. Whether or not regret mini-
mization is on the right track, the reader should bear in mind the main point
I am using it to illustrate: by situating the TRI account in the context of
population ethics, we can draw on a wider range of theoretical and intuitive
considerations in developing and evaluating the view.
46To say that justifying the asymmetry is a pressing need is not to say that the asymmetry
is untouchable. Rather, given the indisputable prevalence of asymmetric intuitions, we
should ask how they can best be justified, and evaluate them in that context.
IV-8 AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ORTHODOXY 242
Regret Minimization and the Asymmetry
I know of essentially two distinct ways of arriving at the asymmetry. One is
to start, as I did in discussing necessitarianism, from the idea that bringing
someone into existence neither harms nor benefits them. At this stage we
have no reason to create good lives – this is half of the asymmetry – but we
also have no reason not to create bad ones. The reason not to create bad
lives must be reached in a different way, either by positing an additional
impersonal disvalue to suffering, or by identifying some sort of deontic
constraint. The asymmetry arises because this additional ingredient operates
in terms of bad lives but not in terms of good ones.
The alternative, which I prefer, is to say that someone who has a good
life benefits from it, and someone who has a bad life suffers from it – but
if the relevant person does not exist, then there is no one who benefits or
suffers. If a person X has a good life in A and not in B , and that is the only
difference between these options, then in B there is no one who has a claim
on the wellbeing that X has in A. In that sense, failing to create a person
with a good life should carry with it no regret. Creating a person with a good
life carries no regret, either. Quite the opposite: doing so creates a person
who benefits from being alive. The act of creating a good life will only be
regrettable if the harms to others are greater than the benefit that accrues to
the new person. The one regrettable scenario, in a simple choice between
creating and not creating, is the scenario in which one creates a person with
a bad life. For then there actually is someone who suffers from the choice.
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According to regret minimization, that is the one scenario to be avoided.47
Note how this account automatically produces a moderate asymmetry,
in the sense that it can be permissible to create many lives even if some of
them are bad ones. For such an act creates some people who benefit from
existence, and others who suffer from it; there is only cause to regret the
situation overall if the suffering outweighs the benefits. By the same token,
creating good lives can be permissible even if it harms pre-existing people,
as in Harmful Creation. To see if such an act is regrettable overall, we must
balance those harms against the benefits conferred on the people who come
to exist. I will say more about this below, when I consider in detail how
regret minimization revises the orthodox verdicts of the TRI account.
To arrive at the proper formulation of regret minimization, we must try
to understand the preceding comments in a way that overcomes the non-
identity problem. In the case of Adam and Steve, we must recognise a sense
in which creating Eve would be regrettable. There is a narrow sense in which
it would not be regrettable, since Eve’s life is not a bad one, and the alternative
for her is non-existence. But, in a broader sense, we should recognize Steve
in A as the counterpart of Eve in C . Creating Eve is regrettable because
the extra person, de dicto, could have been better off. How to make sense
of this in more complicated situations – in particular, when the relevant
47This basic way of justifying the asymmetry was suggested to me by Daniel Cohen.
Note that the asymmetry enters in through the focus on regret-minimization as opposed
to contentment-maximization (supposing that ‘contentment’ is the opposite of ‘regret’).
Other proposals in the same family are found in Roberts (2011a,b), and in the so-called
‘harm-minimization’ views going back to McDermott (1982); see also Meacham (2012);
Ross (2015) for recent developments. In those views, the asymmetry arises through the focus
on harm-minimization rather than benefit-maximization. In developing regret minimization
I have reinterpreted a view that Cohen develops in unpublished work, and modified it to
overcome the non-identity problem.
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options contain different numbers of contingent people – is a delicate matter.
The particular form of regret minimization I describe below is motivated by
averaging over counterpart relations, in the way I explained in my discussion
of complex necessitarianism. At any rate, in this respect regret minimization
is certainly no worse off than complex necessitarianism and other similar
theories.
To conclude this preliminary discussion, let me contrast regret minimiza-
tion with ‘actualist’ views. On the simplest version of actualism, each option
is evaluated on the basis of the welfare of the people who actually exist. So in
Harmful Creation, if if outcome B actually occurs, then outcome A is to be
evaluated only on the basis of the welfare of Young Robert, Old Robert, and
Young Teddy; outcome A is worse than outcome B , and therefore impermis-
sible. McMahan often appears to appeal to this sort of thinking, but it leads
to the serious problems I have pointed out before, in sections 3 and 5.
Regret minimization in many ways respects the actualist thought that non-
actual people are morally irrelevant. But it does so in a more plausible way,
avoiding the problem of normative variance. In evaluating how regrettable
each outcome would be, it will consider only the welfare of the people who
would exist, were that outcome actual. This is another reason to consider
regret minimization in this context. It allows one to make sense of the
actualist strain in McMahan’s development of the TRI account.
With all that preliminary, regret minimization is easy to state. The theory
has the following structure. For each pair of options A and B , there is a value
of B for the people in A, denoted VA(B ). Given a set S of available options,
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the regret of A, Reg(A), is the extent to which A falls short of being the best




Finally, an option is permissible if and only if it minimizes regret.48
It remains to define the value VA(B ). The idea here is to choose coun-
terparts in B for as many people in A as possible, in a way that extends
transworld identity. (That is, if X exists in both A and B , then X must be
its own counterpart.) Then VA(B ) is just the total welfare of the people in
B who are counterparts of people in A, averaged over all different ways of
choosing the counterpart relation.
The upshot of this is that, if there are fewer contingent people in B than
in A, VA(B ) is the total welfare in B ; if there are more contingent people in
B than in A, VA(B ) is the total welfare of the necessary people in B , plus
the total welfare that the contingent people in A would have if they had the







Tnec(B ) +Tcon(B ) if Ncon(B ) ≤Ncon(A)
Tnec(B ) +Tcon(B )
Ncon(A)
Ncon(B )
if Ncon(B ) >Ncon(A).
This is the ‘standard’ version of regret minimization, which takes persons as
basic. But it is simple enough to reformulate it in terms of person-stages and
personal identity, exactly as I did for complex necessitarianism. We can then
replace personal identity by the prudential counterpart relation, and finally
48Alternatively, we could use this characterisation of permissibility in two-option cases,
and then extend the rule to multiple options using Schwartz’s method mentioned above. I
do not know which of these routes is more reasonable.
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resolve indeterminacy by averaging over precisifications.49 We thereby obtain
a version of regret minimization founded on psychological connectedness,
and vindicating the different-person heuristic.
Now that we have a precise statement of the view, let me conclude simply
by revisiting the asymmetrical case of Long-Suffering Eve. In that example,
the regret of A is 1 (Adam, the only person in A, could have been better off)
but the regret of B is 9 (Adam is better off than he might have been, but Eve
need not have suffered). This seems to me to capture particularly well the
intuitions behind the asymmetry.50
Embracing Heterodoxy
Regret minimization entails certain amendments to the orthodox verdicts of
the TRI account. I conclude by arguing that these amendments ought to be
embraced.
Consider again a case like Harmful Creation, which is related to Emer-
gency Room through the different-person heuristic. When is it permissible
to harm a person X (or to withhold a benefit) while creating a second person
Y ? Complex necessitarianism says that it is never permissible to do so, for the
harm to X cannot be compensated by any welfare that the new person might
have. In contrast, regret minimization says that it is permissible to do so as
49An alternative, as in fn. 37, is to interpret the statistics Tnec, Tcon, and Ncon as expected
values.
50With regard to the standard problems of population ethics, regret minimisation mod-
erates the problem that complex necessitarianism had with the sadistic conclusion (see
fn. 30): it says that either option (creating the X s and Y s or creating the P s and the Q s) is
permissible. On the other hand, unlike complex necessitarianism, regret minimization also
controversially rules that either option is permissible in a choice like that of the ‘repugnant
conclusion’. I think both of these verdicts are defensible, but I will not defend them here.
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long as the lifetime welfare of the new person is greater than the harm to X .
But (in line with the principle of neutrality) it is never obligatory to create the
new person. We can explain this in McMahan’s terms of ‘offsetting weight’.
Just as McMahan (2015) claims that the creation of good lives can offset the
reason we have to avoid creating bad lives, so too, on regret minimization,
the creation of good lives can offset the reason we have to avoid harming
necessary people, even though we never have a positive reason to create those
lives. I can only say that this seems a matter of consistency: it is hard to see
why good contingent lives would have offsetting weight in one way but not
in another.
But what about the intuition in Emergency Room? In McMahan’s
original version of the case, the choice is between saving a foetus at the cost
of its mother’s life, or saving the mother only. At a first look, McMahan may
seem right to say
Most of us believe that the doctor ought not to save the fetus.
And the basis for this belief is our sense that the death of the
fetus would be less bad – that it would be the less serious of the
two possible misfortunes. (McMahan, 2002, p. 186)
Although I get the intuition mentioned in the first sentence of this passage,
I am much less confident than McMahan is of the explanation offered in
the second. There are all sorts of confounding factors. For example, in
McMahan’s version of the case, it is hard to avoid thinking about the special
relationship between mother and child, both during gestation and afterwards.
There could be many factors contributing to the intuition here, including the
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propensity to relate to the adult as a friend, at whose death we ourselves would
feel more significant grief. As Greaves (MSa) argues, focusing on our sense
of misfortune is suspect; there can be no general principle of minimizing
‘tragedy’, another word McMahan frequently employs. It may be the case
that our sense of tragedy tracks the present time-relative interests of the
patients in cases like these. But, if so, that fact has no great moral authority.
It also seems useful to think through the case retrospectively. Suppose
the foetus is saved. Despite the loss of its mother it grows up to have a rich
and meaningful human life. Once I focus on the details of that outcome,
it becomes repugnant to me to think, ‘It would be better if his mother had
not died and he had never existed’. As unfortunate as her death may have
been, in this retrospective evaluation, the fact of the child’s flourishing does
intuitively offset the misfortune of his mother’s death, even though, as a
foetus, he had no interest in that flourishing. Now, to focus exclusively on this
retrospective evaluation risks falling prey to the modal variance of actualism.
But there may still be something legitimate about it, which is nicely reflected
by my technical notion of regret.
Consider also Suffering Now, and in particular the choice between B
(Tommy’s death) and C (one year of suffering followed by many years of
good life). The orthodox judgment of the TRI account is that B is preferable
to C . McMahan himself admits that this judgment may strike many as
‘implausible’ (p. 72). But from the point of view of the different-person
heuristic, this is yet another case of harmful creation. The present-bound
animal is harmed and this harm is not (on McMahan’s interpretation) offset
by the creation of future happy animal-stages. It is hard to see how to deny
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this counter-intuitive verdict in Suffering Now while accepting the orthodox
verdict in Emergency Room. This should at least cast some doubt of the
significance of the intuitions in these cases. Regret minimization goes for the
middle ground here: it will say that these cases are parallel, and that either
option in them is permissible.51
In short, I am skeptical of the orthodox intuition in Emergency Room,
and of the related judgment in Harmful Creation. But, much like psycholog-
ical connectedness, heterodoxy comes in degrees. Denying the orthodoxy in
these specific cases need not involve a significant deviation from McMahan’s
vision of the TRI account. First of all, it does nothing to undercut the
basic account of prudential value. Nor does it require us to give up on the
different-person heuristic. Finally, it does not require us to give up on the
principle of neutrality, which, I have suggested, is the basis for the broad
ethical outlook associated with the TRI account.
Let me illustrate this with two examples in which McMahan applies
the orthodox TRI account, and in which it might seem that the orthodox
judgment in Harmful Creation plays a crucial role.
The first application is in support of a liberal attitude towards abortion.
To this end, it is important to avoid the result in Emergency Room that
we must save the foetus or newborn, and especially to avoid that result in
similar cases where the potential harm to the adult is more modest. Regret
minimization gets us this far, since it will typically say that either option is
51As this shows, regret minimization is a fairly permissive view. This goes against the
claim in Broome (2004, p. 169) that the neutrality of adding lives should not not be ‘greedy’.
I disagree with him about whether having greediness at all is counterintuitive, but it is a fair
question whether regret minimization ends up being too permissive.
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permissible, as it does in Harmful Creation. It would be significantly stronger
– I think too strong – to conclude on the basis of time-relative interests that
saving the adult is obligatory. (It may be so for other reasons related to the
adult’s moral and legal status.) At any rate the stronger conclusion is not
necessary to justify a liberal attitude.
The second example is more complicated. It concerns McMahan’s project
to explain how the TRI account can justify the intuition that, for low-level
animals, suffering is worse than death. He introduces that intuition in terms
of a
version of humane omnivorism [which] implies that while it
would be permissible to deprive an animal of many years of life
as a means of providing each of twenty people a certain amount
of pleasure, it would not be permissible to cause that animal
more than a small amount of suffering as a means of providing
the same pleasure to the same people.
According to this version of humane omnivorism, therefore, it
is worse to cause an animal to experience a small amount of
suffering than it is to kill the animal, even when killing it would
deprive it of many years of life without significant suffering, so
that the good life it would lose would be good for it by much
more than the suffering would be bad for it. (McMahan, 2015,
pp. 65–66).
The switch here from permissibility in the first paragraph to axiology in the
second is confusing. But later in the article, McMahan effectively takes the
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conclusion expressed in the second paragraph to mean that the animal should
be killed in Suffering Now. Since he takes the TRI account to deliver that
verdict in Suffering Now, he concludes that the TRI account supports the
intuition that ‘suffering is worse’. On the face of it, it seems that overturning
the orthodox judgment in Suffering Now would throw a spanner in the
works.
However, understood as an argument for a specific verdict in Suffering
Now, the argument from humane omnivorism is invalid. There are really two
problems with it. First, the argument has the following form: between A and
B , A is permissible; between B and C , B is obligatory; therefore, between A
and C , A is obligatory. But there are many plausible counterexamples to this
form of argument, with the best-known ones arising in cases where some of
the options are incommensurable, or on a par. Suppose that B is better than
C , but B and C are both incommensurable with A. Then the most common
view is that the pattern of permissibility is exactly the one just described.52
What if we modified the original premisses to claim that, on humane
omnivorism, between killing the animal and failing to benefit the humans,
killing the animal is obligatory (assuming, of course, that these are the only
options)? Then the argument would be as follows: A is preferable to B , and
B is preferable to C , so A is preferable to C . This form of argument is more
widely considered valid, but we have also seen in section 3 that it is not
valid according to the orthodox judgments of the TRI account. Even with
the strengthened premiss, we cannot rely on the provided argument from
52See, for example, Rabinowicz (2012) for a recent systematic development of this view
in terms of permissible preferences.
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humane omnivorism to a specific answer in Suffering Now.
Because of this, overturning the implausible but orthodox verdict in
Suffering Now does not necessarily undermine the TRI account’s support
for humane omnivorism.53 Indeed, consider the following pure population-
ethics case.
The Bobs (Table 11)
In the status quo (outcome B ), Hannibal will have a good life,
and there will be a long series of people called Bob, with lives
that are about half as good as Hannibal’s. We face one of two
choices. In the first choice, we have the option (A) of bestowing
a small benefit on Hannibal while preventing the existence of
all but the first Bob. In the other choice, we has the option (C )
of bestowing the same small benefit while harming the first Bob
to a greater degree. The total welfare that the other Bobs would
have, if they existed, is greater in magnitude that the possible
harm to the first Bob in C .
Hannibal is the analogue of the omnivore who can benefit by either killing
or hurting an animal. The Bobs are analogous to different life stages of the
same animal, whose psychological connections extend only briefly into the
future and past. Thus painlessly killing the animal is analogous to preventing
the existence of some of the Bobs, and harming the animal at a given time
53Here I note that the practical import of the omnivore’s position depends on the details
of the case: killing the animal will frustrate its time-relative interests, even if these are fairly
modest, and this must be weighed against the arguably even smaller benefit to humans of
eating the meat. What we are discussing is the structure of the view, rather than the how
the details would realistically weigh up.
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Outcome
A B C
Hannibal 15 10 15





Table 11: The Bobs
is analogous to harming one of the Bobs. The humane omnivore’s view
corresponds to the verdicts that in the first choice between A and B , A is
at least permissible, while in the second choice between B and C , C is
obligatory. These are indeed the verdicts of regret minimization. So regret
minimization still supports humane omnivorism. Note, by the way, that
the choice between A and B is similar to the one in Harmful Creation. The
orthodox verdict, then, is that between A and B , A is obligatory – which
seems to support omnivorism too strongly!
To sum up, regret minimization broadly respects the ethical views associ-
ated with the TRI account, while offering plausible amendments in key cases,
including the paradigmatic but dubious case of Emergency Room. It has
the advantage of giving a better answer in the case of Suffering Now. Even
if regret minimization is not quite right, there seem to be good reasons for
revising the orthodox judgments of the TRI account in this way, especially if
doing so allows for a theoretically plausible treatment of the asymmetry.
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9 Conclusion
The TRI account is founded on the view that what matters is not personal
identity but psychological connectedness, and this comes in degrees. For
prudential value this has fairly clear implications (at least if we set aside
fission and other outré circumstances). What it means for ethics is less clear.
The orthodox ethical verdicts of the TRI account entail (in the special case
of all-or-nothing psychological connectedness) specific popular but contro-
versial commitments in population ethics. The strategy I have proposed in
this paper is to work backwards from these commitments to reconstruct a
concrete version of the view. I considered several ways of doing this; the
most promising seems to be a theory of prudential counterparts. I illustrated
this with complex necessitarianism, whose verdicts correspond very closely to
the orthodox verdicts of the TRI account. But I have also presented a theory
of population ethics – and thus indirectly a new way of extending the TRI
account into the ethical domain – that does a better job of justifying some
of the key population-ethical commitments, including the asymmetry. If
this amendment is on the right track, it illustrates the utility of starting from
population ethics and working backwards, rather than trying to construct a
theory directly in terms of time-relative interests.
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